Frederik Stjernfelt

This article investigates recent shifts in the landscape of Artificial Intelligence (ai), focusing on the emergence and controversies surrounding Large Language Models (llm s). Tracing the historical trajectory of ai enthusiasm from the 1960s to the present, the paper delves into the paradigm shifts influenced by symbolic ai, parallel distributed processing, and the rise of llm s, with particular emphasis on the transformative impact of OpenAI’s ChatGPT 3.5 release in late 2022. The paper contributes to the ongoing discourse on ai ethics, societal implications, and the intricate debate surrounding the perceived intelligence and consciousness of contemporary language models.

T.L. Short’s _Charles Peirce and Modern Science,_ in which he discusses Peirce’s intimate relation to modern science, simultaneously functions as Short’s own philosophical testament. Short’s overall argument is that Peirce takes _inquiry_ to be the main definition of science, implying that all other definition attempts or central issues of science are but products of inquiry: methods, experiments, observations, conclusions, results, syntheses, theory buildings, system constructions, laws, predictions, metaphysical assumptions, scientific values, etc. On this basis, Short develops central Peircean ideas such as inquiry into inquiry, phenomenology, and his “normative sciences” as elements of a reinvigorated and metaphysically ambitious version of empiricism. In this process, however, certain problems appear, such as Short’s tendency to refute any relevance in scientific investigations of systematicity, the a priori, the strive for conclusions and results.

Many types of everyday and specialized reasoning depend on diagrams: we use maps to find our way, we draw graphs and sketches to communicate concepts and prove geometrical theorems, and we manipulate diagrams to explore new creative solutions to problems. The active involvement and manipulation of representational artifacts for purposes of thinking and communicating is discussed in relation to C.S. Peirce’s notion of diagrammatical reasoning. We propose to extend Peirce’s original ideas and sketch a conceptual framework that delineates different kinds of diagram manipulation: Sometimes diagrams are manipulated in order to profile known information in an optimal fashion. At other times diagrams are explored in order to gain new insights, solve problems or discover hidden meaning potentials. The latter cases often entail manipulations that either generate additional information or extract information by means of abstraction. Ideas are substantiated by reference to ethnographic, experimental and historical examples.

En 2007, le philosophe danois Frederik Stjernfelt a donné une nouvelle vigueur aux études sur les diagrammes en publiant son opus majeur Diagrammatology. Ce terme a acquis l’extension d’une sous-discipline à part entière à l’intérieur des études sémiotiques. La diagrammatologie fédère aujourd’hui des recherches venues des sciences cognitives aussi bien que du post-structuralisme, des mathématiques et des études littéraires. Frederik Stjernfelt explique comment la diagrammatologie résulte pour lui d’une redéfinition de certains concepts fondamentaux (ceux de signe, de proposition et de diagramme au premier chef) amorcée par le père du pragmatisme, Charles S. Peirce.

This book investigates a number of central problems in the philosophy of Charles Peirce grouped around the realism of his semiotics: the issue of how sign systems are developed and used in the investigation of reality. Thus, it deals with the precise character of Peirce's realism; with Peirce's special notion of propositions as signs which, at the same time, denote and describe the same object. It deals with diagrams as signs which depict more or less abstract states-of-affairs, facilitating reasoning about them; with assertions as public claims about the truth of propositions. It deals with iconicity in logic, the issue of self-control in reasoning, dependences between phenomena in their realist descriptions. A number of chapters deal with applied semiotics: with biosemiotic sign use among pre-human organisms: the multimedia combination of pictorial and linguistic information in human semiotic genres like cartoons, posters, poetry, monuments. All in all, the book makes a strong case for the actual relevance of Peirce's realist semiotics.

To Peirce scholars and other aficionados of logic, semiotics, and pragmatism, 2017 brought the great news of Bellucci’s Speculative Grammar book, providing the eye-opening first detailed chronological overview over Peirce’s career-length developing of his semiotics. Now, the first volume of Ahti Pietarinen’s long-awaited three-volume publication of the totality of Peirce’s writings on his mature logic representation system known as Existential Graphs not only gives us a plethora of hitherto unpublished Peirce papers but also a new and in many ways surprising view into the origin and development of this important fruit of Peirce’s last, creative philosophical burst taking its beginning around 1896, famously to...

