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Memory as Window on the MindIn Alexandru Manafu (ed.), The Prospects for Fusion Emergence, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science, Vol. 313. 2015.
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62What is Epistemic Discourse About?In D. Kolak & J. Symons (eds.), Quantifiers, Questions and Quantum Physics, Springer. pp. 49--60. 2004.
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21Review of Radu J. Bogdan: Interpreting Minds: The Evolution of a Practice (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3): 492-496. 1999.
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19By way of means and endsIn Grounds for Cognition, Lawrence Erlbaum. 1994.This chapter provides the teleological foundations for our analysis of guidance to goal. Its objective is to ground goal-directedness genetically. The basic suggestion is this. Organisms are small things, with few energy resources and puny physical means, battling a ruthless physical and biological nature. How do they manage to survive and multiply? CLEVERLY, BY ORGANIZING
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24More theory and evolutionBehavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1): 390-391. 1991.Heyes’s skepticism about theory of mind (ToM) in nonhuman primates exploits the idea of a strong and unified theory of mind in humans based on an unanalyzed category of mental state. It also exploits narrow debates about crucial observations and experiments while neglecting wider evolutionary trends. I argue against both exploitations
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The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive SciencePhilosophical Quarterly 44 (175): 246-251. 1994.
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16Information and Semantic Cognition: An Ontological AccountMind and Language 3 (2): 81-122. 1988.
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1Arne Naess, "The Pluralist and the Possibilist Aspect of the Scientific Enterprise" (review)Theory and Decision 5 (3): 353. 1974.
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157Mind, content and informationSynthese 70 (February): 205-227. 1987.What is it that one thinks or believes when one thinks or believes something? A mental formula? A sentence in some natural language? Its truth conditions? Or perhaps an abstract proposition? The current story of content is fairly ecumenical. It says that a number of aspects, some mental, other semantic, go into our understanding of content. Yet the current story is incomplete. It leaves out a very important aspect of content, one which I call incremental information. It is information in a speci…Read more
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69Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop lateIn B. Malle & S. Hodges. (eds.), Other Minds: How Humans Bridge the Gap Between Self and Others, Guilford Press. pp. 190--206. 2005.Many philosophers and a few psychologists think that we understand our own minds before we understand those of others. Most developmental psychologists think that children understand their own minds at about the same time they understand other minds, by using the same cognitive abilities. I disagree with both views. I think that children understand other minds before they understand their own. Their self-understanding depends on some cognitive abilities that develop later than, and independently…Read more
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11Jaakko Hintikka (edited book)Reidel. 1987.The aim of this series is to inform both professional philosophers and a larger readership (of social and natural scientists, methodologists, mathematicians, students, teachers, publishers, etc. ) about what is going on, who's who, and who does what in contemporary philosophy and logic. PROFILES is designed to present the research activity and the results of already outstanding personalities and schools and of newly emerging ones in the various fields of philosophy and logic. There are many Fest…Read more
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The manufacture of beliefIn R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function, Oxford University Press. 1986.
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89Grounds for cognition: how goal-guided behavior shapes the mindL. Erlbaum Associates. 1994.This is how guidance of behavior to goal grounds and explains cognition and the main forms in which it manages information.
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1Stephen Schiffer and Susan Steele, eds., Cognition and Representation Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 10 (1): 39-42. 1990.
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148``Cognition and Epistemic Closure"American Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1): 55--63. 1985.JUSTIFICATION and knowledge are thought to be closed under known implication..1 This widely shared assumption is embodied in the following principles of epistemic closure
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42More theory and evolution, please!Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6): 1140-1141. 2001.Heyes's (1998) skepticism about theory of mind (ToM) in nonhuman primates exploits the idea of a strong and unified theory of mind in humans based on an unanalyzed category of mental state. It also exploits narrow debates about crucial observations and experiments while neglecting wider evolutionary trends. I argue against both exploitations.
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168Mental attitudes and common sense psychology: The case against eliminationNoûs 22 (3): 369-398. 1988.Aside from brute force, there are several philosophically respectable ways of eliminating the mental. In recent years the most popular elimination strategy has been directed against our common sense or folk psychological understanding of the mental. The strategy goes by the name of eliminative materialism (or eliminativism, in short). The motivation behind this strategy seems to be the following. If common sense psychology can be construed as the principled theory of the mental, whose vocabulary…Read more
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155Inside loops: Developmental premises of self-ascriptionsSynthese 159 (2): 235-252. 2007.Self-ascriptions of thoughts and attitudes depend on a sense of the intentionality of one’s own mental states, which develops later than, and independently of, the sense of the intentionality of the thoughts and attitudes of others. This sense of the self-intentionality of one’s own mental states grows initially out of executive developments that enable one to simulate one’s own actions and perceptions, as genuine off-line thoughts, and to regulate such simulations
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Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Cognitive Sciences |