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703Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lotteryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.(1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411
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770Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309-329. 2002.The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”
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62Replies to my commentatorsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 906-922. 2016.
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221Knowledge, context, and social standardsSynthese 73 (1). 1987.This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives r…Read more
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102Greco’s Agent Reliabilism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2). 2003.John Greco's Putting Skeptics in their Place presents an illuminating perspective on the nature of the skeptical problem and how to respond to it. Building on Ernest Sosa's Virtue Epistemology, Greco develops an account of knowledge he calls, “Agent Reliabilism”. In this essay, I will take up several issues regarding the details of this account.
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246Contextualism defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's skeptical problems, contextualist solutionsPhilosophical Studies 103 (1). 2001.
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358Two Kinds of Skeptical ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 143-159. 1998.This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without …Read more
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31Contextualismo y escepticismoTeorema: International Journal of Philosophy 19 (3): 113-126. 2000.
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5Skepticism, relevance, and relativityIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 17--37. 1991.
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100Knowledge, speaker and subjectPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219). 2005.I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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1Contextualism defended some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 67-71. 2013.
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2Ascriber ContextualismIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 417. 2008.
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325Why Basic Knowledge is Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 417-430. 2007.The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we …Read more
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196Knowledge as aptnessPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 121--125. 2009.I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.