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Logan Paul Gage

Franciscan University of Steubenville
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    44
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    1
  •  News and Updates
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 More details
  • Franciscan University of Steubenville
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Baylor University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2014
Email (login required)
Homepage
Steubenville, Ohio, United States of America
0000-0002-5286-5626
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Religion
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics
Normative Ethics
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (44)
  •  1233
    Rudolf Carnap
    In Copan Paul, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, L. Reese Christopher & G. Strauss Michael (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science, Zondervan Academic. pp. 79-80. 2017.
    A brief introduction to the life and key work of Rudolf Carnap with special attention to his work on inductive logic.
    Carnap: Probability and Inductive LogicCarnap: Philosophy of LogicCarnap's Intellectual ContextCarna…Read more
    Carnap: Probability and Inductive LogicCarnap: Philosophy of LogicCarnap's Intellectual ContextCarnap: Confirmation and VerificationCarnap: Epistemology
  •  1149
    William Paley
    In Copan Paul, I. I. I. Tremper Longman, L. Reese Christopher & G. Strauss Michael (eds.), Dictionary of Christianity and Science: The Definitive Reference for the Intersection of Christian Faith and Contemporary Science, Zondervan Academic. pp. 500. 2017.
    A brief introduction to the life and work of William Paley, including a discussion of the structure of his famous design argument.
    Design Arguments for Theism, MiscIntelligent DesignHume: Design Arguments for Theism19th Century Bri…Read more
    Design Arguments for Theism, MiscIntelligent DesignHume: Design Arguments for Theism19th Century British Philosophy, Misc17th/18th Century British Philosophy, Misc
  •  1114
    Michael Augros: Who Designed the Designer? A Rediscovered Path to God’s Existence
    Philosophia Christi 19 (1): 238-241. 2017.
    A review of Michael Augros's book Who Designed the Designer.
    Cosmological Arguments from Regress
  •  1171
    David O’Connor. God, Evil, and Design: An Introduction to the Philosophical Issues. Blackwell, 2008 (review)
    European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1): 209-215. 2014.
    Design Arguments for Theism, MiscThe Argument from Evil
  •  2213
    Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases
    Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1): 57-70. 2013.
    Contextualism (the view that ‘knowledge’ and its variants are context-sensitive) has been supported in large part through appeal to intuitions about Keith DeRose’s Bank Cases. Recently, however, the contextualist construal of these cases has come under fire from Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel who question whether the Bank Case subject’s confidence can remain constant in both low- and high-stakes cases. Having explained the Bank Cases and this challenge to them, I argue that DeRose has given a reas…Read more
    Contextualism (the view that ‘knowledge’ and its variants are context-sensitive) has been supported in large part through appeal to intuitions about Keith DeRose’s Bank Cases. Recently, however, the contextualist construal of these cases has come under fire from Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel who question whether the Bank Case subject’s confidence can remain constant in both low- and high-stakes cases. Having explained the Bank Cases and this challenge to them, I argue that DeRose has given a reasonable reply to this initial challenge. However, I proceed to argue that the current stalemate can be broken. Seeking to extend the Bach-Nagel critique, I offer a novel interpretation of the Bank Cases according to which the subject’s evidence changes between low- and high-stakes cases. If I am correct, then, given the amount of support the Bank Cases have been thought to lend contextualism, the case for contextualism is seriously weakened.
    Epistemic Contextualism and InvariantismEvidence, Misc
  •  608
    Jerry Root: C.S. Lewis and a Problem of Evil (review)
    Theological Book Review 23 (2): 80-81. 2011.
    A review of Jerry Root's book C.S. Lewis and a Problem of Evil.
    Philosophy of Religion, Misc
  •  845
    Thomas Nagel: Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 66 (3): 588-590. 2013.
    A review of Thomas Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos.
    Anti-Darwinist Approaches, MiscScience and Religion
  •  1210
    Can a Thomist Be a Darwinist?
    In Jay Wesley Richards (ed.), God and Evolution, Discovery Inst. pp. 187-202. 2010.
    A discussion of several tensions between Thomistic philosophy and modern Darwinian theory as well as several recent Thomistic criticisms of intelligent design.
