Fabrizio Macagno

Comparison arguments, commonly identified by their specific types, i.e., a fortiori/maiori, a minori, and a simili, are a neglected topic in argumentation theory, legal reasoning, and logic. They are regarded as a kind of analogy, but in the history of dialectics, they were not considered as analogies. Their structure is reconstructed as a kind of syllogism, but the conclusion does not follow due to the formal properties of the argument. The material relation connecting premises and conclusion is that what holds for the more should hold also for the less (or the same judgment should hold for the same). But is this sufficient? And why should it be persuasive? This paper proposes an argumentation scheme approach to the structure of comparison arguments, which is developed based on insights from the dialectical tradition. Comparison arguments are claimed to be higher-order arguments that manifest a complex, deeper argumentative structure, represented through argumentation schemes. A fortiori is based on a mechanism similar to analogy, as it involves the abstraction of a functional genus, i.e., an abstract generic characteristic, and expresses further arguments. However, the inferential structure of a fortiori is distinguished by an asymmetry between the members of the comparison, i.e., a scalar paradigm. Moreover, at a deep level, it can be reconstructed as a bundle of implicit arguments in which the argument from commitment backgrounds or is backgrounded by other types of argument.

This chapter proposes a dialectical approach to legal interpretation, consisting of three dimensions: (1) a formalization of the canons of interpretation in terms of argumentation schemes; (2) a dialectical classification of interpretive schemes; and (3) a logical and computational model for comparing the arguments pro and contra an interpretation. The traditional interpretive maxims or canons used in both common and civil law are translated into defeasible patterns of arguments, which can be evaluated through sets of corresponding critical questions. These interpretive argumentation schemes are classified in general categories and a distinction is drawn between schemes supporting and rebutting an interpretation. This framework allows conceiving statutory interpretation as a dialectical procedure consisting in weighing arguments pro and contra an interpretation. This procedure is formalized and represented computationally through tools from formal argumentation systems.

Every theory of metaphor faces the challenge of explaining the complex relationship between literal and metaphorical meaning. In this chapter, we analyze Hesse’s approach to metaphor, arguing that her original perspective sheds light on the contemporary debate on the literal-metaphorical distinction, going beyond how it is interpreted within the domains of semantics and pragmatics. To this end, we discuss the theoretical move that allowed Hesse to reject the primacy of literal meaning and the semantic-pragmatic distinction in her explanation of the interpretation of metaphorical meanings. Reference is made to ancient, medieval, and contemporary debates to underline the three theoretical steps upon which Hesse’s original view is based: (1) an approach to metaphor as an analogical process capable of reshaping previous uses of words and previous perceptions of reality; (2) a description of the analogical process as a classification that identifies similarities that constitute higher categories; and (3) the equation between word meaning and word classificatory uses, which explains how the discovery of new similarities and differences can modify the meaning of a word and create new relations between words.

Argument interpretation and reconstruction are two necessary presuppositions of argument analysis and evaluation, constituting a cornerstone of argumentation theory. One of the most used, and at the same time most controversial, principles underlying this interpretative practice is the Principle of Charity (CP), recommending a “charitable” (i.e., the strongest, or a strong within certain limits) reconstruction of the arguments expressed in a text. Grounded on “ethical,” “practical,” or “strategic” considerations, criticized, rejected, or replaced by criteria seen as inherently charitable, the various versions of CP advanced in argumentation theory raise the basic questions of where charity comes from, and how in the history of argumentation the problem of argument reconstruction was addressed before the concept of charity. This paper aims to provide a historical overview of the Charity Principles, evaluating them in light of some challenging cases. Such accounts will be compared with the Aristotelian principles used for reconstructing enthymematic arguments, which can be regarded as the predecessors of the modern CP. The Aristotelian texts suggest hermeneutic and logical guidelines grounded on the pragmatic and dialectical dimensions of rhetorical arguments, which avoid some pitfalls of charity and complement some fundamental insights of the CP tradition.

