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32Brute association is not identityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 171-171. 1999.O'Brien & Opie run into conceptual problems trying to equate stable patterns of neural activation with phenomenal experiences. They also seem to make a logical mistake in thinking that the brute association between stable neural patterns and phenomenal experiences implies that they are identical. In general, the authors do not provide us with a story as to why stable neural patterns constitute phenomenal experience.
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31Throwing the conscious baby out with the Cartesian bath waterBehavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2): 202-203. 1992.
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29Cognitive Science and the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness, or Why the Computational Science of Mind Suffers the Slings and Arrowsof Outrageous FortuneTechné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 5 (2): 73-82. 2000.
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26On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychologyBiology and Philosophy 18 (5): 669-681. 2003.The naturalistic fallacy is mentioned frequently by evolutionary psychologists as an erroneous way of thinking about the ethical implications of evolved behaviors. However, evolutionary psychologists are themselves confused about the naturalistic fallacy and use it inappropriately to forestall legitimate ethical discussion. We briefly review what the naturalistic fallacy is and why it is misused by evolutionary psychologists. Then we attempt to show how the ethical implications of evolved behavi…Read more
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26Editorial: Epistemic Feelings: Phenomenology, Implementation, and Role in CognitionFrontiers in Psychology 11. 2020.
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25On the inappropriate use of the naturalistic fallacy in evolutionary psychologyBiology and Philosophy 18 (5): 669-681. 2003.The naturalistic fallacy is mentionedfrequently by evolutionary psychologists as anerroneous way of thinking about the ethicalimplications of evolved behaviors. However,evolutionary psychologists are themselvesconfused about the naturalistic fallacy and useit inappropriately to forestall legitimateethical discussion. We briefly review what thenaturalistic fallacy is and why it is misusedby evolutionary psychologists. Then we attemptto show how the ethical implications of evolvedbehaviors can be …Read more
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25When Science Confronts Philosophy: Three Case StudiesAxiomathes 30 (5): 479-500. 2020.This paper examines three cases of the clash between science and philosophy: Zeno’s paradoxes, the Frame Problem, and a recent attempt to experimentally refute skepticism. In all three cases, the relevant science claims to have resolved the purported problem. The sciences, construing the term broadly, are mathematics, artificial intelligence, and psychology. The goal of this paper is to show that none of the three scientific solutions work. The three philosophical problems remain as vibrant as e…Read more
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16Do Noncassical Worlds Entail Dualism? (review)Constructivist Foundations 12 (3): 275-276. 2017.The vast differences between the objective, classical realm of our everyday lives and any nonclassical realm have worried researchers for almost a century. No attempt at resolving the differences or explaining them away has ever worked. Maybe there are two realms, the classical and the nonclassical, and maybe they are paradoxical.
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15Replies to my computational commentatorsSocial Epistemology 369 (October-December): 369-375. 1990.
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13Toward a book of counter-examples for cognitive science: Dynamic systems theory, emotion, and aardvarksDanish Yearbook of Philosophy 36 (1): 35-48. 2001.
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11It does so: Review of The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (review)AI Magazine 22 (4): 141-144. 2001.Objections to AI and computational cognitive science are myriad. Accordingly, there are many different reasons for these attacks. But all of them come down to one simple observation: humans seem a lot smarter that computers -- not just smarter as in Einstein was smarter than I, or I am smarter than a chimpanzee, but more like I am smarter than a pencil sharpener. To many, computation seems like the wrong paradigm for studying the mind. (Actually, I think there are deeper and darker reasons why A…Read more
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8Review of The Death of Philosophy: Reference and Self-Reference in Contemporary Thought, by Isabelle Thomas-Fogiel, trans. Richard A. Lynch (review)Essays in Philosophy 13 (2): 605-610. 2012.
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7The Allure of the Serial KillerIn Fritz Allhoff & S. Waller (eds.), Serial Killers ‐ Philosophy for Everyone, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010-09-24.This chapter contains sections titled: The Allure of Monsters Explaining the Allure: First Look Stalking the Deeper Reasons Closing in for the Kill Removing Empathy The Prison of Rules Conclusion.
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Philosophy of artificial intelligenceIn Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Macmillan. pp. 203--208. 2002.
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Computer Thought: Propositional Attitudes and Meta-KnowledgeDissertation, The University of Arizona. 1985.Though artificial intelligence scientists frequently use words such as "belief" and "desire" when describing the computational capacities of their programs and computers, they have completely ignored the philosophical and psychological theories of belief and desire. Hence, their explanations of computational capacities which use these terms are frequently little better than folk-psychological explanations. Conversely, though philosophers and psychologists attempt to couch their theories of belie…Read more
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