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99Possibility, chance and necessityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1). 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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10Properties and PredicatesIn David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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39Probable explanationAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 54 (3). 1976.This Article does not have an abstract
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28Probability: A Philosophical IntroductionRoutledge. 2004._Probability: A Philosophical Introduction_ introduces and explains the principal concepts and applications of probability. It is intended for philosophers and others who want to understand probability as we all apply it in our working and everyday lives. The book is not a course in mathematical probability, of which it uses only the simplest results, and avoids all needless technicality. The role of probability in modern theories of knowledge, inference, induction, causation, laws of nature, ac…Read more
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25Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future (review)Philosophical Review 108 (3): 428-430. 1999.The content and style of this book differ from those of most recent works on the topics listed in its title. In its first part, Cockburn does indeed address the current debate between advocates of tensed and tenseless views of time. Not however to try and settle it—God and Wittgenstein forbid!—but to argue that we who do try mistake for a metaphysical issue what is really an ethical one, namely the “place which tense should occupy in our justifications of action and feeling”. In part 2 he provid…Read more
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21Obituary: R. B. Braithwaite (1900-1990)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4): 579-580. 1990.
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11We do not know whether there are other universes. Perhaps we never shall. But I want to argue that 'do other universes exist?' can be posed in a form that makes it a genuine scientific question. Moreover, I shall outline why it is an interesting question; and why, indeed, I already suspect that the answer may be 'yes'.
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On Raising the Chances of EffectsIn J. H. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon, D. Reidel. pp. 229-239. 1988.I show that the connotations of causation - temporal, explanatory, predictive and means-end - are preserved in indeterministic causation only to the extent that effects have a greater chance of occurring in the circumstances if their causes do than if they don’t.
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Physics and furnitureIn Peter Achinstein (ed.), Studies in the philosophy of science, Published By Basil Blackwell With the Cooperation of the University of Pittsburg. pp. 171--187. 1969.
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53Mind, Meaning, and Reality: Essays in PhilosophyOxford University Press. 2012.Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time
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76Nature's joints: A realistic defence of natural propertiesRatio 25 (4): 387-404. 2012.This paper attacks two contrary views. One denies that nature has joints, taking the properties we call natural to be merely artefacts of our theories. The other accepts real natural properties but takes their naturalness to come by degrees. I argue that both are wrong: natural properties are real, and their naturalness no more comes by degrees than does the naturalness of the things that have them.1
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4Mctaggart's proofIn L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The philosophy of time, Routledge. pp. 1--81. 2008.
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24McTaggart, fixity and coming trueIn Michael Tooley (ed.), Time and causation, Garland. pp. 325-343. 1999.
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48Imprecision and explanationPhilosophy of Science 34 (1): 1-9. 1967.The paper, analyses the role of measurable concepts in deductive explanation. It is shown that such concepts are, although imprecise in a defined sense, exact in that neutral candidates to them do not arise. An analysis is given of the way in which imprecision is related to generalisation, and it is shown how imprecise concepts are incorporated in testable deductive explanations
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5Levi's ChancesIn Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Cambridge University Press. pp. 111. 2006.
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62I and NowProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 89. 1989.D. H. Mellor; VI*—I and Now, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 89, Issue 1, 1 June 1989, Pages 79–94, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/89.1.79.
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73Micro-compositionRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62 65-80. 2008.Entities of many kinds, not just material things, have been credited with parts. Armstrong , for example, has taken propositions and properties to be parts of their conjunctions, sets to be parts of sets that include them, and geographical regions and events to be parts of regions and events that contain them. The justification for bringing all these diverse relations under a single ‘part–whole’ concept is that they share all or most of the formal features articulated in mereology . But the conc…Read more
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25Inexactness and explanationPhilosophy of Science 33 (4): 345-359. 1966.The paper discusses the problems raised by the inexactness of experiential concepts for a deductivist account of theoretical explanation. The process of theoretical explanation is explicated in terms of the devising of exact forms of inexact concepts. Analysis of the adjustments of concepts and their exact forms to each other reveals an implicit criterion of adequacy for theories which is related to the principle of connectivity
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165Laws, chances and propertiesInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2): 159-170. 1990.The paper develops a unified account of both deterministic and indeterministic laws of nature which inherits the merits but not the defects of the best existing accounts. As in Armstrong's account, laws are embodied in facts about universals; but not in higher‐order relations between them, and the necessity of laws is not primitive but results from their containing chances of 0 or 1. As in the Ramsey‐Lewis account, law statements would be the general axioms and theorems of the simplest deductive…Read more
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78I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like ExperienceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 1-16. 1993.D. H. Mellor; I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 1–16, https.
Hugh Mellor
(1938 - 2020)
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Probability |
Philosophy of Physical Science |