In numerous communicative practices, particularly in social media communication, it has become common to encounter messages pursuing a multiplicity of possible functions. They provide information, but sharing it is not their only or most important purpose. They appear to advocate for a particular viewpoint, yet no specific conclusion is stated, no argumentative or persuasive context surrounds them, and no dialectical exchanges follow or precede them. From a practical perspective, such messages, designated as “info-arguments,” are powerful strategies for advancing reasons, enabling the speaker to avoid the corresponding burden of proof. From a theoretical perspective, they challenge the pragmatic theories of meaning underlying argument reconstruction. Absent a specific context and considering the composite nature of an audience characterized by diverse backgrounds, how can we establish and justify that an info-argument conveys an argument? This paper proposes an analytical framework based on a dynamic and dialectical approach to meaning. In this view, the meaning of an info-argument is not represented as a pre-existing speaker’s intention manifested in a clear communication setting. Instead, it is regarded as a set of distinct, least defeasible interpretations characterizing various possible scenarios defined by several factors (or presumptions) that vary depending on the interlocutors’ backgrounds and values.

This paper investigates the nature of the emotive meaning (or expressive force) of words commonly referred to as “thick” or “emotive,” which include slurs, derogative or pejorative words, and ethical terms. The inclusion of an expressive component in the semantic representation of a slur is assessed by considering the notion of definition and the related inferential tests developed in the dialectical tradition. The failure of such tests shows how the expressive force cannot be accounted for in terms of lexical meaning. Emotive meaning is analyzed by distinguishing the evaluative component from the emotive one, which results from the former. The negative evaluation is explained as a stable but defeasible inference resulting from different types of triggers, which can be classified into three categories: a specific definitional component (often revealed through its etymology), the denotation, or the “expression” level of a word (connotation). In this sense, instead of considering emotive meaning as a unique concept, it is more adequate to refer to distinct emotive meanings, which vary according to their triggers. At the same time, this approach can account for the characteristics of stability, force variability, historical variability, and cancellability in specific contexts of use.

This paper aims to develop the criteria for assessing semantic arguments. However, while this notion constituted the core of ancient dialectics and is addressed in several approaches to argument analysis, the criteria for evaluating such arguments are insufficient. This paper intends to address this problem by combining the insights of classical and contemporary logic and testing them against some controversies involving controversial definitions or classifications. Through detailed case studies of the argumentative uses involving the (re)definitions of racism, war, peace, and feminism, we formulated and tested eight evaluation criteria that may be expressed as critical questions. Résumé: Cet article vise à développer les critères d’évaluation des arguments sémantiques. Cependant, bien que cette notion constitue le coeur de la dialectique ancienne et soit abordée dans plusieurs approches de l’analyse des arguments, les critères d’évaluation de ces arguments sont insuffisants. Cet article vise à résoudre ce problème en combinant les idées de la logique classique et contemporaine et en les testant par rapport à certaines controverses impliquant des définitions ou des classifications controversées. À travers des études de cas détaillées sur les usages argumentatifs impliquant les (re)définitions du racisme, de la guerre, de la paix et du féminisme, nous avons formulé et mis à l’épreuve huit critères d'évaluation qui peuvent être exprimés sous forme de questions critiques.

This paper investigates the emotive (or expressive) meaning of words commonly referred to as “loaded” or “emotive,” which include slurs, derogative or pejorative words, and ethical terms. We claim that emotive meaning can be reinterpreted from a pragmatic and argumentative perspective, which can account for distinct aspects of ethical terms, including the possibility of being modified and its cancellability. Emotive meaning is explained as a defeasible and automatic or automatized evaluative and intended inference commonly associated with the use of specific terms, which can be represented and assessed considering its logical structure and its defeasibility conditions. This automatic inference is conceived as part of the connotation of an ethical term, and is not necessarily stable. By means of quasi-definitions, it is possible to modify the emotive meaning while maintaining the descriptive one, automaticizing the inferences drawn from an ethical word. Through examples drawn from the recent US presidential campaign, we show how re-contextualization and emotive contexts can affect emotive meaning.

