Anne Jeffrey

Some moral arguments for God begin with the phenomenon of moral goodness and argue that the most adequate explainer of this phenomenon is God. In this chapter, I put to the side such arguments and instead focus on whether a certain garden-variety theism supplies material to produce an improved theory of goodness. By layering onto an Aristotelian naturalist account of goodness a theistic account of providential creation, we can account for the continuity of our language and thought about the goodness of human and nonhuman organisms. This sort of supernaturalist theory of goodness can account for the ordinary grammar of goodness without inviting objections raised against Aristotelian naturalism and other godless theories of goodness; and in that respect, it should count as an improvement on such theories.

The ideal of loving our enemies figures in a range of traditions and political movements even if it is an ethical principle most of us fail to live up to. That does not keep us from thinking of the person who loves their enemies as exceptionally admirable; and we might think enemy love is good and good for us, not least because of its promise to restore relationships broken by trust and move us towards each other amidst polarization. But if we dig into our contemporary philosophical conceptions of love and consider the psychological implications of loving those who merit hate, we will see that the norm of enemy love looks either psychologically impossible or morally inappropriate. I explore three less-than-satisfying strategies for dealing with this puzzle and conclude by asking what this all means for recent theories of love.

Action from virtue has more value than merely virtuous action. The most common account of why this is so relies on the Silencing View of reasons: virtue focuses the agent's attention singularly and accurately on the very thing that matters morally, rather than allowing attention to be diffuse, divided between phantom reasons. This paper challenges the Silencing View and shows that virtue ethicists can make use of a different, multidimensional model of reasons to explain why virtuous actions performed from virtue are better than those performed without it. I suggest that virtuous reasons—the reasons the virtuous respond to— register on various dimensions of normative strength. This model accounts for an evaluative difference between actions done from sensitivity and responsiveness to just the right reasons and actions done without that fitting sensitivity. While sometimes virtue will silence all but one consideration, in other cases, virtue trains our attention on multiple considerations which together contribute to what is done and the manner in which it is done. Section 1 explains why virtue ethicists worry about the Value Challenge for Virtue. Section 2 recounts how the Silencing View is supposed to help the virtue ethicist meet that challenge. In section 3 I identify two features of reasons on the Silencing View—their requiring strength and sparsity—which together generate the normative problem I present in section 4. Section 5 illustrates how a multidimensional model of reasons can avoid this problem with the Silencing View without sacrificing an answer to the Value Challenge for Virtue.

We compare the definition of virtue in philosophy with the definition and operationalization of virtue in psychology. We articulate characteristics that virtue is presented as possessing in the perennial western philosophical tradition. Virtues are typically understood as (a) dispositional (b) deep-seated (c) habits (d) that contribute to flourishing and (e) that produce activities with the following three features: they are (f) done well, (g) not done poorly, and (h) in accordance with the right motivation and reason. We form a definition from these characteristics and defend our exclusion of some other characteristics from the definition. Using our definition as a rubric, we evaluate conceptions of virtue in psychology, showing how many fall short at operationalizing at least one component of the philosophical notion of virtue.

Informed by philosophical virtue theory, we tested developmental trajectories of welcoming accountability to other people in tandem with patience and courage. We sampled 870 US undergraduates pursuing personally-identified goals (N = 1,996 goals) across four timepoints in two years. Multi-level bivariate latent growth curve modeling disaggregated between-person patterns from within-person goal-level patterns for the three virtue measures. All three virtues’ slopes were nonsignificant, meaning virtues showed no uniform patterns of change for the sample. The slope of welcoming accountability was associated with the slopes of patience and courage so closely at the between-person level that a combined slope parameter was created, indicating virtues developed collectively. Importantly, at the within-person goal-level, the slopes of the virtues were not associated; in the context of pursuing particular goals, virtues developed distinctly. Results suggest that collective character growth, stagnation, or decline occurred for the whole person, yet specific goals call for specific virtues.

Historically, we see figures of major political movements advocating that people suffering from oppressive political powers cultivate a love of enemy. It should strike us as astonishing: it is one thing to maintain an attitude of concern and empathy toward those who oppose you when you are in a position of power, or even on equal footing, but quite another to maintain such attitudes toward those who hold power over you and actively threaten your life and livelihood. Why is it that the injunction to love our enemies is preached and practiced by those harmed by enmity? I suggest that the skills W. E. B. Du Bois calls “clairvoyance” are at once skills needed to maintain one’s own dignity under oppression and skills by which we can love enemies while retaining a sense of agency and self.

