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1021Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual JustificationLogos and Episteme 7 (2): 215-219. 2016.James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
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180Knowledge, speaker and subjectPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219). 2005.I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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295Contextualism defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's skeptical problems, contextualist solutionsPhilosophical Studies 103 (1): 87-98. 2001.
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264Knowledge as aptnessPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 121--125. 2009.I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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31Contextualismo y escepticismoTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 113-126. 2000.
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563Theorizing about the epistemicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 839-857. 2016.I argue that epistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led to serious confusion in the discussion of epistemological issues. The source of the problem is that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined technical term. I show how this confusion has infected discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and knowledge norms for assertion and belief.
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267Luminosity, Reliability, and the SoritesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 718-730. 2010.
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3Contextualism defended some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 67-71. 2013.
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178Replies to my commentatorsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 906-922. 2016.
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318Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 447-455. 2012.
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194Contextualism and unhappy-face solutions: Reply to Schiffer (review)Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 185-197. 2004.
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318Two Kinds of Skeptical ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 143-159. 1998.This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without …Read more
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945Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasonsPhilosophical Perspectives 13 57-89. 1999.
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451Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justificationPhilosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 141-159. 2010.
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5Skepticism, relevance, and relativityIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics, Blackwell. pp. 17--37. 1991.
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296Knowledge, context, and social standardsSynthese 73 (1): 3-26. 1987.This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives r…Read more
