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Stephen Puryear

North Carolina State University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    34
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 More details
  • North Carolina State University
    Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
    Professor
University of Pittsburgh
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2006
APA Eastern Division
Email (login required)
Homepage
Raleigh, North Carolina, United States of America
0000-0002-4517-005X
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Ethics
17th/18th Century Philosophy
19th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy
Social and Political Philosophy
  • All publications (34)
  •  859
    Leibniz über Begriffe und ihr Verhältnis zu den Sinnen
    In Dominik Perler & Markus Wild (eds.), Sehen und Begreifen: Wahrnehmungstheorien in der frühen Neuzeit, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 235-264. 2008.
    Despite holding that all concepts are strictly speaking innate, Leibniz attempts to accommodate the common belief that at least some concepts are adventitious by appealing to his theory of ideal action. The essential idea is that an innate concept can be considered adventitious, in a sense, just in case its ideal cause is to be found outside the mind of the one who possesses the concept. I explore this attempt at accommodation and argue that it fails. [See external link for English draft.]
    Leibniz: Philosophy of MindLeibniz: Philosophy of LanguageLeibniz: Epistemology
  •  1316
    Idealism and Scepticism: A Reply to Brueckner
    Theoria 79 (4): 290-293. 2012.
    Anthony Brueckner argues that Berkeleyan idealism lacks anti-sceptical force because of the way Berkeley draws the appearance/reality distinction. But Brueckner's case rests on a misunderstanding of Berkeley's view. Properly understood, Berkeleyan idealism does indeed have anti-sceptical force
    IdealismHistory: SkepticismBerkeley: SkepticismSkepticism, MiscReplies to Skepticism, MiscBerkeley: …Read more
    IdealismHistory: SkepticismBerkeley: SkepticismSkepticism, MiscReplies to Skepticism, MiscBerkeley: Immaterialism
  •  977
    Motion in Leibniz's Middle Years: A Compatibilist Approach
    Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 6 135-170. 2012.
    In the texts of the middle years (roughly, the 1680s and 90s), Leibniz appears to endorse two incompatible approaches to motion, one a realist approach, the other a phenomenalist approach. I argue that once we attend to certain nuances in his account we can see that in fact he has only one, coherent approach to motion during this period. I conclude by considering whether the view of motion I want to impute to Leibniz during his middle years ranks as a kind of realism or rather as some kind of ph…Read more
    In the texts of the middle years (roughly, the 1680s and 90s), Leibniz appears to endorse two incompatible approaches to motion, one a realist approach, the other a phenomenalist approach. I argue that once we attend to certain nuances in his account we can see that in fact he has only one, coherent approach to motion during this period. I conclude by considering whether the view of motion I want to impute to Leibniz during his middle years ranks as a kind of realism or rather as some kind of phenomenalism or idealism.
    Leibniz: Philosophy of ScienceLeibniz: Metaphysics
  •  1544
    Finitism, Divisibilty, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4): 808-813. 2016.
    Some philosophers contend that the past must be finite in duration, because otherwise reaching the present would have involved the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events, which they regard as impossible. I recently developed a new objection to this finitist argument, to which Andrew Ter Ern Loke and Travis Dumsday have replied. Here I respond to the three main points raised in their replies.
    Philosophy of Time, MiscSpace and Time, MiscKalam Cosmological ArgumentMetaphysics, General WorksThe…Read more
    Philosophy of Time, MiscSpace and Time, MiscKalam Cosmological ArgumentMetaphysics, General WorksThe Infinite
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