Argumentation schemes have played a key role in our research projects on computational models of natural argument over the last decade. The catalogue of schemes in Walton, Reed and Macagno’s 2008 book, Argumentation Schemes, served as our starting point for analysis of the naturally occurring arguments in written text, i.e., text in different genres having different types of author, audience, and subject domain (genetics, international relations, environmental science policy, AI ethics), for different argument goals, and for different possible future applications. We would often first attempt to analyze the arguments in our corpora in terms of those schemes, then adapt schemes as needed for the goals of the project, and in some cases implement them for use in computational models. Among computational researchers, the main interest in argumentation schemes has been for use in argument mining by applying machine learning methods to existing argument corpora. In contrast, a primary goal of our research has been to learn more about written arguments themselves in various contemporary fields. Our approach has been to manually analyze semantics, discourse structure, argumentation, and rhetoric in texts. Another goal has been to create sharable digital corpora containing the results of our studies. Our approach has been to define argument schemes for use by human corpus annotators or for use in logic programs for argument mining. The third goal is to design useful computer applications based upon our studies, such as argument diagramming systems that provide argument schemes as building blocks. This paper describes each of the various projects: the methods, the argument schemes that were identified, and how they were used. Then a synthesis of the results is given with a discussion of open issues.

There are many benefits of using argumentation-based techniques in multi-agent systems, as clearly shown in the literature. Such benefits come not only from the expressiveness that argumentation-based techniques bring to agent communication but also from the reasoning and decision-making capabilities under conditions of conflicting and uncertain information that argumentation enables for autonomous agents. When developing multi-agent applications in which argumentation will be used to improve agent communication and reasoning, argumentation schemes (reasoning patterns for argumentation) are useful in addressing the requirements of the application domain in regards to argumentation (e.g., defining the scope in which argumentation will be used by agents in that particular application). In this work, we propose an argumentation framework that takes into account the particular structure of argumentation schemes at its core. This paper formally defines such a framework and experimentally evaluates its implementation for both argumentation-based reasoning and dialogues.

Argumentation schemes bring artificial intelligence into day to day conversation. Interpreting the force of an utterance, be it an assertion, command, or question, remains a task for achieving this goal. But it is not an easy task. An interpretation of force depends on a speaker’s use of words for a hearer at the moment of utterance. Ascribing force relies on grammatical mood, though not in a straightforward or regular way. We face a dilemma: on one hand, deciding force requires an understanding of the speaker’s words; on the other hand, word meaning may shift given the force in which the words are spoken. A precise theory of how mood and force relate helps us handle this dilemma, which, if met, expands the use of argumentation schemes in language processing. Yet, as our analysis shows, force is an inconstant variable, one that contributes to a scheme’s defeasibility. We propose using critical questions to help us decide the force of utterances.

This paper advances an approach to relevance grounded on patterns of material inference called argumentation schemes, which can account for the reconstruction and the evaluation of relevance relations. In order to account for relevance in different types of dialogical contexts, pursuing also non-cognitive goals, and measuring the scalar strength of relevance, communicative acts are conceived as dialogue moves, whose coherence with the previous ones or the context is represented as the conclusion of steps of material inferences. Such inferences are described using argumentation schemes and are evaluated by considering 1) their defeasibility, and 2) the acceptability of the implicit premises on which they are based. The assessment of both the relevance of an utterance and the strength thereof depends on the evaluation of three interrelated factors: 1) number of inferential steps required; 2) the types of argumentation schemes involved; and 3) the implicit premises required.

Presuppositions are at the same time a crucial and almost neglected dimension of arguments and fallacies. Arguments involve different types of presuppositions, which can be used for manipulative purposes in distinct ways. However, what are presuppositions? What is their dialectical function? Why and how can they be dangerous? This paper intends to address these questions by developing the pragmatic approaches to presupposition from a dialectical perspective. The use of presuppositions will be analyzed in terms of presumptive conclusions concerning the interlocutor’s acceptance of a proposition, which can be assessed as reasonable or unacceptable. Their dialectical function is described in terms of dark side commitments attributed to a collective "voice" representing what is commonly shared. For this reason, they count as attempts to include the presupposed contents into the hearer’s commitment store, which in some circumstances can reverse the burden of proof. The different manipulative strategies grounded on controversial presuppositions will be examined by showing the distinct roles that the latter play and the relationship between the degrees of presuppositional implicitness and the speaker’s burden of retraction.

