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346Time, tense, truthSynthese 160 (2). 2008.Abstract: A theory of time is a theory of the nature of temporal reality, and temporal reality determines the truth-value of temporal sentences. Therefore it is reasonable to ask how a theory of time can account for the way the truth of temporal sentences is determined. This poses certain challenges for both the A theory and the B theory of time. In this paper, I outline an account of temporal sentences. The key feature of the account is that the primary bearers of truth-values are not utterance…Read more
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710Independent intentional objectsIn Tadeusz Czarnecki, Katarzyna Kijanija-Placek, Olga Poller & Jan Wolenski (eds.), The Analytical Way, College Publications. 2010.Intentionality is customarily characterised as the mind’s direction upon its objects. This characterisation allows for a number of different conceptions of intentionality, depending on what we believe about the nature of the objects or the nature of the direction. Different conceptions of intentionality may result in classifying sensory experience as intentional and nonintentional in different ways. In the first part of this paper, I present a certain view or variety of intentionality which is b…Read more
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2432Semantic internalism and externalismIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 323. 2006.Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents
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1245Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience?In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. pp. 351-370. 2014.It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of percepti…Read more
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391The Unity of Descartes's ThoughtHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1). 2005.Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence …Read more
Hungarian Academic of Sciences
Alumnus, 1998
Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Cognitive Sciences |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Philosophy of Law |