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98On desires and practical reasonsActa Analytica 19 (32): 5-18. 2004.A common and plausible assumption about the relation between desires and practical reasons—namely, that if øing is an optimal way (or even just a way) for a person, P, to satisfy one of his or her desires, then P has a (normative) reason to ø. This paper discusses that assumption. Although it does not deny that desires are a source of practical reasons, it shows that in some situations, rare though not impossible, P can lack a reason to ø despite having a desire that he or she could satisfy opti…Read more
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84Prisoner's dilemma from a moral point of viewTheory and Decision 41 (2): 187-193. 1996.In a recent issue of this journal, C. L. Sheng claims to havesolved andexplained the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by studying it ‘from a moral point of view’ - i.e., by assuming that each player feels sympathy for the other. Sheng does not fully clarify this claim, but there is textual evidence that his point is this: PD's arise only for agents who feel little or no sympathy for each other; they cannot arise in the presence of a high degree of reciprocal sympathy. A high degree of such sympathysolves…Read more
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51Altruism and the prisoner's dilemmaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (3). 1991.This Article does not have an abstract
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47Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical ReasonModern Schoolman 69 (2): 81-109. 1992.
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36Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence. By Gregory Mellema (review)Modern Schoolman 71 (1): 73-75. 1993.
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20Two (Faulty) Responses to the Challenge of AmoralismThe Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 44 248-253. 1998.To the question "Why should I be moral?" there is a simple answer that some philosophers find tempting. There is also a response, common enough to be dubbed the standard response, to the simple answer. In what follows, I show that the SA and SR are unsatisfactory; they share a serious defect.
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17Desires and Practical ReasonsThe Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 123-128. 2006.This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.
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1Troubles for Psychological HedonismSkepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 10. 1999.
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Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of ProofMillennium: Journal of International Studies 27 (2): 275-97. 1998.
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'Humean' Rationality, Morality, and Reasons for ActionDissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison. 1988.This thesis clarifies and defends the view of practical reason often dubbed "Humean", "instrumental", or "preference-based". Three familiar charges against this view are addressed, and claimed to be ineffective. They are: first, that the Humean view entails the easily refuted theory that all reasons for action have their source in individual desires; second, that it brings with it an extreme version of ethical relativism; and third, that it presupposes a view of motivation which has been shown t…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |