Yochai Ataria

Anxiety is one of the most common mental disorders, yet current approaches (psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioural, biomedical, etc.) have failed to provide a comprehensive theory of the phenomenon or effective methods of treatment. Previous studies on a variety of pathologies (schizophrenia, post-trauma, depersonalization, etc.) have shown that taking a cognitive-phenomenological approach, which focuses on the pre-reflective experience and especially on its bodily aspects, may significantly improve our ability to understand a range of pathologies. The present study offers a cognitive-phenomenological analysis of an excerpt selected from the personal diary of a woman coping with anxiety. We hope that this modest study will contribute to a better understanding of anxiety disorders and perhaps even suggest new theoretical and therapeutic trajectories.

This book offers a critique of a certain contemporary discourse in popular science that consists of (1) identifying the origins and therefore essential nature of Homo Sapiens; and (2) identifying the nature of technology. The author’s critique is that this double gesture generates a deterministic worldview – man is evil and technology has its own necessity – that operates to exonerate humanity from responsibility to the horrors of the 20th century, epitomized in Auschwitz and Hiroshima, for example. The author situates this operation within what he identifies as an “apocalyptical-eschatological state of mind”. Yochai Ataria explains that the dynamics of technology and the quest for the first human are the two central vectors shaping both scientific and popular discourse today, highlighting the importance of understanding the deep connection between the two.

This paper delves into the concept of the uncanny, a theme that has fascinated scholars across multiple disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, literature, and film studies. The study’s primary goal is twofold: to examine the theoretical foundations of the uncanny as explored by Jentsch, Freud, and Heidegger, and to propose a new perspective on the uncanny within the context of modern technological and urban developments. The paper argues that urban, technologically advanced environments foster conditions in which the uncanny can easily emerge, and suggests that the adoption of a techno-scientific worldview plays a central role in the rise of uncanny experiences. Through an analysis of Hoffmann’s The Sandman, this paper revisits classical theories of the uncanny and connects them with contemporary realities. Jentsch’s emphasis on cognitive uncertainty, Freud’s exploration of repressed traumatic memories, and Heidegger’s focus on the broader atmospheric conditions of the uncanny are all examined. The paper concludes by reflecting on how urbanization, technological dependency, and scientific reductionism contribute to a profound sense of alienation, increasing the likelihood of uncanny experiences in the modern world.

If we are to understand the premises at the core of debates regarding the philosophy of technology, as in the works of several prominent figures such as Marcuse, Ellul, and Habermas, we must confront Heidegger's philosophical legacy. Based on a broad overview of early and later Heidegger, and some of his notable followers, we argue that Heidegger's philosophy of technology created a problematic intellectual legacy. This resulted not only from his well-known political involvement with the Nazi regime but arguably from the philosophical structure that enables such political views to be grounded in his thought. We argue that Heidegger's understanding of technology as possessing an essence [Wesen], which arises from his interpretation of metaphysics as onto-theology, continues to serve as the point of departure for technological discourse. This article traces the infrastructure of ‘Heideggerian Intellectualism’ that accepts the totality of technology as a form of thinking and yet entails multiple fluctuations regarding how we are coerced to engage with metaphysics, making it difficult to evaluate its contributions or limits. In the framework of the rapid technological changes underway at present and the concerns regarding them, there is a tendency to once again delve into Heidegger's thought on this matter. This article attempts to demonstrate that such a tendency also entails a certain degree of danger.

Muselmannwas a term used in German concentration camps to describe prisoners near death due to exhaustion, starvation, and helplessness. This paper suggests that the inhuman conditions in the concentration camps resulted in the development of a defensive sense of disownership toward the entire body. The body, in such cases, is reduced to a pure object. However, in the case of theMuselmannthis body-as-object is felt to belong to the captors, and as such is therefore identified as a tool to inflict suffering and pain on theMuselmannhimself. In this situation, lacking cognitive resources, theMuselmannmay have no other alternative than to treat his body as an enemy, and then to retreat or disinvest from the body. This response is a form of somatic apathy, an indifference that is tied to a loss of the self/non-self distinction. This may, in turn, lead to suicidal inclinations, even after liberation from the camp.

