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2482Semantic internalism and externalismIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 323. 2006.Abstract: This paper introduces and analyses the doctrine of externalism about semantic content; discusses the Twin Earth argument for externalism and the assumptions behind it, and examines the question of whether externalism about content is compatible with a privileged knowledge of meanings and mental contents
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1257Which Causes of an Experience are also Objects of the Experience?In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content?, Oxford University Press. pp. 351-370. 2014.It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the objects of percepti…Read more
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397The Unity of Descartes's ThoughtHistory of Philosophy Quarterly 22 (1). 2005.Abstract: On several occasions (see e.g. Principles I/48) Descartes claims that sensations, emotions, imagination and sensory perceptions belong neither to the mind or to the body alone, but rather to their union. This seems to conflict with Descartes’s definition of “thought” given elsewhere, which classifies the same events as modes of a thinking substance, and hence depending for their existence only on minds. In this paper I offer an interpretation, which, I hope, will restore the coherence …Read more
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1951Belief May Not Be a Necessary Condition for KnowledgeErkenntnis 80 (1): 185-200. 2015.Most discussions in epistemology assume that believing that p is a necessary condition for knowing that p. In this paper, I will present some considerations that put this view into doubt. The candidate cases for knowledge without belief are the kind of cases that are usually used to argue for the so-called ‘extended mind’ thesis
Hungarian Academic of Sciences
Alumnus, 1998
Vienna, Austria
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Cognitive Sciences |
17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Philosophy of Law |