In this article, we explain how Kant upends the terms of the debate concerning the relationship between God’s existence and an objective morality by looking at his moral-teleological argument for God’s existence in the third Critique. We explain Kant’s rejection of external sources of moral normativity and his method of grounding moral authority in the normativity of practical reason. We then turn to Kant’s argument justifying a practical belief in God as the moral author of nature. Kant’s claims about how we must conceptualize organisms teleologically and, as a result, how reason seeks an unconditioned end of nature, brings together our moral purpose with a conception of nature as an organized whole. Since our teleological concepts of organisms seem to require that human beings serve as the final, unconditioned end of nature, but morality and nature might be incompatible and divergent, we must also believe in a moral author of nature. This belief guards against demoralization and creates a unified view of the human moral agent and the world she inhabits, which Kant thinks of as indispensable for our practical lives. Kant notoriously blurs the lines between theology and ethics in nonstandard ways. Although he rejects many traditional approaches to grounding ethics in a conception of divine commands or eternal law, he still devotes a considerable amount of time to dis-cussing the role of religion as a bulwark of the moral life. The goal of this paper is to defend Kant’s relevance to a discussion of the relationship between an objective ethics and the existence of God; his contribution deserves our notice precisely for the ways in which it promises to shift the terms of the contemporary debate and complicate possible answers to the question of whether there can be an objective morality without God.

This mixed-methods study used a participatory action approach to develop and test a culturally grounded measure of hope among adolescents. Nineteen adult community leaders participated in interviews and a youth advisory board provided their perspectives on hope in the southeastern U.S. This information was used to develop the Adolescent Hope Scale. Psychometric testing was conducted using data from an online panel of 311 youth participants (66.2% male; Mage = 12.62; 62.1% White American, 32.8% Black or African American) and their parents or legal guardians in the U.S. The newly developed Adolescent Hope Scale functioned equally well across gender and ethnicity. It was uniquely predictive of physical and relational aggression, conduct problems, and prosocial behavior. Promoting hope is a potential intervention target to reduce problem behaviors.

Recent work in positive psychology demonstrates the importance of self-transcendence: understanding oneself to be part of something greater than the self, such as a family, community, or tradition of sacred practice. Self-transcendence is positively associated with wellbeing and a sense of meaning and purpose. Philosophers have argued that self-transcendent motivation has a central role in good character, or virtue. Positive psychologists are just now beginning to integrate the aim of developing such motivation in character interventions. In this paper we draw attention to an important but overlooked condition on effectively developing self-transcendent motivation constitutive of virtue: such a process must engage the subject’s will in the right way. If a process does not meet this condition it will fail to produce motivation constitutive of virtue according to leading philosophical accounts of virtue. We identify a suite of strategies for cultivating motivations that do meet this condition but have not been explored in relation to character interventions, namely, reappraisal strategies from the extended process model of emotion regulation (EPM-ER).

Debates in metaethics about metanormative realism, quasi-realism, anti-realism, and nihilism mostly focus on epistemic reasons for beliefs about values. Very little has been said about our practical reasons for metaethical beliefs, and even less is said about practical reasons for other attitudes we might take toward metaethical views. This paper shows why a recent argument bucking that trend fails to show that we have practical reasons to believe realism over nihilism, but that for many of us, we do have practical reason to hope that what I call Optimistic Realism is true.

Many traditions and worldviews have held that patience is a virtue—a habit that is morally praiseworthy. In this essay we orient readers to recent work on what patience is and what patience does. What are the distinctive markers of the disposition of patience? And why have people regarded it as so important to living well? We outline four contemporary views all anchored in historical philosophical traditions and then suggest future directions for work on patience in normative ethics and political philosophy.

This paper reflects on the contrast between the individualistic philosophical underpinnings of positive psychology and the relational underpinnings of a particular indigenous philosophical framework: that of Anishinaabe (North American Indigenous peoples) philosophy. The salience of the global loneliness epidemic and the fact that positive psychology, constrained by its existing assumptions, has struggled to address it effectively make such an exploration of alternatives timely (Van Zyl et al., 2023). Traditional positive psychological tools may be iatrogenic by perpetuating an isolated view of the self, particularly when imposed on individuals and groups that value interconnectedness. Thus, we advocate for expanding positive psychology to reflect culturally diverse perspectives, especially non-individualistic perspectives that emphasize the relational nature of the person. Further, we propose a contextualistic approach to the problem of loneliness, one where we challenge and reposition assumptions to improve outcomes, avoiding the pitfalls of cultural relativism or the blind spots of universalism. Drawing on Anishinaabe philosophy, we show how three principles—relationality, process, and reciprocity—and their alignment with mino-bimaadiziwin (the good life) might inform a different inflection of positive psychology that would be better equipped to address loneliness. We provide preexisting and underutilized analogs of Anishinaabe relational approaches within psychology that are adaptable to more diverse worldviews to address the human problem of loneliness.