If we are to understand the premises at the core of debates regarding the philosophy of technology, as in the works of several prominent figures such as Marcuse, Ellul, and Habermas, we must confront Heidegger's philosophical legacy. Based on a broad overview of early and later Heidegger, and some of his notable followers, we argue that Heidegger's philosophy of technology created a problematic intellectual legacy. This resulted not only from his well-known political involvement with the Nazi regime but arguably from the philosophical structure that enables such political views to be grounded in his thought. We argue that Heidegger's understanding of technology as possessing an essence [Wesen], which arises from his interpretation of metaphysics as onto-theology, continues to serve as the point of departure for technological discourse. This article traces the infrastructure of ‘Heideggerian Intellectualism’ that accepts the totality of technology as a form of thinking and yet entails multiple fluctuations regarding how we are coerced to engage with metaphysics, making it difficult to evaluate its contributions or limits. In the framework of the rapid technological changes underway at present and the concerns regarding them, there is a tendency to once again delve into Heidegger's thought on this matter. This article attempts to demonstrate that such a tendency also entails a certain degree of danger.

Ender’s Game, Orson Scott Card’s award-winning 1985 novel, has been discovered and rediscovered by generations of science fiction fans, even being adopted as reading by the U.S. Marine Corps. Ender's Game and its sequels explore rich themes — the violence and cruelty of children, the role of empathy in war, and the balance of individual dignity and the social good — with compelling elements of a coming-of-age story. Ender’s Game and Philosophy brings together over 30 philosophers to engage in wide-ranging discussion on issues such as: the justifiability of pre-emptive strikes; how Ender’s disconnected and dispassionate violence is mirrored in today’s drone warfare; whether the end of saving the species can justify the most brutal means; the justifiability of lies and deception in wartime, and how military schools produce training in virtue. The authors of Ender’s Game and Philosophy challenge readers to confront the challenges that Ender’s Game presents, bringing new insights to the idea of a just war, the virtues of the soldier, the nature of childhood, and the serious work of playing games.

The natural sciences seek to explain all natural phenomena, including human beings. This lofty objective encompasses the scientific project in all its glory, within which brain science constitutes an integral part. Essentially, however, neuroscientists not only seek to achieve a greater understanding of how the human brain works but rather, and perhaps mainly, aspire to understand human consciousness, that is, the subjective experience. According to this approach, consciousness is merely brain activity, and thus any progress in the study of the brain represents an advance in the study of consciousness. Yet, despite the many and impressive neuroscientific achievements, when it comes to understanding human consciousness, this discipline cannot deliver the goods. This ongoing failure, so it will be suggested, arouses uncanny anxiety, largely because consciousness is the only phenomenon in which we have complete confidence. The present article suggests that in order to advance our understanding of the subjective experience, we must focus on how the body is thrown into the world in the here-and-now.

Body image and body schema refer to two different yet closely related systems. Whereas BI can be defined as a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body, BS is a system of sensory-motor capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring. Studies have demonstrated that applying the concepts of BI and BS enables us to conceptualize complex pathological phenomena such as anorexia, schizophrenia, and depersonalization. Likewise, it has further been argued that these concepts play a crucial role in our ability to grasp our bodily experiences in the socio-cultural world according to various factors, such as gender, social class, and ethnicity. Referring to the insights of Frantz Fanon, the author of Black Skin, White Masks, this paper suggests that under certain conditions the BI can take over and reshape the BS. Based on an examination of Fanon’s writings, the paper suggests that not only the BI can truly remold the BS but that the gaze of the other can directly influence the BI.

In 1996 Varela established the neurophenomenology research programme. This project was not designed to solve what Chalmers has defined as the hard problem, but rather to offer a methodological remedy for this problem. The NRP seeks to bridge the explanatory gap by creating a reciprocal dialogue between the firstperson perspective on the one hand and third-person perspective on the other. Yet, twenty years after Varela's NRP kicked off, it seems that the explanatory gap is still very much alive. This paper argues that as long as subjective experience remains at least somewhat inaccessible, we will not be able to bridge this gap.

Although not identical, this article suggests that complex posttraumatic stress disorder, depersonalization and schizophrenia share at least one feature: in all these cases, the body becomes a defective tool, an IT. In turn, those suffering from them can no longer be-in-the-world through the living body but rather experience their body as an object; they manage their lives on the level of body image.The next section outlines some cognitive and phenomenological concepts such as body schema, body image, body-as-subject and body-as-object. Thereafter, the article explores the phenomenology of C-PTSD, depersonalization, and schizophrenia, finally suggesting that in each of these cases the body...