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5Skepticism, relevance, and relativityIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics, Blackwell. pp. 17--37. 1991.
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9Knowledge, speaker and subjectPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219). 2005.I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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1Contextualism defended some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 67-71. 2013.
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2Ascriber ContextualismIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 417. 2008.
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18Why Basic Knowledge is Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 417-430. 2007.The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we …Read more
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12Knowledge as aptnessPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 121--125. 2009.I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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6Contextualism and unhappy-face solutions: Reply to Schiffer (review)Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 185-197. 2004.
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101Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual JustificationLogos and Episteme 7 (2): 215-219. 2016.James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
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2Lehrer on Coherence and Self-Trust (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1043-1048. 1999.
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32Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasonsPhilosophical Perspectives 13 57-89. 1999.
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17Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justificationPhilosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 141-159. 2010.
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20Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 447-455. 2012.
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3Contextualism defendedIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 56-62. 2013.
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35Theorizing about the epistemicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 839-857. 2016.I argue that epistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led to serious confusion in the discussion of epistemological issues. The source of the problem is that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined technical term. I show how this confusion has infected discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and knowledge norms for assertion and belief.