Psychology as a distinct scientific discipline originated within Western contexts, predominantly serving and studying Western populations (the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe). Likewise, dominant theories of well-being revolve around Western ideals such as individualism, self-actualization, personal achievement, and the pursuit of happiness (Krys et al., 2024; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Furthermore, psychological theories of ‘the good life’ are mostly Aristotelian and Western (Ratchford et al., 2023). Even the selection of what virtues constitute ‘the good life’ reflects preferences and personality traits that are adaptive and socially desirable in Western contexts but not necessarily in other Majority World Contexts (i.e., people from contexts outside of Western localities) (Wilson et al., 2024; Yu & Xie, 2021). The prevailing frameworks of well-being reflect culturally specific ideals of self-actualization and independence, often neglecting broader relational and ecological dimensions. In contrast, communal well-being, as central to many Indigenous philosophies, features relational harmony across generations, interconnectedness with others and the environment, and transcends individual concerns. This distinction underscores the need for communal perspectives to enrich and diversify well-being paradigms toward a truly global science of personality. In response, we present a Majority World perspective of communal well-being that has been largely overlooked in the literature: the Anishinaabe concept of Mino-Bimaadiziwin, or “living in a good way.” Mino-Bimaadiziwin is a philosophy of well-being rooted in the rich teachings, practices, and values of the Anishinaabeg, a particular North American Indigenous group. The Anishinaabeg are Indigenous peoples consisting of the Ojibwe (Chippewa), Potawatomi, Algonquin, Saulteaux, Nipissing, and Mississauga First Nations. We highlight this Indigenous perspective because the lead author is a descendant of the Bois Fort Band of Chippewa. Thus, the purpose of this article is to present insights into the process and content of Mino-Bimaadiziwin and the pursuit of harmony as a First Nations Majority World approach to well-being. Mino-Bimaadiziwin emphasizes the interconnectedness of all life, offering a relational, ecological, and spiritual framework for well-being (Nelson et al., 2024). Central to this framework are the Seven Grandfather Teachings—Truth, Humility, Respect, Love, Courage, Honesty, and Wisdom. These interdependent virtues guide individuals and communities towards harmony—the telos of Anishinaabe flourishing. Moreover, in contrast to empirical epistemologies, Anishinaabe do not view causal relationships as linear, so we present the Seven Grandfather Teachings or virtues as both a process and outcome of Mino-Bimaadiziwin. Because of these distinctions, this dynamic perspective of well-being is best portrayed through the Indigenous methodology of storywork (Archibald, 2008; Smith, 2012). Thus, we employ a narrative approach in the posture of a pluralistic scientific perspective, layering Anishinaabe teachings with Western psychological theories to diversify the discourse of human flourishing.

Aristotelian Naturalism (AN) has enjoyed a surge of interest in recent decades, and the field is now ripe for elaborations that go beyond, or critique, its traditional formulations. If we are to take seriously challenges to AN emerging from advances in feminist philosophy, disability theory, and social sciences, while taking seriously its naturalism we need to provide an empirical update to the account of human goodness and virtue. On the pluralist form of AN developed here, human goodness is not a single, unitary ideal out of reach for the majority world. Instead, following mundane evaluative practice and thought as well as social scientific evidence, I argue that people in a wide range of bodily, social, and environmental contexts can and do flourish. Moreover, people exhibit a variety of distinct forms of human goodness, all equally valuable, and different sets of virtues fit them for flourishing in these discrete contexts. This means that the ethical terrain is rather complex, populated by a multitude of peaks that people can ascend by a variety of paths rather than a single mountain we all should try to summit from wherever we are. Once we recognize the genuine diversity of forms human good lives take, and how the virtues suited for one type of life might simultaneously enable us to achieve other forms of flourishing, we will see how most people are for most of their lives simultaneously being and becoming good.

Debates in metaethics about metanormative realism, quasi-realism, anti-realism, and nihilism mostly focus on epistemic reasons for beliefs about values. Very little has been said about our practical reasons for metaethical beliefs, and even less is said about practical reasons for other attitudes we might take toward metaethical views. This paper shows why a recent argument bucking that trend fails to show that we have practical reasons to believe realism over nihilism, but that for many of us, we do have practical reason to hope that what I call Optimistic Realism is true.

