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17Mental ExplicitnessAbstracta 3 (1): 2-22. 2006.This paper aims at answering the question “When is informational content explicitly represented in a cognitive system?”. I first distinguish the explicitness this question is about from other kinds of explicitness that are currently investigated in philosophy of mind, and situate the components of the question within the various conceptual frameworks that are used to study mental representations. I then present and criticize, on conceptual and empirical grounds, two basic ways of answering the q…Read more
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33Who's on first? Living situations and lived experienceJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (2): 27. 2011.This paper is a discussion of Claire Petitmengin and Michel Bitbol's article 'The validity of first-person descriptions as authenticity and coherence' . In section I, I present what I take as being the main points they defend in that article, and put them in relation with the global purpose of the special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies in which their article is included. In section II, I start discussing the paper by comparing the conception of description they defend with a const…Read more
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2Relocating mental phenomena: the philosophy of the spirit of DeweyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (245): 273-292. 2008.
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20Embodied Cognitive Science, Pragmatism, and the Fate of Mental RepresentationIn Matthias Jung & Roman Madzia (eds.), Pragmatism and Embodied Cognitive Science: From Bodily Intersubjectivity to Symbolic Articulation, De Gruyter. pp. 73-98. 2016.
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62Survenance, émergence et immersion. Le problème de la conscience d'un point de vue externalisteRevue Philosophique De Louvain 111 (1): 69-108. 2013.
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89Beyond the internalism/externalism debate: The constitution of the space of perceptionConsciousness and Cognition 19 (4): 938-952. 2010.This paper tackles the problem of the nature of the space of perception. Based both on philosophical arguments and on results obtained from original experimental situations, it attempts to show how space is constituted concretely, before any distinction between the “inner” and the “outer” can be made. It thus sheds light on the presuppositions of the well-known debate between internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind; it argues in favor of the latter position, but with arguments that…Read more
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90Boundless thought. The case of conceptual mental episodesManuscrito 35 (2): 269-309. 2012.I present and defend here a thesis named vehicleless externalism for conceptual mental episodes. According to it, the constitutive relations there are between the production of conceptual mental episodes by an individual and the inclusion of this individual in social discursive practices make it non-necessary to equate, even partially, conceptual mental episodes with the occurrence of physical events inside of that individual. Conceptual mental episodes do not have subpersonal vehicles; they hav…Read more
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89The bounds of representation: A non-representationalist use of the resources of the model of extended cognitionPragmatics and Cognition 18 (2): 235-272. 2010.Based on an endorsement of the hypothesis of extended cognition , this paper proposes a criticism of the representationalist assumptions that still pertain to these contemporary models of cognition. I first rehearse some basic problems akin to any representationalist model of cognition, before proposing some more specific arguments directed against the necessity, the plausibility, and the coherence of the marriage between extended cognition and contemporary representationalism . Extended and dis…Read more
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64The nature of the modern mind. Some remarks on Dewey's "Unmodern philosophy and modern philosophy"European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (1). 2013.In Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy, Dewey develops a comprehensive account of mindedness and a genealogical picture of the modern concept of ‘mind.’ Chapter X, “Mind and Body”, is the longest chapter of the book. Its three sections correspond to three different folders, yet all written in 1942. The title of the chapter – Dewey’s own title – might sound surprising to the readers of chapter VII of Experience and Nature, where Dewey explicitly coined the term ‘body-min...
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20Délocaliser les phénomènes mentaux: la philosophie de l'esprit de DeweyRevue Internationale de Philosophie 245 (3): 273-292. 2008.
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84C.S. Peirce and artificial intelligence: historical heritage and (new) theoretical stakesSAPERE - Special Issue on Philosophy and Theory of AI 5 265-276. 2013.
Compiègne, Hauts-de-France, France
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
20th Century Philosophy |
General Philosophy of Science |