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143Contextualism and unhappy-face solutions: Reply to Schiffer (review)Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 185-197. 2004.
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545Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual JustificationLogos and Episteme 7 (2): 215-219. 2016.James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
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38Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1043-1048. 1999.
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798Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasonsPhilosophical Perspectives 13 57-89. 1999.
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355Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justificationPhilosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 141-159. 2010.
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217Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 447-455. 2012.
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3Contextualism defendedIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 56-62. 2013.
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386Theorizing about the epistemicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 839-857. 2016.I argue that epistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led to serious confusion in the discussion of epistemological issues. The source of the problem is that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined technical term. I show how this confusion has infected discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and knowledge norms for assertion and belief.
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203Luminosity, Reliability, and the SoritesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 718-730. 2010.
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703Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lotteryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.(1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411
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770Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309-329. 2002.The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”
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62Replies to my commentatorsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 906-922. 2016.
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221Knowledge, context, and social standardsSynthese 73 (1). 1987.This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives r…Read more
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102Greco’s Agent Reliabilism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2). 2003.John Greco's Putting Skeptics in their Place presents an illuminating perspective on the nature of the skeptical problem and how to respond to it. Building on Ernest Sosa's Virtue Epistemology, Greco develops an account of knowledge he calls, “Agent Reliabilism”. In this essay, I will take up several issues regarding the details of this account.
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246Contextualism defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's skeptical problems, contextualist solutionsPhilosophical Studies 103 (1). 2001.