This open access monograph argues established democratic norms for freedom of expression should be implemented on the internet. Moderating policies of tech companies as Facebook, Twitter and Google have resulted in posts being removed on an industrial scale. While this moderation is often encouraged by governments - on the pretext that terrorism, bullying, pornography, “hate speech” and “fake news” will slowly disappear from the internet - it enables tech companies to censure our society. It is the social media companies who define what is blacklisted in their community standards. And given the dominance of social media in our information society, we run the risk of outsourcing the definition of our principles for discussion in the public domain to private companies. Instead of leaving it to social media companies only to take action, the authors argue democratic institutions should take an active role in moderating criminal content on the internet. To make this possible, tech companies should be analyzed whether they are approaching a monopoly. Antitrust legislation should be applied to bring those monopolies within democratic governmental oversight. Despite being in different stages in their lives, Anne Mette is in the startup phase of her research career, while Frederik is one of the most prolific philosophers in Denmark, the authors found each other in their concern about Free Speech on the internet. The book was originally published in Danish as Dit opslag er blevet fjernet - techgiganter & ytringsfrihed. Praise for 'Your Post has been Removed' "From my perspective both as a politician and as private book collector, this is the most important non-fiction book of the 21st Century. It should be disseminated to all European citizens. The learnings of this book and the use we make of them today are crucial for every man, woman and child on earth. Now and in the future.” Jens Rohde, member of the European Parliament for the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe “This timely book compellingly presents an impressive array of information and analysis about the urgent threats the tech giants pose to the robust freedom of speech and access to information that are essential for individual liberty and democratic self-government. It constructively explores potential strategies for restoring individual control over information flows to and about us. Policymakers worldwide should take heed!” Nadine Strossen, Professor, New York Law School. Author, HATE: Why We Should Resist It with Free Speech, Not Censorship.

The seventh sign in Charles Peirce’s well-known 10-sign taxonomy of the 1903 Syllabus has received relatively little attention compared to many other types of sign that he described. It is the sign type of “Dicent Indexical Legisigns”, a result of the combinatory strategy of the 3x3 elementary sign aspects defined by the three basic sign trichotomies of Qualisign-Sinsign-Legisign, Icon-Index-Symbol and Rheme-Dicisign-Argument, a new strategy developed by Peirce in that famous text. It is well known how such aspects do not combine freely, hence not resulting in 3 × 3 × 3 = 27 sign types, but only in 10 sign types, due to the application of the rule aptly summarized by Bellucci as “a certain combination...

What are the points of contact between Peirce’s and Husserl’s thoughts? Ever since the rather negative conclusions of Herbert Spiegelberg’s 1956 evaluation of the commonalities in Peirce’s and Husserl’s systems of thought, virtually no comprehensive studies have appeared on the mutual insights that could be obtained from the works of these two influential philosophers, despite the fact that some of their fundamental ideas germinated under similar conditions, contexts, influences and predecessors.

​This book investigates the nature of aesthetic experience and aesthetic objects. Written by leading philosophers, psychologists, literary scholars and semioticians, the book addresses two intertwined issues. The first is related to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience: The understanding of how human beings respond to artworks, how we process linguistic or visual information, and what properties in artworks trigger aesthetic experiences. The examination of the properties of aesthetic experience reveals essential aspects of our perceptual, cognitive, and semiotic capacities. The second issue studied in this volume is related to the ontology of the work of art: Written or visual artworks are a specific type of objects, containing particular kinds of representation which elicit a particular kind of experience. The research question explored is: What properties in artful objects trigger this type of experience, and what characterizes representation in written and visual artworks? The volume sets the scene for state-of-the-art inquiries in the intersection between the psychology and ontology of art. The investigations of the relation between the properties of artworks and the characteristics of aesthetic experience increase our insight into what art is. In addition, they shed light on essential properties of human meaning-making in general.

The aim of this paper is to make a concise presentation and comparison of classical anti-psychologism in the semiotics of Peirce and Husserl in order to actualize anti-psychologism for current semiotic studies. A reason why this seems again necessary is the introduction of cognitive science and the neurosciences in semiotics. This is not to claim that this development necessarily leads to psychologism. The important study of the relations between semiotics and cognition and the many investigations of how the brain and mind process sign use form central and important parts of actual semiotics; yet, the oblivion of anti-psychologism may, in some cases, lead researchers to assume untenable dreams of the complete reduction of things semiotic to psychology, thereby unknowingly repeating late nineteenth century cul-de-sacs of psychologism and leading to erroneous or exaggerated interpretations of experimental findings.

