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84Prisoner's dilemma from a moral point of viewTheory and Decision 41 (2): 187-193. 1996.In a recent issue of this journal, C. L. Sheng claims to havesolved andexplained the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) by studying it ‘from a moral point of view’ - i.e., by assuming that each player feels sympathy for the other. Sheng does not fully clarify this claim, but there is textual evidence that his point is this: PD's arise only for agents who feel little or no sympathy for each other; they cannot arise in the presence of a high degree of reciprocal sympathy. A high degree of such sympathysolves…Read more
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2003John Clarke of Hull's Argument for Psychological EgoismBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (1): 69-89. 2015.John Clarke of Hull, one of the eighteenth century's staunchest proponents of psychological egoism, defended that theory in his Foundation of Morality in Theory and Practice. He did so mainly by opposing the objections to egoism in the first two editions of Francis Hutcheson's Inquiry into Virtue. But Clarke also produced a challenging, direct argument for egoism which, regrettably, has received virtually no scholarly attention. In this paper I give it some of the attention it merits. In additio…Read more
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600Cultural Relativism and ToleranceLyceum 6 (1): 1-11. 1994.This was a class handout that I turned into a publication. As its title indicates, it's about the relation (or non-relation) of (ethical) cultural relativism to tolerance. Core elements of the paper were later absorbed into sections 5K, 6M, and 7K of my paper "Cultural Relativism" (2000), which is listed (and downloadable) on my PhilPapers page.
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4065The Problem for Normative Cultural RelativismRatio Juris 11 (3): 272-290. 1998.The key problem for normative (or moral) cultural relativism arises as soon as we try to formulate it. It resists formulations that are (1) clear, precise, and intelligible; (2) plausible enough to warrant serious attention; and (3) faithful to the aims of leading cultural relativists, one such aim being to produce an important alternative to moral universalism. Meeting one or two of these conditions is easy; meeting all three is not. I discuss twenty-four candidates for the label "cultural rela…Read more
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47Moral Relativism, Internalism, and the "Humean" View of Practical ReasonModern Schoolman 69 (2): 81-109. 1992.
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949Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations upon the Moral SenseJournal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1): 53-83. 2012.One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not par…Read more
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810Accounting for the 'Tragedy' in the Prisoner's DilemmaSynthese 99 (2). 1994.The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a tragedy in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a trembling-hand equilibrium. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of the problem posed…Read more
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3119Cultural RelativismIn Ritzer George (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd ed., Wiley-blackwell. 2000.A brief reference article on cultural relativism, forthcoming in the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd edition.
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1115Physical Objects and Moral Wrongness: Hume on the “Fallacy” in Wollaston’s Moral TheoryHume Studies 35 (1-2): 87-101. 2009.In a well-known footnote in Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume calls William Wollaston's moral theory a "whimsical system" and purports to destroy it with a few brief objections. The first of those objections, although fatally flawed, has hitherto gone unrefuted. To my knowledge, its chief error has escaped attention. In this paper I expose that error; I also show that it has relevance beyond the present subject. It can occur with regard to any moral theory which, like Wollaston's, loc…Read more
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852Justifying reasons, motivating reasons, and agent relativism in ethicsPhilosophical Studies 118 (3): 373-399. 2004.According to agent relativism, each person's moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to ø depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity in the term "reason," "reason for action,'' or the like. This paper shows that although the argument for agent relativism may indeed harbor an ambiguity, the ambiguity is no Achilles’ heel. To remove it is not t…Read more
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17Desires and Practical ReasonsThe Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 123-128. 2006.This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.
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611The Problem of Inconsistency in Wollaston's Moral TheoryHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3). 2012.This paper challenges Francis Hutcheson's and John Clarke of Hull's alleged demonstrations that William Wollaston's moral theory is inconsistent. It also present a form of the inconsistency objection that fares better than theirs, namely, that of Thomas Bott (1688-1754). Ultimately, the paper shows that Wollaston's moral standard is not what some have thought it to be; that consequently, his philosophy withstands the best-known efforts to expose it as inconsistent; and further, that one of the l…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |