Carlo Penco

On the basis of historical and textual evidence, this paper claims that after his Tractatus, Wittgenstein was actually influenced by Einstein's theory of relativity and, the similarity of Einstein's relativity theory helps to illuminate some aspects of Wittgenstein's work. These claims find support in remarkable quotations where Wittgenstein speaks approvingly of Einstein's relativity theory and in the way these quotations are embedded in Wittgenstein's texts. The profound connection between Wittgenstein and relativity theory concerns not only Wittgenstein's “verificationist” phase , but also Wittgenstein's later philosophy centred on the theme of rule‐following

Is deduction of use in application to our everyday problems? Aristotle said that in practical matters we cannot use a strictly deductive attitude: "we must be content...in speaking about things which are only for the most part true, with premises of the same kind, to reach conclusions that are no better" (Nic.Eth.I,4 - my underlining). We may content ourselves with conclusions which - according to the usual views - are not true; but what happens when we realize that such conclusions bring us into contradiction with some of our deepest beliefs? We have to pursue our search of rationality in the most compelling manner, and this effort forces us to express our background beliefs in order to check what may be wrong with that. In this paper I will give two classical examples, one form the history of cinema and another from the history of artificial intelligence: in comparing these two examples I claim that logical compulsion - the deep need for convention - is highly valuable where feelings are not enough

In questo lavoro tratto del problema del rapporto tra semantica e pragmatica, e in particolare cerco di dare una visione generale di cosa si dovrebbe intendere per "competenza pragmatica". Assumo una visione olistica del significato, perché mi permette di mostrare come, anche con una posizione radicale di questo genere, possiamo trovare modi per spiegare la comunicazione e salvare la composizionalità. Il modo per spiegare la comunicazione e salvare la composizionalità passa attraverso la dimensione pragmatica, intesa come il modo di filtrare il livello "giusto" di contesto entro cui elaborare la valutazione e l'interpretazione semantica, e giungere all'interpretazione intesa. Nel § 1 presento i problemi di una teoria olistica del significato riguardo a una teoria della comunicazione; nel § 2 presento una possibile risposta dell'olismo ai problemi della comunicazione, ridefinendo la comunicazione come processo di convergenza del significato. Nel § 3 presento quello che può essere definito il punto cieco della teoria olistica di Davidson: l'idea che la strategia di convergenza è un "processo misterioso". Mostro come diverse linee di ricerca lavorano proprio all'individuazione del "mistero" davidsoniano. Nel § 4 presento una delle linee di ricerca rivolte di fatto a riempire il vuoto della teoria di Davidson: la teoria multicontesti in intelligenza artificiale. Nel § 5 delineo la similarità di tale teoria con altri tentativi in pragmatica, mostrando che ragionare su questa similarità può aiutare a ridefinire il concetto di "competenza pragmatica" come filtro per la semantica. Nel § 6 abbozzo una riflessione su come queste riflessioni potrebbero avere una influenza sul tema della composizionalità

In this paper I shall outline a short history of the ideas concerning sense and reference of a concept-word from Frege to model theoretic semantics. I claim that, contrary to what is normally supposed, a procedural view of sense may be compatible with model theoretic semantics, especially in dealing with problems at the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. A first paragraph on the paradox of the concept horse will clarify the attitude concerning the history of ideas that I assume in this paper. In the second paragraph I will discuss some misunderstandings in the shift from the sense/reference distinction in Frege to the intension/extension distinction in model theoretic semantics. In the third I will show how a particular interpretation of the Fregean sense of a concept word may be of interest for model theoretic semantics.

In this paper I give a reconstruction of Dummett’s main arguments concerning the theory of the occult origin of the Tarot, and discuss the reasons behind the success of the Tarot pack – in particular the Major Arcana – in the history of card games. I also provide some indication of the links between Dummett’s interest in the history of card games and aspects of his philosophical background. As I am not an expert on card games, this paper is mainly a personal tribute to a side of Dummett’s work to which philosophers have in general paid little attention.

[This is a larger version of the published article] In the discussion on semantic holism it has been claimed that A.I. is almost entirely holistic. In this paper I show that some of the main lines of research in symbolic artificial intelligence are not holistic; I will consider three classical cases: toy words, frames and contextual reasoning. I claim that these examples from A.I. can be interpreted as implementing molecularist intuitions about language. Eventually I suggest that some assumptions behind the discussion on holism should be re-interpreted, expecially the usual references to Frege and Wittgenstein.

In "Wittgenstein in relation to his times" Von Wright1 poses a dilemma regarding the relationship between three wittgensteinian tenets: (i) the view that individual's beliefs and thoughts are entrenched in accepted language games and socially sanctioned forms of life (ii) the view that "philosophical problems are disquietudes of the mind caused by some malfunctioning in the language games, and hence in the way of life of the community". (iii) the "rejection of the scientific-technological civilisation of industrialised societies". The dilemma is the following: is Wittgenstein's rejection of technological civilisation strictly linked to his general view of philosophy? Or is it "only contingently - that is for historical and psychological reasons, connected with the other two in Wittgenstein's thought"? Von Wright argues, even with some doubts, for a strong link between Wittgenstein's rejection of technological society and his general approach to philosophy; the argument is as follows: "because of the interlocking of language and ways of life, a disorder in the former reflects disorder in the latter. If philosophical problems are symptomatic of language, producing malignant outgrowths which obscure our thinking, then there must be a cancer in the Lebensweise, in the way of life itself" (p.119). The argument seems to be not compelling; among some of the main philosophical problems Wittgenstein is willing to "cure" there are misunderstandings lying in the history of our language much time before our technological civilisation (Wittgenstein refers to Augustine and Plato as suffering these disorder of language). We should generalise the criticism to technological society to the effect of enclosing ancient Greece. In this way the criticism seems to loose all its polemical vein, becoming a generic criticism of the structures of western thought since Greece. But probably this was the point Wittgenstein wanted to make in his criticism of the idea of progress and technological civilisation. I will argue therefore for the second horn of the dilemma, relying on another kind of de facto argument: contemporary technological civilisation is embodying some of Wittgenstein's main ideas (we might also note that these ideas are among the strongest points Wittgenstein gives against Greek classical tradition in philosophy)..

In this paper we give some theoretical links between the wittgensteinian strategy of language-games and the strategy followed by students in Artificial Intelligence in the seventies. We refer also to the interpretation given by Dummett and Prawitz to the Wittgenstein's slogan of "meaning as use", showing the link of this ideas with the needs of Artificial Intelligence. We sustain that the concept of "procedure" as developed in early Artificial Intelligence is still one of the main attempt, realized in that field of research, to give a definition of meaning , which gives good hopes to be a suitable explicatum of the idea of "meaning as use".