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Steven Merle Duncan

Bellevue Community College
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    47
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    47

 More details
  • Bellevue Community College
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
University of Washington
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1987
Email (login required)
Homepage
Bellevue, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy
  • All publications (47)
  •  1224
    Pain and Evil
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
    Values and NormsPleasure and PainThe Value of Pleasure
  •  705
    It's Murder!(?)
    Seattle Critical Review 3 8-12. 2013.
    Although this piece was inspired by the kinds of legal puzzles discussed by Hart and Honore in Causation in the Law, the puzzle cases presented here are intended to test the reader's intuitions about what constitutes murder. Play along!
    Philosophy, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Law, MiscApplied Ethics, Misc
  •  972
    A Defense of the Crucial Premise of the Third Way
    Aquinas' Third Way is often dismissed as a howler, because he infers from the fact that, since the universe is metaphysically contingent that there was some time in the past when it didn't exist. I offer an argument to justify this inference.
    Cosmological Arguments from Contingency
  •  810
    How is Neuroscience Possible?
    In this paper, I argue that neuroscience not only is not complemented, but rather is positively undermined, by the substantive commitments of materialist philosophers of mind. Thus, we can have neuroscience or "neurophilosophy" but not both. Since neuroscience is a real science, to the extent that it is in tension with materialistic neurophilosophy, the latter should be abandoned and the former retained.
    NeurophilosophyPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscScientific Realism, Misc
  •  1116
    Why there can't be a Self-Explanatory Series of Infinite Past Events
    Based on a recently published essay by Jeremy Gwiazda, I argue that the possibility that the present state of the universe is the product of an actually infinite series of causally-ordered prior events is impossible in principle, and thus that a major criticism of the Secunda Via of St. Thomas is baseless after all.
    Cosmological Arguments from Regress
  •  628
    Possibilities that Matter IV: The Ground of All Possibilities
    This is the final paper in the Possibilities that Matter series and attempts to complete the project of constructing a material interpretation of modal logic.
    Intensional Modal Logic
  •  1068
    Mind, Body, Space, and Time
    In this essay I explore some of the basic elements of consciousness from a substance dualist point of view, incorporating some elements of Kant's Transcendental Analytic into an overall account of the constitution of consciousness.
    Knowledge of ConsciousnessEpistemology of Mind, MiscFirst-Person Approaches in the Science of Consci…Read more
    Knowledge of ConsciousnessEpistemology of Mind, MiscFirst-Person Approaches in the Science of ConsciousnessKant: TimeKant: Philosophy of Mind
  •  1199
    God is NOT Hidden
    In this paper I argue that there is no problem of Divine Hiddenness for Christians and offer an alternate explanation for the widespread claim that God's existence is hidden based on the Christian doctrine of Original Sin.
    Arguments Against Theism, MiscDivine Hiddenness
  •  1554
    Dualism and Neuroscience
    In this paper, I offer a new account of mind/body interaction that shows how it is possible for an immaterial mind or soul to influence a physical system without entering the horizontal system of efficient causes studied by natural science.
    Philosophy of Neuroscience, Misc
  •  1073
    The Burning Bush
    In this paper, I present some ruminations on Hume's argument from miracles and the distorted view of rationality that it reflects (along with religious skepticism generally) contrasting it with what I take to be a better account of rationality, one more sympathetic - at least less hostile - to religious claims.
    Epistemology of Religion, MiscReligious Skepticism
  •  952
    Possibilities that Matter I: Material Possibility
    This is the first of a series of four papers presenting modal logic as a branch of material, rather than merely formal, logic.
    Intensional Modal Logic
  •  562
    Kant and Theoretical Inquiry
    This essay discusses recent attempts to show that Kant's philosophy is coherent and consistent on its own terms. This paper was read at the annual POH Symposium in Lake Wenatchee, WA in May, 2013.
    Kant: Transcendental Idealism
  •  809
    Causal Necessity and the Future: Two Views
    In this paper I offer an alternative to the standard, mechanistic/fatalistic account of causal necessity, one compatible with the existence of laws of nature but not deterministic in the way this is usually understood.
    Causation and Laws of NatureModality and Laws of Nature
  •  1174
    Platonism by the Numbers
    In this paper, I defend traditional Platonic mathematical realism from its contemporary detractors, arguing that numbers, understood as abstract, non-physical objects of rational intuition, are indispensable for the act of counting.
    Mathematical Truth, MiscMathematical Platonism
  •  1059
    Could Introspection be Unreliable - even in Principle?
    I argue that, despite claims that might be made to the contrary, no scientific evidence could ever prove that introspection is unreliable, even in principle. This paper was read at the annual POH symposium in Lake Wenatchee in May, 2011.
    Epistemology, Misc
  •  952
    Sin and Suffering
    In this essay I discuss the concept of suffering, the causes of suffering, and the Christian solution to the problem of suffering. I conclude that there is no basis, within the Christian view of things, for raising the traditional problem of evil through reflection on the fact of substantial suffering in the world. I thus respectfully suggest that the problem of evil is only a problem for non-believers, who have the wrong perspective on the nature and source of suffering. (When first uploaded to…Read more
    In this essay I discuss the concept of suffering, the causes of suffering, and the Christian solution to the problem of suffering. I conclude that there is no basis, within the Christian view of things, for raising the traditional problem of evil through reflection on the fact of substantial suffering in the world. I thus respectfully suggest that the problem of evil is only a problem for non-believers, who have the wrong perspective on the nature and source of suffering. (When first uploaded to this website, the text of this essay was inadvertently replaced by that for a different essay, "Morality and Fallen Man." That essay has been uploaded and the original text restored.)
    Christianity, MiscThe Argument from Evil
  •  679
    Negative Emotions
    I have a theory of the emotions that many people find unflattering. I contend that all emotions, as such, are negative and neither life-enhancing nor truth-connected. In this essay, I present this theory and my reasons for it.
    Cognitive Theories of Emotions
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