Paolo Costa

In broad terms, realism, relativism and pluralism can be regarded as the theoretical articulations of the following insights. Realism embodies the sense that what is at stake in our beliefs is something serious, i.e. that there is a fact of the matter, independent from our desire, which is going to decide whether what we believe in is true or not. Relativism, on the other hand, incorporates the realization that our cognitive take on the world is always perspectival, that there is no way to overcome the blind spot which enables the knower to have a world in view at all. Pluralism, finally, draws on the intuition that every human being and every human community cannot fully understand, let alone save themselves, without the help of others’ sense-making efforts. Against the background of Charles Taylor’s philosophy, the core of truth of the above insights will be discussed and arranged to develop an active view of toleration that not only urges us to put up with others, but encourages us to rely on the benefit of coming to terms with different outlooks and ways of life.

Da un punto di vista temporale la felicità rappresenta un’esperienza intensa del presente. Non a caso la tradizione metafisica e cristiana ha rappresentato la beatitudine come una fuoriuscita dal tempo in un attimo che permane. Ma, accogliendo alcuni suggerimenti di Hannah Arendt, la felicità umana può essere intesa altresì come l’esperienza di un presente dilatato in cui il tempo non è trasceso, bensì esaltato in uno “spazio” della presenza in cui il trascorrere degli attimi non costituisce una perdita. Ma questo dono della felicità non è senza costi: esso spetta solo a chi si oppone alla deriva del tempo, a chi parteggia per un “presente che lotta”.From a temporal point of view, happiness consists in an intense experience of the present. It is not a chance that the metaphysical and christian tradition has understood beatitude as a getting out of time in a lasting moment. Drawing on some suggestions by Hannah Arendt, however, human happiness can be seen also as an experience of an extended present where the time is not transcended, but exalted in a “space” of presence where the elapsing of the “nows” does not represent a loss. In any case, the gift of happiness is not without costs: it belongs to those who oppose the drift of time, those who stand for a “fighting present”

The essay’s main goal is to see what connection (if any) may be drawn between McDowell’s theoretical quietism and Hegel’s idea of philosophy. McDowell’s view is explicitly rooted in Wittgenstein’s belief that «philosophy leaves everything as it is» and that its task only «consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose», but it may be interesting to investigate whether this quietism, as he has recently reiterated, is merely «Wittgensteinian» or has a broader import. The issue is approached «sideways on». The essay starts with a discussion of David Foster Wallace’s view that «the most obvious, ubiquitous, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about» and it bridges the gap between Hegel and McDowell’s Wittgensteinianism by resorting to an examination of Charles Taylor’s «qualitative conception of action».

La nozione di limite è al contempo familiare e sfuggente. Comprendere il suo significato potrebbe fornire una chiave per la comprensione stessa della condizione umana. La prima cosa che si può osservare è che gli uomini s’imbattono nei limiti in una condizione di non equilibrio, sperimentano cioè i confini della propria esistenza esercitando una pressione contro di essi. Come hanno mostrato sia Kant sia Hegel, tali confini hanno più il carattere di linee di articolazione della nostra esperienza che di vere e proprie barriere. Volendo, si potrebbe descriverli come regole costitutive delle pratiche umane non esplicitabili in maniera definitiva. Regole che vengono patite prima ancora che astrattamente conosciute.The concept of limit is both familiar and slippery. Understanding its meaning would somehow mean to grasp the meaning of human condition itself. Men come up against limits in an unbalanced state and they experience the boundaries of their own experience by exercising pressure upon them. As it can be seen both in Kant and Hegel, such boundaries are less barriers than articulations of our own experience. In a way, they might be described as not fully explicitable constitutive rules of human practices. These are rules that are first suffered rather than abstractly known.

In maggioranza la tradizione intellettuale e politica occidentale ha guardato con sospetto il sentimento di compassione. Una delle più celebri critiche della compassione è quella proposta da Hannah Arendt. A ben vedere, però, la Arendt non critica la compassione in quanto tale, ma l’uso politico che di essa è stato fatto dai rivoluzionari moderni. In sé e per sé essa ha infatti un valore umano innegabile in quanto apertura all’altro e alla nostra realtà più immediata. Recentemente Martha Nussbaum ha proposto un’analisi dettagliata del sentimento di compassione. Anche dalla sua disamina emerge il carattere ambivalente della compassione che a suo avviso deve essere guidata da una teoria etica corretta. Se mantenuta entro i limiti della ragione la compassione può svolgere un ruolo essenziale nelle democrazie liberali contemporanee.Compassion has been looked upon with suspicion by the majority of our western intellectual and political tradition. One of the most famous criticisms of compassion was Hannah Arendt’s. She, however, did not criticize compassion as such, but complained the way it was used by modern rivolutionaries. Compassion in itself has an undeniable human value, to the extent that it opens us up to the others and to our most immediate reality. Martha Nussbaum has recently offered a detailed analysis of compassion. Its ambivalent character emerges from her reading, too. Her conclusion is that compassion should be guided by a correct ethical theory. If kept within the limits of reason, it can play a crucial role in contemporary liberal democracies.