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18Review of Laird Addis, Ontology and Explanation: Collected Papers (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (8). 2008.
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422Does twin earth rest on a mistake?Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (8): 155-169. 2003.In this paper I argue against Twin-Earth externalism. The mistake that Twin Earth arguments rest on is the failure to appreciate the force of the following dilemma. Some features of things around us do matter for the purposes of conceptual classification, and others do not. The most plausible way to draw this distinction is to see whether a certain feature enters the cognitive perspective of the experiencing subject in relation to the kind in question or not. If it does, we can trace conceptual …Read more
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738Practical Know‐WhNoûs 51 (4): 855-870. 2017.The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cas…Read more
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336Time, tense, truthSynthese 160 (2). 2008.Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterance…Read more
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704Independent intentional objectsIn Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way, College Publications. 2010.Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is b…Read more
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2397Semantic internalism and externalismIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 323. 2006.Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents
Hungarian Academic of Sciences
Alumnus, 1998
Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Cognitive Sciences |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Philosophy of Law |