Two different concepts of iconicity compete in Peirce's diagrammatical logic. One is articulated in his general reflections on the role of diagrams in thought, in what could be termed his diagrammatology — the other is articulated in his construction of Existential Graphs as an iconic system for representing logic. One is operational and defines iconicity in terms of which information may be derived from a given diagram or diagram system — the other has stronger demands on iconicity, adding to the operational criterion a demand for as high a degree of similarity as possible and may be termed optimal iconicity. Peirce himself does not clearly distinguish these two iconicity notions, a fact that has caused some confusion. By isolating them, we get a clearer and more refined conceptual apparatus for analyzing iconic signs, from pictures to logic

Peirce’s notion of “habit” is famously wide, including also natural dispositions. Another Peircean notion generalized from its normal use is his term for propositions, “Dicisigns”. What is the connection between the two? It goes via the pragmatist notion of belief: “A belief in a proposition is a controlled and contented habit of acting in ways that will be productive of desired results only if the proposition is true” (Kaina Stoicheia 1904). This paper charts the important connection between habits, beliefs and Dicisigns.

This paper investigates the classical issue of ‘point of view,’ but from a cognitive stance. Under the headline of ‘enunciation,’ the paper argues that the cognitive linguistics tradition may provide a better understanding of the subjective aspect of language in general and of the narrative aspect of fiction in particular. The paper introduces the contributions of Leonard Talmy and Wallace Chafe. Talmy frames the issues of enunciation within his notion of conceptual structures, while Chafe reinterprets point-of-view as the issue of devices permitting different representations of consciousness in a text. The paper further develops these insights with reference to analyses of a string of fiction examples.

The paper develops a characterization of nominal compounds. The analysis is carried out on frame-schematic and construction-grammatical grounds. It rests on assumptions about cognitive processing long since known within cognitive linguistics, but it criticizes certain linguistic applications of Fauconnier and Turner's theory of conceptual integration, which historically is a reelaboration of Lakoff and Johnson's theory of metaphor.The first section sums up two classical approaches in the analysis of nominal compounds; it comments on their inadequacies, and how these have been assessed by Fauconnier and Turner; next, it sketches out the way these two authors and other scholars in blending theory have traditionally analyzed nominal compounds in terms of conceptual integration, and finally one of the major drawbacks of this approach is identified: namely, its limited descriptive import.In the following section, the authors unfold their own semantic analysis. A non-trivial and non-standard compositional theory is proposed, likely to capture the general way in which semantic parts of a compound configure into a semantic whole. Hereafter the authors proceed to a summary survey of how this scaffolding is actually instantiated or processed cognitively. A crucial difference between processing of literal and metaphorical compounds is established. Thus, the approach has a double scope: it aims at characterizing both the semantics of compounds and the way the semantics is cognitively accessed.

This essay – a collection of contributions from 10 scholars working in the field of biosemiotics and the humanities – considers nature in culture. It frames this by asking the question ‘Why does biosemiotics need the humanities?’. Each author writes from the background of their own disciplinary perspective in order to throw light upon their interdisciplinary engagement with biosemiotics. We start with Donald Favareau, whose originary disciplinary home is ethnomethodology and linguistics, and then move on to Paul Cobley’s contribution on general semiotics and Kalevi Kull’s on biosemiotics. This is followed by Cobley with Frederick Stjernfelt who contribute on biosemiotics and learning, then Gerald Ostdiek from philosophy, and Morten Tønnessen focusing upon ethics in particular. Myrdene Anderson writes from anthropology, while Timo Maran and Louise Westling provide a view from literary study. The essay closes with Wendy Wheeler reflecting on the movement of biosemiotics as a challenge, often via the ecological humanities, to the kind of so-called ‘postmodern’ thinking that has dominated humanities critical thought in the universities for the past 40 years. Virtually all the matters gestured to in outline above are discussed in much more satisfying detail in the topics which follow.

Our paper rejects Anders Søgaard's claim in Semiotica 169 (1/4) to the effect that our article ‘Waterproof fire stations? Conceptual schemata and cognitive operations involved in compound constructions’ in Semiotica 161 (1/4) goes astray in that it is ‘monoconstructional’ when it ought to be ‘multiconstructional.’ We demonstrate point by point that Søgaard's objections are wrong, not only as regards the argument, but also, as regards plain empirical assertions. In our paper we 1. redevelop our notion of ‘construction’; 2. refute Søgaard's objections, both formally and empirically.