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26On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychologyBiology and Philosophy 18 (5): 669-681. 2003.The naturalistic fallacy is mentioned frequently by evolutionary psychologists as an erroneous way of thinking about the ethical implications of evolved behaviors. However, evolutionary psychologists are themselves confused about the naturalistic fallacy and use it inappropriately to forestall legitimate ethical discussion. We briefly review what the naturalistic fallacy is and why it is misused by evolutionary psychologists. Then we attempt to show how the ethical implications of evolved behavi…Read more
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116Merleau-ponty, embodied cognition, and the problem of intentionalityCybernetics and Systems 28 345-58. 1997.
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780Concepts: Fodor's little semantic BBs of thought - A critical look at Fodor's theory of concepts -J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 13 (2): 89-94. 2001.I find it interesting that AI researchers don't use concepts very often in their theorizing. No doubt they feel no pressure to. This is because most AI researchers do use representations which allow a system to chunk up its environment, and basically all we know about concepts is that they are representations which allow a system to chunk up its environment.
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564The Prepared Mind: The Role of Representational Change in Chance DiscoveryIn Yukio Ohsawa Peter McBurney (ed.), Chance Discovery by Machines, Springer-verlag, Pp. 208-230.. 2003.Analogical reminding in humans and machines is a great source for chance discoveries because analogical reminding can produce representational change and thereby produce insights. Here, we present a new kind of representational change associated with analogical reminding called packing. We derived the algorithm in part from human data we have on packing. Here, we explain packing and its role in analogy making, and then present a computer model of packing in a micro-domain. We conclude that packi…Read more
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973Some strangeness in the proportion, or how to stop worrying and learn to love the mechanistic forces of darknessPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3): 349-352. 2008.Understanding humans requires viewing them as mechanisms of some sort, since understanding anything requires seeing it as a mechanism. It is science’s job to reveal mechanisms. But science reveals much more than that: it also reveals enduring mystery—strangeness in the proportion. Concentrating just on the scientific side of Selinger’s and Engström’s call for a moratorium on cyborg discourse, I argue that this strangeness prevents cyborg discourse from diminishing us.
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49All information processing entails computation, or, if R. A. Fisher had been a cognitive scientist . .Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5): 637-638. 1998.We argue that the dynamical and computational hypotheses are compatible and in fact need each other: they are about different aspects of cognition. However, only computationalism is about the information-processing aspect. We then argue that any form of information processing relying on matching and comparing, as cognition does, must use discrete representations and computations defined over them.
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47Review of "The Death of Philosophy: Reference and Self-Reference in Contemporary Thought" (review)Essays in Philosophy 13 (2): 605-610. 2012.
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32Throwing the conscious baby out with the Cartesian bath waterBehavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2): 202-203. 1992.
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11It does so: Review of The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (review)AI Magazine 22 (4): 141-144. 2001.Objections to AI and computational cognitive science are myriad. Accordingly, there are many different reasons for these attacks. But all of them come down to one simple observation: humans seem a lot smarter that computers -- not just smarter as in Einstein was smarter than I, or I am smarter than a chimpanzee, but more like I am smarter than a pencil sharpener. To many, computation seems like the wrong paradigm for studying the mind. (Actually, I think there are deeper and darker reasons why A…Read more
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394A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' CourtNewsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct). 2002.What is consciousness? Of course, each of us knows, privately, what consciousness is. And we each think, for basically irresistible reasons, that all other conscious humans by and large have experiences like ours. So we conclude that we all know what consciousness is. It's the felt experiences of our lives. But that is not the answer we, as cognitive scientists, seek in asking our question. We all want to know what physical process consciousness is and why it produces this very strange, almost m…Read more
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466It Does So: Review of Jerry Fodor, The Mind Doesn't Work That Way (review)AI Magazine 22 (4): 121-24. 2001.Objections to AI and computational cognitive science are myriad. Accordingly, there are many different reasons for these attacks. But all of them come down to one simple observation: humans seem a lot smarter that computers -- not just smarter as in Einstein was smarter than I, or I am smarter than a chimpanzee, but more like I am smarter than a pencil sharpener. To many, computation seems like the wrong paradigm for studying the mind. (Actually, I think there are deeper and darker reasons why A…Read more
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1267Discrete thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representationsMind and Language 18 (1): 95-119. 2003.Advocates of dynamic systems have suggested that higher mental processes are based on continuous representations. In order to evaluate this claim, we first define the concept of representation, and rigorously distinguish between discrete representations and continuous representations. We also explore two important bases of representational content. Then, we present seven arguments that discrete representations are necessary for any system that must discriminate between two or more states. It…Read more
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67Thinking Computers and Virtual Persons: Essays on the Intentionality of Machines (edited book)Academic Press. 1994.Can computers think? This book is intended to demonstrate that thinking, understanding, and intelligence are more than simply the execution of algorithms--that is, that machines cannot think. Written and edited by leaders in the fields of artificial intelligence and the philosophy of computing.
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724After the Humans are GonePhilosophy Now 61 (May/June): 16-19. 2007.Recently, on the History Channel, artificial intelligence (AI) was singled out, with much wringing of hands, as one of the seven possible causes of the end of human life on Earth. I argue that the wringing of hands is quite inappropriate: the best thing that could happen to humans, and the rest of life of on planet Earth, would be for us to develop intelligent machines and then usher in our own extinction.
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44Some assumptions underlying Smolensky's treatment of connectionismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1): 29-31. 1988.
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476AI and the Mechanistic Forces of DarknessJ. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 7 (2): 155-161. 1995.Under the Superstition Mountains in central Arizona toil those who would rob humankind o f its humanity. These gray, soulless monsters methodically tear away at our meaning, our subjectivity, our essence as transcendent beings. With each advance, they steal our freedom and dignity. Who are these denizens of darkness, these usurpers of all that is good and holy? None other than humanity’s arch-foe: The Cognitive Scientists -- AI researchers, fallen philosophers, psychologists, and other benighted…Read more
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