Some theories of goodness are descriptively rich: they have much to say about what makes things good. Neo-Aristotelian accounts, for instance, detail the various features that make a human being, a dog, a bee good relative to facts about those forms of life. Famously, such theories of relative goodness tend to be comparatively poor: they have little or nothing to say about what makes one kind of being better than another kind. Other theories of goodness—those that take there to be absolute goodness—are comparatively rich: they offer grounds for judging some types of things better than others because they have more absolute goodness. Moorean accounts, for example, can tell us that humans and human experiences are superior to bees and blades of grass. But such theories tend to be descriptively poor: they struggle to tell us in virtue of what this is so. In this essay we motivate and flesh out a view that splits the difference between accounts of goodness as relative and accounts of goodness as absolute. Such a view holds promise only if the mechanics of this kind of metaphysics of goodness can be worked out. Here we present a view on which the paradigm for absolute goodness is God and the paradigm for each kind of relative goodness is a divine idea.

Philosophical anarchism, in its strongest form, says that a right to be obeyed would run up against the duty to act autonomously, so there must be no one with a right to be obeyed. More recently, a parallel criticism of moral testimony has been advanced according to which there can be no right to be believed about moral matters because it would lead us to fail in our duty to form our moral beliefs for ourselves, and thus to bear responsibility for the beliefs and the actions we perform on account of them. This essay advances an interpretation of both objections to practical deference and a novel solution drawing on G.E.M. Anscombe’s little discussed essay, “Authority in Morals.” I argue that the concern animating a priori anarchism and this version of moral testimony pessimism is that practical deference undermines our responsibility for our actions or beliefs. Anscombe’s discussion of teaching authority affords us a way of seeing that this is wrong-headed. In fact, the right to be obeyed or believed does not— and cannot— threaten to undermine a subject’s responsibility for what she believes or does out of deference to authority.

The growth of positive psychology has birthed debate on the nature of what “positive” really means. Conceptualizations of positive attributes vary across psychological perspectives, and it appears these definitional differences stem from standards for “positive” espoused by three normative ethical frameworks: consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. When definitions of “positive” do not align with one of these ethical schools, it appears researchers rely on preference to distinguish positive attributes. In either case, issues arise when researchers do not make their theoretical alignment explicit, leading to value-laden, often subjective criteria being smuggled into science as a description of what is positive. To foster a deeper critical understanding of the different approaches, we examine how these conceptual definitions of positive attributes (mis)align with their ethical traditions or fail to align with an ethical school.

We compare the definition of virtue in philosophy with the definition and operationalization of virtue in psychology. We articulate characteristics that virtue is presented as possessing in the perennial western philosophical tradition. Virtues are typically understood as (a) dispositional (b) deep-seated (c) habits (d) that contribute to flourishing and (e) that produce activities with the following three features: they are (f) done well, (g) not done poorly, and (h) in accordance with the right motivation and reason. We form a definition from these characteristics and defend our exclusion of some other characteristics from the definition. Using our definition as a rubric, we evaluate conceptions of virtue in psychology, showing how many fall short at operationalizing at least one component of the philosophical notion of virtue.

Research on interventions that aim to cultivate character strengths, or virtues, has been conducted primarily among highly resourced, predominantly White communities, and the interventions have been developed to reflect the values of those communities. The purpose of this study was to use a participatory action research approach to develop a virtue intervention focused on addressing the community-identified problem of violence in a predominantly Black community, and to test its effectiveness in a pilot study. Participants were 37 youth (M age = 12.1 years old; 97% Black) who attended summer programs in two sites (on intervention, one control condition). Participants in the intervention group had greater increases in effective nonviolent behavior than participants in the comparison group according to teacher report. Overall, the results of this pilot test suggest it is possible to build a feasible, attractive, evidence-based intervention to promote character strengths using participatory action research.

Character strengths research has the potential to imply that youth have character deficits or moral failings that cause their problematic behavior. This ignores the impact of context, especially for youth who are members of historically marginalized groups in under resourced communities. On the other hand, framing youth who are members of underrepresented groups solely as products of oppression undermines their agency and the power of collective action. It may be possible to promote character development in a contextually relevant, culturally grounded way through a transdisciplinary, participatory action approach. We engaged in this work in three phases: goal specification; logic model identification; and intervention development and testing. Lessons learned included the need for intensive trust-building and identifying the limitations in scope and capacity. Overall, a transdisciplinary, participatory action approach is a promising strategy to overcome the existing bias in virtue development research and to leverage positive psychology to address health disparities.