The Holy Scriptures can be considered a specific kind of normative texts, whose use to assess practical moral cases requires interpretation. In the field of ethics, this interpretative problem results in the necessity of bridging the gap between the normative source – moral precepts – and the specific cases. In the history of the Church, this problem was the core of the so-called casuistry, namely the decision-making practice consisting in applying the Commandments and other principles of the Holy Scriptures to specific cases or moral problems. By taking into account the sin of lying, this paper argues that casuistic texts reveal an extremely sophisticated interpretative method, grounded on “pragmatic” contextual and communicative considerations and argumentative structures that resemble the ones used in legal interpretation. These works show how the underspecified biblical text expressing an abstract norm was enriched pragmatically by completing it and modulating its meaning so that it could be used to draw a conclusion in a specific context on a specific case. The mutual interdependence between biblical interpretation, pragmatics, and argumentation sheds light on a much broader phenomenon, namely the pragmatic nature of argumentation.

Despite the emphasis on dialogue and argumentation in educational settings, still not much is known about how best we can support learners in their interthinking, reasoning, and metadialogic understanding. The goal of this classroom intervention study is to explore the degree of students’ dialogicity and its possible increase during a learning programme implementing dialogic and argument-based teaching goals and principles. In particular, we focus on how students from 5 to 15 years old engage with each other's ideas, and whether/how this engagement is influenced by lesson and classroom setting factors. The participants were 4208 students distributed in preprimary, primary, and secondary classrooms of five countries (UK, Portugal, Germany, Spain, and Cyprus). Findings suggest that there is a consistent increase with age for some high-dialogicity moves, and students behave more dialogically in whole-class discussions rather than small-group activities.

Cancellability is an essential feature of implicatures. However, its reliability has been challenged by several cases and examples in which conversational implicatures seem to be hard or even impossible to cancel. Should it then be concluded that not all implicatures are cancellable, and therefore Grice's cancellability test should be weakened or abandoned? The present paper addresses this problem by drawing a distinction between theoretical and practical cancellability, where the latter concept captures the (un)reasonableness of explicit or contextual cancellation. By analyzing three legal cases of misleading advertising, I show how the indefensibility of an interpretation can account for the practical uncancellability of an implicature. To explain and account for the reasonableness of an interpretation, the presumptive inferences involved must be reconstructed and evaluated considering different dimensions, such as the conversational context and the associated presumptions.

This paper explains how to use a new software tool for argument diagramming available free on the Internet, showing especially how it can be used in the classroom to enhance critical thinking in philosophy. The user loads a text file containing an argument into a box on the computer interface, and then creates an argument diagram by dragging lines from one node to another. A key feature is the support for argumentation schemes, common patterns of defeasible reasoning historically know as topics . Several examples are presented, as well as the results of an experiment in using the system with students in a university classroom

Bad jokes are not simply non-humorous texts. They are texts that are humorous for someone––their author at least––but not for their audience. Bad jokes thus involve a contextual––pragmatic––dimension that is neglected in the semantic theories of humor. In this paper, we propose an approach to humor based on the Aristotelian notion of surprising enthymemes. Jokes are analyzed as kinds of arguments, whose tacit dimension can be retrieved and justified by considering the “logic” on which it is based. However, jokes are based on specific pragmatic conditions: they are regarded as arguments grounded on a generalization that is at the same time uncommon, retrievable, and acceptable or plausible for the audience. This perspective integrates the “local logic” of jokes within a broader rhetorical theory that ultimately rests on the communicative notion of common ground.

Questions, and more specifically authentic questions, are at the core of dialogue-based learning and teaching. However, what is a question, and how can it be authentic? This paper addresses this problem by analyzing the distinct dimensions of questions, showing how their pragmatic nature is interwoven with the syntactic and semantic one, and how it can be grasped only by considering their dialogical functions. Questions are maintained to be proposals of different dialogue games (or types), pursuing specific interactional purposes, and potentially contributing to learning processes in different ways. By understanding how questions shape different dialogues it is possible to ask more suitable questions to the questioner’s goals. In this framework, the dichotomy between authentic and inauthentic questions becomes a strategic choice between different types of dialogical possibilities.

