•  724
    Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference
    Philosophy of Science 87 (2): 319-335. 2020.
    Why are conditional degrees of belief in an observation E, given a statistical hypothesis H, aligned with the objective probabilities expressed by H? After showing that standard replies are not satisfactory, I develop a suppositional analysis of conditional degree of belief, transferring Ramsey’s classical proposal to statistical inference. The analysis saves the alignment, explains the role of chance-credence coordination, and rebuts the charge of arbitrary assessment of evidence in Bayesian in…Read more
  •  35
    Erratum to: Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect (review)
    Erkenntnis 79 (S3): 669-670. 2014.
  •  214
    The No Alternatives Argument
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1): 213-234. 2015.
    Scientific theories are hard to find, and once scientists have found a theory, H, they often believe that there are not many distinct alternatives to H. But is this belief justified? What should scientists believe about the number of alternatives to H, and how should they change these beliefs in the light of new evidence? These are some of the questions that we will address in this article. We also ask under which conditions failure to find an alternative to H confirms the theory in question. Th…Read more
  •  113
    Testing a precise null hypothesis: the case of Lindley’s paradox
    Philosophy of Science 80 (5): 733-744. 2013.
    The interpretation of tests of a point null hypothesis against an unspecified alternative is a classical and yet unresolved issue in statistical methodology. This paper approaches the problem from the perspective of Lindley's Paradox: the divergence of Bayesian and frequentist inference in hypothesis tests with large sample size. I contend that the standard approaches in both frameworks fail to resolve the paradox. As an alternative, I suggest the Bayesian Reference Criterion: it targets the pre…Read more
  •  139
    Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength
    Philosophical Review 127 (3): 371-398. 2018.
    This paper develops axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic-interventionist theory of causal strength. Transferring methods from Bayesian confirmation theory, I proceed in three steps: I develop a framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength; I argue that no single measure can satisfy all natural constraints; I prove two representation theorems for popular measures of causal strength: Pearl's causal effect measure and Eells' difference measure. In other words, I demonstrate…Read more