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Steven Merle Duncan

Bellevue Community College
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    47
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    47

 More details
  • Bellevue Community College
    Department of Philosophy
    Retired faculty
University of Washington
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1987
Email (login required)
Homepage
Bellevue, Washington, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
17th/18th Century Philosophy
Areas of Interest
History of Western Philosophy
  • All publications (47)
  •  952
    Possibilities that Matter I: Material Possibility
    This is the first of a series of four papers presenting modal logic as a branch of material, rather than merely formal, logic.
    Intensional Modal Logic
  •  562
    Kant and Theoretical Inquiry
    This essay discusses recent attempts to show that Kant's philosophy is coherent and consistent on its own terms. This paper was read at the annual POH Symposium in Lake Wenatchee, WA in May, 2013.
    Kant: Transcendental Idealism
  •  1174
    Platonism by the Numbers
    In this paper, I defend traditional Platonic mathematical realism from its contemporary detractors, arguing that numbers, understood as abstract, non-physical objects of rational intuition, are indispensable for the act of counting.
    Mathematical Truth, MiscMathematical Platonism
  •  809
    Causal Necessity and the Future: Two Views
    In this paper I offer an alternative to the standard, mechanistic/fatalistic account of causal necessity, one compatible with the existence of laws of nature but not deterministic in the way this is usually understood.
    Causation and Laws of NatureModality and Laws of Nature
  •  1059
    Could Introspection be Unreliable - even in Principle?
    I argue that, despite claims that might be made to the contrary, no scientific evidence could ever prove that introspection is unreliable, even in principle. This paper was read at the annual POH symposium in Lake Wenatchee in May, 2011.
    Epistemology, Misc
  •  952
    Sin and Suffering
    In this essay I discuss the concept of suffering, the causes of suffering, and the Christian solution to the problem of suffering. I conclude that there is no basis, within the Christian view of things, for raising the traditional problem of evil through reflection on the fact of substantial suffering in the world. I thus respectfully suggest that the problem of evil is only a problem for non-believers, who have the wrong perspective on the nature and source of suffering. (When first uploaded to…Read more
    In this essay I discuss the concept of suffering, the causes of suffering, and the Christian solution to the problem of suffering. I conclude that there is no basis, within the Christian view of things, for raising the traditional problem of evil through reflection on the fact of substantial suffering in the world. I thus respectfully suggest that the problem of evil is only a problem for non-believers, who have the wrong perspective on the nature and source of suffering. (When first uploaded to this website, the text of this essay was inadvertently replaced by that for a different essay, "Morality and Fallen Man." That essay has been uploaded and the original text restored.)
    Christianity, MiscThe Argument from Evil
  •  679
    Negative Emotions
    I have a theory of the emotions that many people find unflattering. I contend that all emotions, as such, are negative and neither life-enhancing nor truth-connected. In this essay, I present this theory and my reasons for it.
    Cognitive Theories of Emotions
  •  1687
    Happiness: A Preliminary Investigation
    Philosophy, Miscellaneous
  •  1770
    Descartes' Refutation of Atheism: A Defense
    Descartes argues that, apart from the existence of a veracious God, we can have no reason to believe that we possess reliable cognitive faculties, with the result that, if atheism is true, not even our seemingly most certain beliefs can count as knowledge for us. Since the atheist denies the existence of God, he or she will be precisely in this position. I argue that Descartes' argument is sound, and that atheism is therefore self-refuting.
    René DescartesAtheism
  •  1305
    The Inescapable Self
    In this paper I discuss the existence of the substantial self and argue against those, like Hume, who deny its reality.
    The SoulIntrospection and IntrospectionismObservation-Based Accounts of Self-Knowledge
  •  887
    Possibilities that Matter II: Material Contingency and Sufficient Reason
    This is the second of a series of papers inspired by a paper I wrote around 1989. In this paper, I consider the notion of material contingency and relate it to the traditional, metaphysically loaded Principle of Sufficient Reason.
    Intensional Modal Logic
  •  2133
    Kant's Critique of the Ontological Argument: FAIL
    In this paper, I argue that Kant's famous critique of the Ontological Argument largely begs the question against that argument, and is no better when supplemented by the modern quantificational analysis of "exists." In particular, I argue that the claim, common to Hume and Kant, that conceptual truths can never entail substantive existential claims is false,and thus no ground for rejecting the Ontological Argument.
    Descartes' Ontological ArgumentKant: Social, Political and Religious Thought, MiscKant: Rational The…Read more
    Descartes' Ontological ArgumentKant: Social, Political and Religious Thought, MiscKant: Rational Theology
  •  980
    Could Sensation be a Bodily Act?
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
    Philosophical Traditions, MiscThe Objects of PerceptionSensation and PerceptionBodily Sensations
  •  982
    Can I know what I am ThInking?
    In this paper, I argue that, if a common form of materialism is true, I cannot know my own thoughts, or even that I am thinking. I conclude that, since I can and do know these things, materialism about mind as I characterize it must be false.
    Other Anti-Materialist Arguments
  •  929
    Space - Why you just have to be there!
    In this paper I explore the implications of the notion of hyperspace for scientific realism and the sort of theoretical activity represented by the attempt to arrive at a literal characterization of the noumenal realities that natural science, especially physics, investigates. I conclude that whether or not this enterprise is possible, its being so depends on factors outside of our control for which no internal means of correction is possible. Only a very attenuated form of scientific realism, t…Read more
    In this paper I explore the implications of the notion of hyperspace for scientific realism and the sort of theoretical activity represented by the attempt to arrive at a literal characterization of the noumenal realities that natural science, especially physics, investigates. I conclude that whether or not this enterprise is possible, its being so depends on factors outside of our control for which no internal means of correction is possible. Only a very attenuated form of scientific realism, then, can reasonably be endorsed by sober philosophy.
    Philosophy of Time, Misc
  •  1411
    On Causation: With Special Reference to Hume
    Hume was correct in his critique of causation as understood by the New Science, a critique deadly to both causal and scientific realism. Getting beyond Hume's critique of causation requires that we call into question the New Science's understanding of causation and replace it with a Neo-Aristotelian account of causal processes. In this paper, I try to point the way to such an account.
    Hume: Laws of NatureCausal RealismDispositions and Powers, MiscHume: Causation
  •  1649
    Having Faith in Reason
    An Address delivered to the Seattle G. K. Chesterton Society at the University of Washington Newman Center, May 2, 2013.
    Epistemology of Specific Domains, MiscPhilosophy, MiscellaneousFaithPhilosophy, General Works
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