It seems like people have character traits that explain a good deal of their behavior. Call a theory character realism just in case it vindicates this folk assumption. Recently, Christian Miller has argued that the way to reconcile character realism with decades of psychological research is to adopt metaphysical reductivism about character traits. Some contemporary psychological theories of character and virtue seem to implicitly endorse such reductivism; others resist reduction of traits to finer-grained mental components or processes; and still others remain silent on the metaphysics of traits. In this paper we argue that character realists do not have to, and in fact should not, be reductivists. We introduce a theoretical dilemma for reductivist character realism. Then we explain how nonreductivists can meet the standards for empirical adequacy laid out by Miller and others. Further, we argue, hylomorphic nonreductivism avoids the theoretical dilemma that threatens reductivism. It also fits nicely the major commitments of recent models of virtue in psychology. Thus, character realists should not be reductivists.

One task of moral theory is to answer the question, “Why be moral?” This paper describes a particular theistic theory’s account of moral motivation, which I call the Divine Friendship Theory. I illustrate its plausibility and promise by showing how well the theory does along two dimensions along which an answer to the why-be-moral question can fare better or worse, namely, being psychologically realistic and supporting recognizably moral actions and attitudes. of the answer to the why-be-moral question. Given that the Divine Friendship Theory does well on each dimension, it deserves serious consideration.

In this paper we argue that the eudaimonist virtue of hope holds pride of place in development of psychological traits that promote human flourishing. The argument is part theoretical and part empirical. On the theoretical side, hope, the virtue, is the disposition to envision future good possibilities for oneself and one’s community and to move towards those possibilities. This renders hope necessary for any agent’s self-conscious pursuit of the goods that constitute flourishing, and also for the development of other virtues. On the empirical side, we draw on evidence from psychology to argue that early in development, humans need relationships of trust with caregivers to develop the future orientation and features of agency constitutive of the virtue of hope. Thus the virtue of hope generally needs to be fostered, in part, through trusting relationships for humans to flourish.

A number of important religious views entail that the ontological and epistemic relations between religion and morality are tighter than most secular thinkers suppose. We will focus on three theistic metaethical accounts of moral phenomena and moral knowledge: natural law theories, divine command theories, and divine will theories. These three types of accounts are among the most dominant in the philosophical literature on theistic ethics in contemporary anglophone philosophy, perhaps owing to their connection to major Western religions such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. It is important to note, however, that they hardly exhaust the conceptual space. Intellectual traditions of other religions such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, traditional Chinese religions, and African religions raise distinct philosophical questions about and offer a host of alternative views on the relationship between religion and morality (Jeffrey 2019). We close by offering a few such examples, though it is outside the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive survey of available views.

Debates in metaethics about metanormative realism, quasi-realism, anti-realism, and nihilism mostly focus on epistemic reasons for beliefs about values. Very little has been said about our practical reasons for metaethical beliefs, and even less is said about practical reasons for other attitudes we might take toward metaethical views. This paper shows why a recent argument bucking that trend fails to show that we have practical reasons to believe realism over nihilism, but that for many of us, we do have practical reason to hope that what I call Optimistic Realism is true.

One of the major contemporary challenges to Thomistic moral psychology is that it is incompatible with the most up-to-date psychological science. Here Thomistic psychology is in good company, targeted along with most virtue-ethical views by philosophical situationism, which uses replicated psychological studies to suggest that our behaviors are best explained by situational pressures rather than by stable traits (like virtues and vices). In this essay we explain how this body of psychological research poses a much deeper threat to Thomistic moral psychology in particular. For Thomistic moral psychology includes descriptive claims about causal connections between certain cognitive processes and behaviors, even independent of whether those processes emerge from habits like virtues. Psychological studies of correlations between these can provide evidence against those causal claims. We offer a new programmatic response to this deeper challenge: empirical studies are relevant only if they investigate behaviors under intentional descriptions, such that the correlations discovered are between cognition and what Aquinas calls human acts. Psychological research on aggression already emphasizes correlations between cognition and intentional behavior, or human acts, and so is positioned to shed light on how well Thomistic moral psychology fits with empirical data. Surprisingly, Aquinas’s views have quite a lot in common with a leading model of aggression, the social information processing (SIP) model. We close by suggesting how we might examine claims of Thomistic moral psychology from an empirical perspective further using research on social information processing and aggression.

Does theism make a difference to whether there are moral facts? In this paper I suggest that, despite how much uptake this question gets in philosophical literature, it is not well formed. “Theism” leaves too indeterminate what God is like for us to discern what difference God’s existence would make to moral facts. Arguments like the explanans-driven argument for theistic moral realism and the explanationist argument for naturalist moral realism both require extra substantive assumptions about God in order to be valid and compelling. Specifically, the arguments must take a stand on whether God is personal or a-personal, and how this affects God’s relation to the natural world.