In the literature, the pragmatic dimension of metaphors has been clearly acknowledged. Metaphors are regarded as having different possible uses, especially pursuing persuasion. However, an analysis of the specific conversational purposes that they can be aimed at achieving in a dialogue and their adequacy thereto is still missing. In this chapter, we will address this issue focusing on the classical distinction between the explanatory and persuasive uses of metaphors, which is, however, complex to draw at an analytical level and often blurred and controversial also from a theoretical point of view. Building on the analysis of explanation in different theories and fields of study, we show how it can be conceived as characterized by a cognitive and a pragmatic dimension, where the transference of understanding is used pragmatically for different dialogical goals - such as informing, making a joint decision, and most importantly persuading. In this sense, the cognitive effects of understanding are not incompatible with a persuasive dialogical purpose. This theoretical proposal will be applied to examples drawn from the medical context, to show how a pragmatic approach to explanation can account for the complexity of the cases that can be found in actual dialogical contexts.

Together with the volume “Inquiries in philosophical pragmatics: Linguistic and theoretical issues,” this book collects selected contributions to the conference Pragmasophia II held in Lisbon in 2018. This first volume intends to contribute to the dialogue between philosophers and linguists, trying to broaden the boundaries of this discipline defined by the crucial notions of context and verbal action. To this purpose, the contributions are collected in an order that reflects the core and the frontiers of pragmatics, the former constituted by the classical and more philosophical topics as quantifiers, semantic intentions and semantics, and common knowledge, and the latter exploring areas such as the relationship between pragmatics and other fields, such as argumentation and discourse analysis. Between these two poles of theoretical developments, we can find new theoretical challenges to some basic pragmatic problems, such as pure indexicals, deferred reference, polysemy, explicatures and indirect reports.

An argumentation profile is defined as a methodological instrument for analyzing argumentative discourse considering distinct and interrelated dimensions: the types of argument used, their quality, and the emotions triggered. Walton’s theoretical contributions are developed as a coherent analytical and multifaceted toolbox for capturing these aspects. Argumentation schemes are used to detect and quantify the types of argument. Fallacy analysis and the assessment of the implicit premises retrieved through the schemes allow evaluating arguments. Finally, the frequency of emotive words signals the most common emotions aroused. This method is illustrated through a corpus of argumentative tweets of three politicians.

ABSTRACT The logic of humor has been acknowledged as an essential dimension of every joke. However, what is the logic of jokes, exactly? The modern theories of humor maintain that jokes are characterized by their own logic, dubbed “pseudo,” “playful,” or “local,” which has been the object of frequent criticisms. This article intends to address the limitations of the current perspectives on the logic of jokes by proposing a rhetorical approach to humorous texts. Building on the traditional development of Aristotle’s almost neglected view of jokes as surprising enthymemes, the former are analyzed as rhetorical arguments. Like enthymemes, jokes are characterized by natural inferences that can be represented as topics, and quasi-formalized in argumentation theory as argumentation schemes. Like rhetorical arguments, jokes express a reason in support of different types of conclusions and proceed from distinct kinds of reasoning and semantic relations.

This paper explains the importance of classifying argumentation schemes, and outlines how schemes are being used in current research in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics on argument mining. It provides a survey of the literature on scheme classification. What are so far generally taken to represent a set of the most widely useful defeasible argumentation schemes are surveyed and explained systematically, including some that are difficult to classify. A new classification system covering these centrally important schemes is built.

The representation and classification of the structure of natural arguments has been one of the most important aspects of Aristotelian and medieval dialectical and rhetorical theories. This traditional approach is represented nowadays in models of argumentation schemes. The purpose of this article is to show how arguments are characterized by a complex combination of two levels of abstraction, namely, semantic relations and types of reasoning, and to provide an effective and comprehensive classification system for this matrix of semantic and quasilogical connections. To this purpose, we propose a dichotomous criterion of classification, transcending both levels of abstraction and representing not what an argument is but how it is understood and interpreted. The schemes are grouped according to an end-means criterion, which is strictly bound to the ontological structure of the conclusion and the premises. On this view, a scheme can be selected according to the intended or reconstructed purpose of an argument and the possible strategies that can be used to achieve it.