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161Wholes and parts: The limits of compositionSouth African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2): 138-145. 2006.The paper argues that very different part-whole relations hold between different kinds of entities. While these relations share most of their formal properties, they need not share all of them. Nor need other mereological principles be true of all kinds of part–whole pairs. In particular, it is argued that the principle of unrestricted composition, that any two or more entities have a mereological sum, while true of sets and propositions, is false of things and events.
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74Prospects for pragmatism: essays in memory of F. P. Ramsey (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 1980.Haack, S. Is truth flat or bumpy?--Chihara, C. S. Ramsey 's theory of types.--Loar, B. Ramsey 's theory of belief and truth.--Skorupski, J. Ramsey on Belief.--Hookway, C. Inference, partial belief, and psychological laws.--Skyrms, B. Higher order degrees of belief.--Mellor, D. H. Consciousness and degrees of belief.--Blackburn, S. Opinions and chances.--Grandy, R. E. Ramsey, reliability, and knowledge.--Cohen, L. J. The problem of natural laws.--Giedymin, J. Hamilton's method in geometrical opti…Read more
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21Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics, and Economics (edited book)Humanties Press; Routledge. 1978.
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24The unreality of tenseIn Robin Le Poidevin & Murray MacBeath (eds.), The Philosophy of time, Oxford University Press. pp. 47--59. 1993.
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25VI*—Conscious BeliefProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1): 87-102. 1978.D. H. Mellor; VI*—Conscious Belief, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 78, Issue 1, 1 June 1978, Pages 87–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian.
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18VI*—I and NowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89 (1): 79-94. 1989.D. H. Mellor; VI*—I and Now, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 79–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.79.
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91Transcendental tense: D.h. MellorAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s d…Read more
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Transcendental TenseAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 29-56. 1998.[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s d…Read more
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47The Reduction of SocietyPhilosophy 57 (219): 51-75. 1982.How does the study of society relate to the study of the people it comprises? This longstanding question is partly one of method, but mainly one of fact, of how independent the objects of these two studies, societies and people, are. It is commonly put as a question of reduction, and I shall tackle it in that form: does sociology reduce in principle to individual psychology? I follow custom in calling the claim that it does ‘individualism’ and its denial ‘holism’.
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84Transcendental TenseAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1). 1998.[D. H. Mellor] Kant's claim that our knowledge of time is transcendental in his sense, while false of time itself, is true of tenses, i.e. of the locations of events and other temporal entities in McTaggart's A series. This fact can easily, and I think only, be explained by taking time itself to be real but tenseless. /// [J. R. Lucas] Mellor's argument from Kant fails. The difficulties in his first Antinomy are due to topological confusions, not the tensed nature of time. Nor are McTaggart' s d…Read more
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2The singularly affecting facts of causationIn John Jamieson Carswell Smart, Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman (eds.), Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, Blackwell. 1987.
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76Time, tense, and causation by Michael Tooley. Oxford: Clarendon press, 1997, XVI + 399 pp (review)Philosophy 73 (4): 629-645. 1998.
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5Too many universesIn Neil A. Manson (ed.), God and design: the teleological argument and modern science, Routledge. 2003.
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3The need for tenseIn L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (eds.), The New Theory of Time, Yale Up. pp. 23--37. 1994.
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111Truthmakers for What?In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic and Metaphysics, Routledge. 2008.
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13The Facts of CausationRoutledge. 1995.Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. _The Facts of Causation_, now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our place in…Read more
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49The Facts of CausationRoutledge. 1995.Everything we do relies on causation. We eat and drink because this causes us to stay alive. Courts tell us who causes crimes, criminology tell us what causes people to commit them. D.H. Mellor shows us that to understand the world and our lives we must understand causation. _The Facts of Causation_, now available in paperback, is essential reading for students and for anyone interested in reading one of the ground-breaking theories in metaphysics. We cannot understand the world and our place in…Read more
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1The direction of timeIn Robin Le Poidevin, Simons Peter, McGonigal Andrew & Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, Routledge. 2009.
Hugh Mellor
(1938 - 2020)
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Probability |
Philosophy of Physical Science |