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101Formal Modeling in Social Epistemology (edited book)Logic Journal of the IGPL (special issue). 2010.Special issue. With contributions by Rogier De Langhe and Matthias Greiff, Igor Douven and Alexander Riegler, Stephan Hartmann and Jan Sprenger, Carl Wagner, Paul Weirich, and Jesús Zamora Bonilla.
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163The probabilistic no miracles argumentEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 6 (2): 173-189. 2016.This paper develops a probabilistic reconstruction of the No Miracles Argument in the debate between scientific realists and anti-realists. The goal of the paper is to clarify and to sharpen the NMA by means of a probabilistic formalization. In particular, we demonstrate that the persuasive force of the NMA depends on the particular disciplinary context where it is applied, and the stability of theories in that discipline. Assessments and critiques of "the" NMA, without reference to a particular…Read more
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101Probability, rational single-case decisions and the Monty Hall ProblemSynthese 174 (3): 331-340. 2010.The application of probabilistic arguments to rational decisions in a single case is a contentious philosophical issue which arises in various contexts. Some authors (e.g. Horgan, Philos Pap 24:209–222, 1995; Levy, Synthese 158:139–151, 2007) affirm the normative force of probabilistic arguments in single cases while others (Baumann, Am Philos Q 42:71–79, 2005; Synthese 162:265–273, 2008) deny it. I demonstrate that both sides do not give convincing arguments for their case and propose a new acc…Read more
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64A unifying framework of probabilistic reasoning Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9573-x Authors Jan Sprenger, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796
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131The Weight of Competence under a Realistic Loss FunctionLogic Journal of the IGPL 18 (2): 346-352. 2010.In many scientific, economic and policy-related problems, pieces of information from different sources have to be aggregated. Typically, the sources are not equally competent. This raises the question of how the relative weights and competences should be related to arrive at an optimal final verdict. Our paper addresses this question under a more realistic perspective of measuring the practical loss implied by an inaccurate verdict.
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University of TurinProfessor
Torino, Piemonte, Italy
Areas of Specialization
1 more
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |
Causal Reasoning |
Probabilistic Reasoning |
Scientific Method |
Areas of Interest
Cognitive Sciences |
Decision Theory |
Conditionals |