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28Probability: A Philosophical IntroductionRoutledge. 2004._Probability: A Philosophical Introduction_ introduces and explains the principal concepts and applications of probability. It is intended for philosophers and others who want to understand probability as we all apply it in our working and everyday lives. The book is not a course in mathematical probability, of which it uses only the simplest results, and avoids all needless technicality. The role of probability in modern theories of knowledge, inference, induction, causation, laws of nature, ac…Read more
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70Probability: A Philosophical IntroductionRoutledge. 2004.This book: * assumes no mathematical background and keeps the technicalities to a minimum * explains the most important applications of probability theory to ...
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99Possibility, chance and necessityAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1). 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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10Properties and PredicatesIn David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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11We do not know whether there are other universes. Perhaps we never shall. But I want to argue that 'do other universes exist?' can be posed in a form that makes it a genuine scientific question. Moreover, I shall outline why it is an interesting question; and why, indeed, I already suspect that the answer may be 'yes'.
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On Raising the Chances of EffectsIn J. H. Fetzer (ed.), Probability and Causality: Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Salmon, D. Reidel. pp. 229-239. 1988.I show that the connotations of causation - temporal, explanatory, predictive and means-end - are preserved in indeterministic causation only to the extent that effects have a greater chance of occurring in the circumstances if their causes do than if they don’t.
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Physics and furnitureIn Peter Achinstein (ed.), Studies in the philosophy of science, Published By Basil Blackwell With the Cooperation of the University of Pittsburg. pp. 171--187. 1969.
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25Other Times: Philosophical Perspectives on Past, Present and Future (review)Philosophical Review 108 (3): 428-430. 1999.The content and style of this book differ from those of most recent works on the topics listed in its title. In its first part, Cockburn does indeed address the current debate between advocates of tensed and tenseless views of time. Not however to try and settle it—God and Wittgenstein forbid!—but to argue that we who do try mistake for a metaphysical issue what is really an ethical one, namely the “place which tense should occupy in our justifications of action and feeling”. In part 2 he provid…Read more
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21Obituary: R. B. Braithwaite (1900-1990)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4): 579-580. 1990.
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76Nature's joints: A realistic defence of natural propertiesRatio 25 (4): 387-404. 2012.This paper attacks two contrary views. One denies that nature has joints, taking the properties we call natural to be merely artefacts of our theories. The other accepts real natural properties but takes their naturalness to come by degrees. I argue that both are wrong: natural properties are real, and their naturalness no more comes by degrees than does the naturalness of the things that have them.1
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4Mctaggart's proofIn L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The philosophy of time, Routledge. pp. 1--81. 2008.
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53Mind, Meaning, and Reality: Essays in PhilosophyOxford University Press. 2012.Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time
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24McTaggart, fixity and coming trueIn Michael Tooley (ed.), Time and causation, Garland. pp. 325-343. 1999.
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78I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like ExperienceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93 (1): 1-16. 1993.D. H. Mellor; I *—The Presidential Address: Nothing Like Experience, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 1–16, https.
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57This article is the text of an interview with D. H. Mellor conducted by Andrew Pyle and first published in the Spring 1993 issue of the philosophical journal Cogito.
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9Review of Henry Ely Kyburg: Epistemology and Inference (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (2): 175-179. 1984.
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26History without the Flow of TimeNeue Zeitschrift für Systematicsche Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 28 (1): 68-76. 1986.
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80Inaugural lecture: The warrant of inductionIn Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge University Press. 1988.This lecture will last less than twenty four hours. I know that, and so do you. And you knew it before I said so. How? Because you knew that lectures don't last twenty four hours. How do you know that? You haven't heard this one, and 'for all you know' (as the saying is) I could go on all night. But you know I won't. And the 'all you know' which tells you that, without entailing it, is the fact that none, or almost none, of the many lectures, on all subjects, which you've heard or heard of, have…Read more
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48Imprecision and explanationPhilosophy of Science 34 (1): 1-9. 1967.The paper, analyses the role of measurable concepts in deductive explanation. It is shown that such concepts are, although imprecise in a defined sense, exact in that neutral candidates to them do not arise. An analysis is given of the way in which imprecision is related to generalisation, and it is shown how imprecise concepts are incorporated in testable deductive explanations
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5Levi's ChancesIn Erik J. Olsson (ed.), Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, Cambridge University Press. pp. 111. 2006.
Hugh Mellor
(1938 - 2020)
Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Physical Science |
Philosophy of Probability |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Probability |
Philosophy of Physical Science |