Michael Rea

Some philosophers think that the presupposition that there are intrinsic modal properties can be justified on pragmatic grounds; and some also think that, in light of this presupposition, we are justified in thinking that the properties that science takes as definitive of various natural kinds are essential to the things that have them. Argues that this way of explaining how we might be justified in attributing particular intrinsic modal properties to material objects is unsuccessful. Even if it is true that we have pragmatic justification for believing in intrinsic modal properties, it does not follow that we have epistemic justification for believing in them. The author goes on to note that, though one might argue for the conclusion that, for naturalists anyway, pragmatic considerations do confer epistemic justification upon our beliefs, the argument will be cogent only under theistic or anti‐realist assumptions. Theism is an unwelcome alternative for most naturalists; and to concede that naturalists must be anti‐realists is to concede one of the main conclusions that the author aims to defend.

Begins the defense of the conclusion that the characterization of naturalism that is most faithful to the tradition, and the one that best explains both the similarities and the differences one finds among contemporary naturalists, is one which takes naturalism to be not a view but a research programme. Provides a brief discussion of the pre‐history of naturalism, together with a more extended discussion of the relevant views of naturalism's two main spokesmen in the twentieth century – John Dewey and W. V. Quine. The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a clear perspective on the core dispositions underlying the naturalistic tradition.

Supernaturalism is a research programme wherein one takes at least the methods of the natural sciences and religious experience as basic sources of evidence. Argues that embracing supernaturalism offers our best hope of avoiding the consequences of naturalism described earlier in the book. However, the author also argues that not just any version of supernaturalism will do the job, but only those that give rise to evidence for the conclusion that our world and, in particular, our cognitive faculties are the products of intelligent design.

In an earlier chapter, the author argues that naturalists can justifiably accept realism about material objects only if the methods of science justify belief in intrinsic modal properties. One suggestion as to how they might do this is as follows: beliefs attributing intrinsic modal properties to material objects are justified because their truth provides a good explanation for the existence of proper functions in nature. This examines this suggestion and argues that, except in the case of objects that are the products of design, proper functions are not empirically detectable.

Begins the third part of the book, in which the author discusses two important alternatives to naturalism. The alternative that is discussed is intuitionism, a research programme that takes the methods of natural science and rational intuition, but nothing else, as basic sources of evidence. Argues that, unless one has intuitions that support the view that our world is the product of intelligent design, intuitionism is self‐defeating. Also argues that, though there might be empirical reason for thinking that intuition is reliable in some domains, this fact does not save intuitionism from self‐defeat, nor is it of any use to a naturalist in trying to avoid the ontological consequences described in earlier chapters of the book.

Many of the doctrines central to Christianity have important philosophical implications or presuppositions. In this article, we begin with a brief general discussion of the relationship between philosophy and Christian dogma, and then we turn our attention to three of the most philosophically challenging Christian doctrines: the trinity, the incarnation, and the atonement. We take these three as our focus because, unlike (for example) doctrines about providence or the attributes of God, these are distinctive to Christian theology and, unlike (for example) the doctrine of original sin or the Real Presence of Christ in the eucharist, these have been the subject of a great deal of discussion over the past couple of decades.

Introduces several of the concepts and assumptions that will occupy center stage in the book's main argument. In particular, introduces the notion of a research programme, and provides characterizations of realism about material objects and its rival, constructivism. Also defends the conclusion that it is impossible to adopt a research programme on the basis of evidence. This constitutes the author's argument for the conditional claim that if naturalism is a research programme, its status as orthodoxy is without rational foundation. Introduces the central thesis of the book – that naturalists are committed to rejecting realism about material objects, materialism, and perhaps realism about other minds – and goes on to provide a brief outline of the remaining chapters.

Adherents of the Abrahamic religions have traditionally held that God is morally perfect and unconditionally deserving of devotion, obedience, love, and worship. The Jewish, Christian, and Islamic scriptures tell us that God is compassionate, merciful, and just. As is well-known, however, these same scriptures contain passages that portray God as wrathful, severely punitive, and jealous. Critics furthermore argue that the God of these scriptures commends bigotry, misogyny, and homophobia, condones slavery, and demands the adoption of unjust laws-for example, laws that mandate the death penalty for adultery and rebellion against parents, and laws institutionalizing in various ways the diverse kinds of bigotry and oppression just mentioned. In recent days, these sorts of criticisms of the Hebrew Bible have been raised in new and forceful ways by philosophers, scientists, social commentators, and others. This volume brings together eleven original essays representing the views of both critics and defenders of the character of God as portrayed in these texts. Authors represent the disciplines of philosophy, religion, and Biblical studies. Each essay is accompanied by comments from another author who takes a critical approach to the thesis defended in that essay, along with replies by the essay's author.

Mereological Universalism is the thesis that, for any disjoint Xs, the Xs automatically compose something. In his book, Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen provides an argument against Universalism that relies on the following crucial premiss: (F) If Universalism is true, then the Xs cannot ever compose two objects, either simultaneously or successively.1 I have argued elsewhere (Rea 1998) that van Inwagen’s defence of (F) fails because it relies on the false assumption that Universalism is incompatible with the view that, for some Xs, what the Xs compose depends upon how the Xs are arranged. However, Matthew McGrath (1998) has recently provided a new – and in his opinion, better – formulation of van Inwagen’s argument for (F). Furthermore, he claims (contrary to what van Inwagen himself apparently thinks) that four of the ten assumptions listed at the outset of Material Beings are ‘jointly sufficient for the falsity of Universalism’. (1998: 121) Those assumptions, as they appear on page 121 of McGrath 1998, are as follows.

Over the past three decades there has been a great deal of philosophical interest in puzzles about composition and identity over time. Familiar examples include the "Ship of Theseus" puzzle, the "Paradox of Increase", and the "Body-minus" puzzle. The metaphysical importance of these puzzles is hard to overemphasize; their solutions have ramifications for our views about personal identity, de re modality, the mind-body problem, and a host of other ontological issues. Surprisingly, however, no one has discussed how all of these puzzles, and their solutions, are interrelated. I argue that there is one problem underlying these puzzles. I call it the "problem of material constitution". I give, for the first time, a precise statement of this problem, I show how every solution to it is equally a solution to each of the puzzles that raise it, and I defend what I take to be its most plausible solution. ;The problem arises whenever it appears that an object a and an object b share all of the same parts and yet are essentially related to those parts in different ways. This kind of situation is paradoxical because the fact that a and b have all of the same parts suggests that a is identical with b, but the fact that they are essentially related to their parts in different ways suggests that a is distinct from b. I argue that there are only three ways to solve the problem: reject the thesis that, for any x and y, if x and y share all of the same parts then x is identical with y, reject the thesis that if x is identical with y then x is necessarily identical with y, or reject some feature of the story that raises the problem . I defend the third alternative

Philosophical theology is aimed primarily at theoretical understanding of the nature and attributes of God and of God's relationship to the world and its inhabitants. During the twentieth century, much of the philosophical community had grave doubts about our ability to attain any such understanding. In recent years the analytic tradition in particular has moved beyond the biases that placed obstacles in the way of the pursuing questions located on the interface of philosophy and religion. The result has been a rebirth of serious, widely-discussed work in philosophical theology. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology attempts both to familiarize readers with the directions in which this scholarship has gone and to pursue the discussion into hitherto under-examined areas. Written by some of the leading scholars in the field, the essays in the Handbook are grouped in five sections. In the first, articles focus on the authority of scripture and tradition, on the nature and mechanisms of divine revelation, on the relation between religion and science, and on theology and mystery. The next section focuses on philosophical problems connected with the central divine attributes: aseity, omnipotence, omniscience, and the like. In Section Three, essays explore theories of divine action and divine providence, questions about petitionary prayer, problems about divine authority and God's relationship to morality and moral standards, and various formulations of and responses to the problem of evil. The fourth section examines philosophical problems that arise in connection with such central Christian doctrines as the trinity, the incarnation, the atonement, original sin, resurrection, and the Eucharist. Finally, Section Five introduces readers to work that is being done in Jewish, Islamic, and Chinese philosophical theology.

This anthology includes 75 articles in nine areas of philosophy of religion. These areas include: traditional arguments for the existence of God; on the validity of religious experience; the problem of evil and other atheological arguments; the attributes of God; miracles and revelation; death and immortality; faith and reason; religious pluralism; and ethics and religion. The articles are arranged in a coherent framework, with the presentation of each area progressing from the classical to the contemporary and treated in a dialectic (pro and con) fashion.

Vol. I: Foundations • Meta-Ontology • Propositions, States of Affairs, and Events • Universals, Properties, and Kinds • Substances, Bundles, and Substrata -/- Vol. II: Metaphysics of Modality • Possible Worlds • Actualism and Possibilism • Essentialism • Causation and Laws of Nature • Reduction and Supervenience -/- Vol. III: Time and Identity • Time • Individuation • Composition and Material Constitution • Change and Persistence • Realism, Anti-Realism, and Vagueness -/- Vol. IV: God and Persons • The Existence of God • Mind and Body • Personhood and the Self • Fatalism, Determinism, and Free Agency.

In the present article, he explains why divine silence poses a serious intellectual obstacle to belief in God, and then goes on to consider ways of overcoming that obstacle. After considering several ways in which divine silence might actually be beneficial to human beings, he argues that perhaps silence is nothing more or less than God’s preferred mode of interaction with creatures like us. Perhaps God simply desires communion rather than overt communication with human beings, and perhaps God has provided ways for us to experience God’s presence richly even amidst the silence.

Arguing about Metaphysics is a wide-ranging anthology that introduces students to one of the most fundamental areas of philosophy. It covers core topics in metaphysics such as personal identity, the nature of being, time, and the concept of freedom. The volume contains scholarly articles by Quine, Lewis, van Inwagen and Pereboom, as well short works of science fiction that illustrate key ideas in metaphysics. The volume is divided into five parts, helping the student get to grips with classic and core arguments and emerging debates in: - On What There Is - Time and Time Travel - Change and Identity - Freedom - Worlds and Worldmaking Michael C. Rea provides lucid introductions to each section, giving an overview of the debate and outlining the arguments of each sections readings. Arguing About Metaphysics is a comprehensive and engaging reader for students who are new to philosophy

In World Without Design: The Ontological Consequences of Naturalism, I argued that there is an important sense in which philosophilosophical naturalism’s current status as methodological orthodoxy is without rational foundation, and I argued that naturalists must give up two views that many of them are inclined to hold dear-realism about material objects and materialism. In the present article, I respond to objections raised by W. R. Carter, Austin Dacey, Paul Draper, and Andrew Melnyk in a symposium on World Without Design sponsored in part by this journal. The objections I address fall into two main categories: objections against my characterization of naturalism, and objections against the main argument of the book, the argument for the conclusion that naturalists cannot justifiably accept realism about material objects.

Many of the most well-known Protestant systematic theologies, particularly in the Reformed tradition, display (more or less) a common thematic division. There are prolegomena: questions about the nature of theology, the relationship between faith and reason, and (sometimes treated separately) the attributes of scripture and its role in faith and practice. There is the doctrine of God: divine attributes, Godʼs relationship to creation, etc. There is the doctrine of humanity: the nature and post-mortem survival of human persons, and the human condition, including the Fall and human sinfulness. There are parts devoted to the person and work of Christ: most especially, the incarnation and atonement. There is discussion of questions in practical theology: the organization and function of the church, morality and politics. Other matters get discussed along the way as well. Most of these topics are ones which we contributors to this volume have been asked to address in our position statements. So I take my assignment to be, in effect, the production of a miniature sketch of a partial systematic theology. Even in miniature, this is a monumental task for a mere essay, and a daunting one for someone whose formal training lies outside of theology. The remarks that follow represent my best effort to articulate such views on these topics as I currently hold—albeit briefly and incompletely. I hope that the views hang together in a reasonably systematic way; but, as this is but a first effort at accomplishing a task of this sort, I wish to emphasize the programmatic nature of what I shall be saying. Since I am writing specifically as a representative of Protestantism (in all of its wide diversity), it seems fitting for me to structure my essay in accord with the thematic divisions just described. I begin with prolegomena, focusing primarily on faith and reason, and doctrines about scripture. The next three sections are devoted, respectively, to the doctrine of God, doctrine of humanity (in which I include doctrines about the person and work of Christ), and practical theology.

Over the past sixty years, within the analytic tradition of philosophy, there has been a significant revival of interest in the philosophy of religion. More recently, philosophers of religion have turned in a more self-consciously interdisciplinary direction, with special focus on topics that have traditionally been the provenance of systematic theologians in the Christian tradition. The present volumes Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology, volumes 1 and 2 aim to bring together some of the most important essays on six central topics in recent philosophical theology. Volume 1 collects essays on three distinctively Christian doctrines: trinity, incarnation, and atonement. Volume 2 focuses on three topics that arise in all of the major theistic religions: providence, resurrection, and scripture.