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359Two Kinds of Skeptical ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 143-159. 1998.This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without …Read more
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31Contextualismo y escepticismoTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 113-126. 2000.
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5Skepticism, relevance, and relativityIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 17--37. 1991.
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102Knowledge, speaker and subjectPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219). 2005.I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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1Contextualism defended some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 67-71. 2013.
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328Why Basic Knowledge is Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 417-430. 2007.The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we …Read more
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2Ascriber ContextualismIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 417. 2008.
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199Knowledge as aptnessPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 121--125. 2009.I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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144Contextualism and unhappy-face solutions: Reply to Schiffer (review)Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 185-197. 2004.
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555Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual JustificationLogos and Episteme 7 (2): 215-219. 2016.James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
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38Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1043-1048. 1999.
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799Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasonsPhilosophical Perspectives 13 57-89. 1999.