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Steven Merle Duncan

Bellevue Community College
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    47
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    47

 More details
  • Bellevue Community College
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
University of Washington
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1987
Email (login required)
Homepage
Bellevue, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy
  • All publications (47)
  •  982
    Can I know what I am ThInking?
    In this paper, I argue that, if a common form of materialism is true, I cannot know my own thoughts, or even that I am thinking. I conclude that, since I can and do know these things, materialism about mind as I characterize it must be false.
    Other Anti-Materialist Arguments
  •  929
    Space - Why you just have to be there!
    In this paper I explore the implications of the notion of hyperspace for scientific realism and the sort of theoretical activity represented by the attempt to arrive at a literal characterization of the noumenal realities that natural science, especially physics, investigates. I conclude that whether or not this enterprise is possible, its being so depends on factors outside of our control for which no internal means of correction is possible. Only a very attenuated form of scientific realism, t…Read more
    In this paper I explore the implications of the notion of hyperspace for scientific realism and the sort of theoretical activity represented by the attempt to arrive at a literal characterization of the noumenal realities that natural science, especially physics, investigates. I conclude that whether or not this enterprise is possible, its being so depends on factors outside of our control for which no internal means of correction is possible. Only a very attenuated form of scientific realism, then, can reasonably be endorsed by sober philosophy.
    Philosophy of Time, Misc
  •  1411
    On Causation: With Special Reference to Hume
    Hume was correct in his critique of causation as understood by the New Science, a critique deadly to both causal and scientific realism. Getting beyond Hume's critique of causation requires that we call into question the New Science's understanding of causation and replace it with a Neo-Aristotelian account of causal processes. In this paper, I try to point the way to such an account.
    Hume: Laws of NatureCausal RealismDispositions and Powers, MiscHume: Causation
  •  1649
    Having Faith in Reason
    An Address delivered to the Seattle G. K. Chesterton Society at the University of Washington Newman Center, May 2, 2013.
    Epistemology of Specific Domains, MiscPhilosophy, MiscellaneousFaithPhilosophy, General Works
  •  863
    From Private Experience to Public Language
    After discussing the manifest inconveniences of Galilean physicalism for both science and common sense, I propose an alternate, Aristotelian ontology of material things and show how it solves the epistemological problems engendered by the New Science. Read at the annual POH Symposium in Lake Wenatchee, WA, May 2011.
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscRepresentation, Misc
  •  848
    Why Skepticism Fails
    Do skeptical arguments undermine reason, as Hume supposes? In this paper, I argue that they do not and that skepticism is thus no threat to dogmatism about the possibility of knowledge.
    Hume: SkepticismTranscendental Replies to Skepticism
  •  1019
    Possibilities that Matter III: Materially Necessary Being
    This is the third in a series of papers on material modality, which explores the concept of a materially necessary being and argues that such a being exists.
    Intensional Modal Logic
  •  1513
    Kant's Pre-Critical Proof for God's Existence
    In his Beweisgrund (1762), Kant presents a sketch of "the only possible basis" for a proof of God's existence. In this essay, I attempt to present that proof as a valid and sound argument for the existence of God.
    Arguments for Theism, MiscKant's Works in Pre-Critical PhilosophyKant: Rational Theology
  •  1740
    Desire, Love, and Happiness
    In this paper, I explore the concept of happiness by relating it to those of desire, pleasure, and love, arriving at the classical view that objective happiness consists in the possession and enjoyment of the good.
    Philosophy, MiscellaneousPleasure, Misc
  •  1204
    Determinism and Luck
    In the course of writing a book on Free Will, I took the opportunity to read a good deal of contemporary literature on the Free Will problem. This paper is a survey and reflection on that reading, responding to the current trends and state of play concerning the existence of free will.
    DeterminismLibertarianism about Free Will
  •  1061
    Theism and Christianity
    In this essay, I investigate the implications for the discussion of theism in philosophy of religion for the beliefs of ordinary Christians and conclude that, in light of its historical development, those implications are minimal.
    Epistemology of Religion, MiscProbability in the Philosophy of Religion, MiscChristianity, Misc
  •  1224
    Pain and Evil
    In this paper I defend the thesis that, considered simply as certain sorts of bodily sensations, pleasure is not the good nor is pain intrinsically evil. In fact, the opposite is largely the case: pursuit of pleasure is generally productive of ontic evil, and pain, when heeded, directs us toward the ontic good.
    Values and NormsPleasure and PainThe Value of Pleasure
  •  705
    It's Murder!(?)
    Seattle Critical Review 3 8-12. 2013.
    Although this piece was inspired by the kinds of legal puzzles discussed by Hart and Honore in Causation in the Law, the puzzle cases presented here are intended to test the reader's intuitions about what constitutes murder. Play along!
    Philosophy, MiscellaneousPhilosophy of Law, MiscApplied Ethics, Misc
  •  972
    A Defense of the Crucial Premise of the Third Way
    Aquinas' Third Way is often dismissed as a howler, because he infers from the fact that, since the universe is metaphysically contingent that there was some time in the past when it didn't exist. I offer an argument to justify this inference.
    Cosmological Arguments from Contingency
  •  810
    How is Neuroscience Possible?
    In this paper, I argue that neuroscience not only is not complemented, but rather is positively undermined, by the substantive commitments of materialist philosophers of mind. Thus, we can have neuroscience or "neurophilosophy" but not both. Since neuroscience is a real science, to the extent that it is in tension with materialistic neurophilosophy, the latter should be abandoned and the former retained.
    NeurophilosophyPhilosophy of Cognitive Science, MiscScientific Realism, Misc
  •  1116
    Why there can't be a Self-Explanatory Series of Infinite Past Events
    Based on a recently published essay by Jeremy Gwiazda, I argue that the possibility that the present state of the universe is the product of an actually infinite series of causally-ordered prior events is impossible in principle, and thus that a major criticism of the Secunda Via of St. Thomas is baseless after all.
    Cosmological Arguments from Regress
  •  628
    Possibilities that Matter IV: The Ground of All Possibilities
    This is the final paper in the Possibilities that Matter series and attempts to complete the project of constructing a material interpretation of modal logic.
    Intensional Modal Logic
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