Konstantin Pollok

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity.

Welchen Standards müssen Personen genügen, damit ihre Äußerungen als wahrhaftig angesehen werden? Nicht Wahrhaftigkeit als soziale Tugend und auch nicht Wahrhaftigkeit als notwendige Argumentationsvoraussetzung , sondern die normativen Voraussetzungen wahrhaftiger Äußerungen von Überzeugungen, Werten, Wünschen und Gefühlen einer Person, d. h. eine Analyse der normativen Erfordernisse der Wahrhaftigkeit als Teilaspekt einer Sprachpragmatik, sind das Thema dieses Aufsatzes. Ausgehend von Überlegungen Wittgensteins, John Broomes und Robert Brandoms untersuche ich die normative Feinstruktur der Differenz zwischen dem 'Äußern' und dem 'Besitzen' eines propositionalen Gehalts sowie der Vorsätzlichkeit dieser Differenz im 'Äußern'. Mein Ergebnis ist schließlich: Person B glaubt, daß die Äußerung des propositionalen Gehalts p durch Person A wahrhaftig ist, wenn die Person B der Person A die Festlegung auf p zuweist, die Person B der Person A eine Berechtigung zu p zuweist und die Person B der Person A die Festlegung auf eine Berechtigung zu p zuweist

Konstantin Pollok offers the first book-length analysis of Kant's theory of normativity that covers foundational issues in theoretical and practical philosophy as well as aesthetics. Interpreting Kant's 'critical turn' as a normative turn, he argues that Kant's theory of normativity is both original and radical: it departs from the perfectionist ideal of early modern rationalism, and arrives at an unprecedented framework of synthetic a priori principles that determine the validity of our judgments. Pollok examines the hylomorphism in Kant's theory of normativity and relates Kant's idea of our reason's self-legislation to the 'natural right' tradition, revealing Kant's debt to his predecessors as well as his relevance to contemporary debates on normativity. This book will appeal to academic researchers and advanced students of Kant, early modern philosophy and intellectual history.

By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the A-deduction. Whereas the first step of the B-deduction is an attempt to show that the manifold of an intuition belongs to the ‘necessary unity of self-consciousness’ by means of the synthesis of the understanding, the second step has the task of showing that the very same synthesis is responsible for the spatio-temporal unity of the manifold. Thus, Kant's ‘answer to Hume’ is that no spatio-temporal objects of experience at all are merely ‘given’, independently of the conceptual activities of the understanding. Against the established view I substantiate the claim that with this ‘almost single inference’ of the second proof step the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience consequently vanished from Kant's thinking

Konstantin Pollok - Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 559-575 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion Konstantin Pollok There are two significant places in Kant's Critical corpus where he discusses the concept of motion. The first is in the Critique of Pure Reason, where in the "Deduction of the Categories" Kant writes: Motion, as an act of the subject , and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession—if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form. In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject. For present purposes, the most relevant passage is paragraph 15 of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant says that the concept of matter had … to be carried through all four of the indicated functions of the concepts of the understanding , where in each a new determination of this concept was added. The..

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant und das Problem des metaphysischen Idealismusby Dietmar H. HeidemannKonstantin PollokDietmar H. Heidemann. Kant und das Problem des metaphysischen Idealismus. Kantstudien Ergänzungshefte 131, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998. Pp. 268. Cloth, DM 158.00.Immanuel Kant’s critical philosophy was controversial from the very beginning. His refutations of idealism played an important part in these debates. Dietmar H. Heidemann’s book on the problem of idealism is an attempt to evaluate Kant’s arguments against metaphysical idealism. Yet Heidemann never takes a position on whether Kant eventually succeeded or failed in refuting idealism. On the one hand, he thinks it is possible “to consider the proof of the existence of the external world as ultimately unsatisfactory” (238). On the other hand he ambiguously talks of Kant’s “solution of the problem of metaphysical idealism, which is, though not satisfactory in all parts, still quite convincing and even plausible” (238). This indecisiveness constitutes a fundamental shortcoming in an otherwise interesting discussion of a central Kantian problem. The book is distinguished by its close reading of the relevant Kantian texts between 1781 and 1800 and its scrupulous rendering of the respective steps of Kant’s argumentation.Heidemann’s well written investigation consists of an introduction, dealing with the pre-Kantian discussion of that problem, followed by three chapters that present Kant’s criticism of “metaphysical idealism” (3). The author lumps together the theories of Descartes’s ‘skeptical’ or ‘problematic’ idealism and Berkeley’s ‘dogmatic’ idealism with this non-Kantian term. The three chapters correspond to different chronological stages in Kant’s attempts at refuting idealism. First, Heidemann analyzes the structure of the Fourth Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason, which was directed against Descartes. This argument was intended to prove that our knowledge of the external world is [End Page 175]immediate. Kant appeals to a radical difference between transcendental and empirical idealism on the one hand and transcendental and empirical realism on the other, and he claims that doubts about the external world that are based on discursive argumentscan be dismissed as illegitimate in principle. Heidemann criticizes Kant’s argumentation. In particular, he thinks that the immediacy of our perceptions alone cannot prove the necessity of outer objects, which could instead be imaginations of immediate objects.In the second chapter, which is unquestionably the center of Heidemann’s study, he analyzes the Refutation of Idealismin the second edition of the Critique. Beginning from its external occasion—the ‘Göttingen review’ by Garve, edited by Feder— Heidemann tries to show that Kant’s refutation of idealism is compelling. He sees Kant’s arguments as implicitly or explicitly informed by the postulate of actuality and the consciousness of one’s existence in time. It is this consciousness that makes necessary the presupposition of something permanent in intuition and thus of substance as matter. In supporting Kant’s sometimes elliptical argumentation with other passages from the Critique, Heidemann tries to improve on Kant’s text. Yet, he is doubtful as to whether the argument succeeds. He thinks that the refutation of idealism would remain insufficient, unless the “theory of self-affection ( Selbstaffektion)” (127), added in 1787, is taken into consideration. In other words, the refutation depends on Kant’s revision of the relationship between the inner and the outer sense in the B-Deduction.The third chapter examines Kant’s occupation with the refutation of idealism after 1787. Heidemann finds that Kant continues to be preoccupied with this subject because of Eberhard’s articles in his Philosophisches Magazin, G. E. Schulze’s Aenesidemus, and D. Tiedemann’s Theaetet. Using Kant’s Reflexionsbetween 1788 and 1800, Heidemann argues that Kant’s new approach is characterised mainly by a decreasing importance of the permanent in the determination of time and a new emphasis of the coexistence argument. But this is questionable for Kant relies on the synthetic connection between the categories of coexistence and substance in the Critique. Heidemann pays a great deal of attention to Kant’s Reflexion “On inner sense” because of its explicit consideration of the relationship between the inner and the outer sense. Heidemann views this passage as “Kant’s...