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3096Cultural RelativismIn Ritzer George (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd ed., Wiley-blackwell. 2000.A brief reference article on cultural relativism, forthcoming in the Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, 2nd edition.
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1107Physical Objects and Moral Wrongness: Hume on the “Fallacy” in Wollaston’s Moral TheoryHume Studies 35 (1-2): 87-101. 2009.In a well-known footnote in Book 3 of his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume calls William Wollaston's moral theory a "whimsical system" and purports to destroy it with a few brief objections. The first of those objections, although fatally flawed, has hitherto gone unrefuted. To my knowledge, its chief error has escaped attention. In this paper I expose that error; I also show that it has relevance beyond the present subject. It can occur with regard to any moral theory which, like Wollaston's, loc…Read more
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851Justifying reasons, motivating reasons, and agent relativism in ethicsPhilosophical Studies 118 (3): 373-399. 2004.According to agent relativism, each person's moral requirements are relative to her desires or interests. That is, whether a person morally ought to ø depends on what interests or desires she has. Some philosophers charge that the main argument for agent relativism trades on an ambiguity in the term "reason," "reason for action,'' or the like. This paper shows that although the argument for agent relativism may indeed harbor an ambiguity, the ambiguity is no Achilles’ heel. To remove it is not t…Read more
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17Desires and Practical ReasonsThe Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 9 123-128. 2006.This paper refutes a common and influential thesis about the conditions under which desires provide agents with practical reasons. That thesis is that if any agent. A, has a desire which A could satisfy by (ping, then A has a reason—a minimal reason, at least—to (p. Although this thesis comes close to stating a truth, it falls short.
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609The Problem of Inconsistency in Wollaston's Moral TheoryHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 29 (3). 2012.This paper challenges Francis Hutcheson's and John Clarke of Hull's alleged demonstrations that William Wollaston's moral theory is inconsistent. It also present a form of the inconsistency objection that fares better than theirs, namely, that of Thomas Bott (1688-1754). Ultimately, the paper shows that Wollaston's moral standard is not what some have thought it to be; that consequently, his philosophy withstands the best-known efforts to expose it as inconsistent; and further, that one of the l…Read more
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752Wollaston's Early CriticsBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6): 1097-1116. 2012.Some of the most forceful objections to William Wollaston's moral theory come from his early critics, namely, Thomas Bott (1688-1754), Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), and John Clarke of Hull (1687-1734). These objections are little known, while the inferior objections of Hume, Bentham, and later prominent critics are familiar. This fact is regrettable. For instance, it impedes a robust understanding of eighteenth-century British ethics; also, it fosters a questionable view as to why Wollaston's t…Read more
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98On desires and practical reasonsActa Analytica 19 (32): 5-18. 2004.A common and plausible assumption about the relation between desires and practical reasons—namely, that if øing is an optimal way (or even just a way) for a person, P, to satisfy one of his or her desires, then P has a (normative) reason to ø. This paper discusses that assumption. Although it does not deny that desires are a source of practical reasons, it shows that in some situations, rare though not impossible, P can lack a reason to ø despite having a desire that he or she could satisfy opti…Read more
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767Hutcheson's Theological Objection to EgoismJournal of Scottish Philosophy 14 (1): 101-123. 2016.Francis Hutcheson's objections to psychological egoism usually appeal to experience or introspection. However, at least one of them is theological: It includes premises of a religious kind, such as that God rewards the virtuous. This objection invites interpretive and philosophical questions, some of which may seem to highlight errors or shortcomings on Hutcheson's part. Also, to answer the questions is to point out important features of Hutcheson's objection and its intellectual context. And no…Read more
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34Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence. By Gregory Mellema (review)Modern Schoolman 71 (1): 73-75. 1993.
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Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of ProofMillennium: Journal of International Studies 27 (2): 275-97. 1998.
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890Reasons, rational requirements, and the putative pseudo-question “why be moral?”Synthese 161 (2). 2008.In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics sho…Read more
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235Desires, Reasons, and Reasons to be MoralAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4): 287-298. 2004.Opening sentences: "This paper concerns an argument which, in this author's experience, often comes up in discussions of 'Why be moral?' Although initially tempting, the argument is in error. The error warrants attention not only because it spoils the argument but because it connects to a second error which is easy to make. Both errors concern the relation between desires and (normative) practical reasons."
Indianapolis, Indiana, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |