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706Epistemic injustice and a role for virtue in the politics of knowingMetaphilosophy 34 (1/2): 154-173. 2003.The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. …Read more
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563PrécisTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1): 69-71. 2008.This paper summarizes key themes from my Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007); and it gives replies to commentators.
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339Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good InformantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2): 249-276. 2012.We gain information from collective, often institutional bodies all the time—from the publications of committees, news teams, or research groups, from web sites such as Wikipedia, and so on—but do these bodies ever function as genuine group testifiers as opposed to mere group sources of information? In putting the question this way I invoke a distinction made, if briefly, by Edward Craig, which I believe to be of deep significance in thinking about the distinctiveness of the speech act of testim…Read more
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179The Value of Knowledge and The Test of TimeRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64 121-138. 2009.The current literature on the value of knowledge is marred by two unwarranted presumptions, which together distort the debate and conceal what is perhaps the most basic value of knowledge, as distinct from mere true belief. These presumptions are the Synchronic Presumption, which confines philosophical attention to the present snapshot in time; and the Analytical Presumption, which has people look for the value of knowledge in some kind of warrant. Together these presumptions conceal that the va…Read more
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56Knowledge as constructIn Kathleen Lennon & Margaret Whitford (eds.), Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology, Routledge. pp. 95. 1994.
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1322Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowingOxford University Press. 2007.Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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225Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in TimePhilosophical Papers 37 (1): 27-50. 2008.My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the…Read more
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327Powerlessness and social interpretationEpisteme 3 (1-2): 96-108. 2006.Our understanding of social experiences is central to our social understanding more generally. But this sphere of epistemic practice can be structurally prejudiced by unequal relations of power, so that some groups suffer a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice—hermeneutical injustice. I aim to achieve a clear conception of this epistemicethical phenomenon, so that we have a workable definition and a proper understanding of the wrong that it inflicts.
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147Introduction to Special Issue on Applied EpistemologyJournal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2): 153-156. 2016.
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528What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based ExplanationNoûs 50 (1): 165-183. 2014.When we hope to explain and perhaps vindicate a practice that is internally diverse, philosophy faces a methodological challenge. Such subject matters are likely to have explanatorily basic features that are not necessary conditions. This prompts a move away from analysis to some other kind of philosophical explanation. This paper proposes a paradigm based explanation of one such subject matter: blame. First, a paradigm form of blame is identified—‘Communicative Blame’—where this is understood a…Read more
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36Reading ethics: selected texts with interactive commentary (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2008.This introductory text encourages students to engage with key problems and arguments in ethics through a series of classic and contemporary readings. The text will inspire students to think about the distinctive nature of moral philosophy, and to draw comparisons between different traditions of thought, between ancient and modern philosophies, and between theoretical and literary writing about the place of value in human life. Each of the book's six chapters focuses on a particular theme: the na…Read more
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Georgia Warnke, Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates (review)Radical Philosophy 103. 2000.
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755Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?Synthese 190 (7): 1317-1332. 2013.I shall first briefly revisit the broad idea of ‘epistemic injustice’, explaining how it can take either distributive or discriminatory form, in order to put the concepts of ‘testimonial injustice’ and ‘hermeneutical injustice’ in place. In previous work I have explored how the wrong of both kinds of epistemic injustice has both an ethical and an epistemic significance—someone is wronged in their capacity as a knower. But my present aim is to show that this wrong can also have a political signif…Read more
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95Styles of moral relativism : a critical family treeIn Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2013.This chapter focuses on the different styles of moral relativism. The history of moral relativist thinking features different branches to the family tree, each representing a different impetus to relativism, and so producing a different style of moral relativist thought. At the root, however, is a broadly subjectivist parent idea that morality is at least in part the upshot of a shared way of life, and shared ways of life tend to vary markedly from culture to culture. The discussions cover the b…Read more
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1Power, knowledge and injusticeIn Julian Baggini & Jeremy Stangroom (eds.), New British Philosophy: The Interviews, Routledge. pp. 77-94. 2002.
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15Confidence and ironyIn Edward Harcourt (ed.), Morality, Reflection, and Ideology, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-112. 2000.
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111In London in 1993, a black teenager named Stephen Lawrence was fatally stabbed by a small gang of white teenagers. His friend Duwayne Brooks was a witness but the police failed to take his testimony seriously. When someone speaks but is not heard because of accent, sex, or colour, that person is undermined as a knower. This week, we look at was it means to do justice to someone's status as a knower.
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70Evelyn Fox Keller & Helen E. Longino, Feminism & Science (Oxford Readings in Feminism) (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4): 618-620. 1997.
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25Life-story in Beauvoir's memoirsIn Claudia Card (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir, Cambridge University Press. pp. 208-227. 2003.
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632Epistemic Oppression and Epistemic PrivilegeCanadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (sup1): 191-210. 1999.[T]he dominated live in a world structured by others for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various degrees inimical to our development and even existence.We are perhaps used to the idea that there are various species of oppression: political, economic, or sexual, for instance. But where there is the phenomenon that Nancy Hartsock picks out in saying that the world is “structured” by the powerful to the detriment of the powerless, there is another sp…Read more