    Thomas AquinasScience and ReligionIntelligent DesignEvolution and Creationism
  •  814
    Kelly James Clark and Raymond J. VanArragon: Evidence and Religious Belief (review)
    American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 86 (2): 372-375. 2012.
    Epistemology of Religion, MiscEpistemology, MiscReformed Epistemology
  •  1340
    Alvin Plantinga: Where the conflict really lies: science, religion, and naturalism: Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2011, 359 pp. $27.95 (review)
    with Bradley Monton
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (1): 53-57. 2012.
    Science and Religion
  •  1264
    Evidence and What We Make of It
    Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2): 89-99. 2014.
    Some prominent epistemologists make a distinction between evidence on the one hand and what is made of that evidence by a subject on the other. For reasons that will become clear, this view threatens the evidentialist project. Yet, as I will argue, it is possible to retain evidentialism while preserving the intuition behind this distinction. First, I explain this distinction and illustrate it with two examples. Second, I explain what is at stake for evidentialism. Third, I develop a possibl…Read more
    Some prominent epistemologists make a distinction between evidence on the one hand and what is made of that evidence by a subject on the other. For reasons that will become clear, this view threatens the evidentialist project. Yet, as I will argue, it is possible to retain evidentialism while preserving the intuition behind this distinction. First, I explain this distinction and illustrate it with two examples. Second, I explain what is at stake for evidentialism. Third, I develop a possible solution to the problem. I close by considering some likely objections to this solution.
    Evidence, MiscEvidentialismSeemings
  •  709
    Michael Ruse: Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (review)
    Religious Studies Review 38 (1): 10. 2012.
    A brief review of Michael Ruse's 2010 book Science and Spirituality: Making Room for Faith in the Age of Science (Cambridge University Press).
    Science and Religion
  •  1343
    New Atheist Approaches to Religion
    with Trent Dougherty
    In Graham Oppy (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Routledge. pp. 51-62. 2014.
    In this article, we examine in detail the New Atheists' most serious argument for the conclusion that God does not exist, namely, Richard Dawkins's Ultimate 747 Gambit. Dawkins relies upon a strong explanatory principle involving simplicity. We systematically inspect the various kinds of simplicity that Dawkins may invoke. Finding his crucial premises false on any common conception of simplicity, we conclude that Dawkins has not given good reason to think God does not exist.
    Simplicity and ParsimonyArguments from Naturalism against TheismAtheism
  •  249
    Objectivity and Subjectivity in Epistemology: A Defense of the Phenomenal Conception of Evidence
    Dissertation, Baylor University. 2014.
    We all have an intuitive grasp of the concept of evidence. Evidence makes beliefs reasonable, justifies jury verdicts, and helps resolve our disagreements. Yet getting clear about what evidence is is surprisingly difficult. Among other possibilities, evidence might consist in physical objects like a candlestick found at the crime scene, propositions like ‘a candlestick was found at the crime scene,’ or experiences like the experience of witnessing a candlestick at the crime scene. This dissertat…Read more
    We all have an intuitive grasp of the concept of evidence. Evidence makes beliefs reasonable, justifies jury verdicts, and helps resolve our disagreements. Yet getting clear about what evidence is is surprisingly difficult. Among other possibilities, evidence might consist in physical objects like a candlestick found at the crime scene, propositions like ‘a candlestick was found at the crime scene,’ or experiences like the experience of witnessing a candlestick at the crime scene. This dissertation is a defense of the latter view. Evidence, we will argue, consists in experiences or mental states called ‘seeming states.’ We begin with a look at why the logical positivists came to abandon the experiential or “phenomenal” conception of evidence and adopted what I call “the courtroom conception.” Despite its appeal, we argue that this latter view is too objective; it has trouble playing the role of subjective reasons-provider. Being more subjective, the phenomenal conception deserves another look. However, many have thought that the phenomenal conception itself is unable to fulfill other important roles of evidence. In chapter two we dispute this, arguing that the phenomenal conception can play all four of the chief roles of evidence. Examining the religious epistemology of Alvin Plantinga in chapter three we come to see that the phenomenal conception, while attractive, is in danger of being too subjective. If the phenomenal conception of evidence is to be tenable, it must be offered in conjunction with a conservative epistemic principle which tethers together experiences with the beliefs they evidence in an epistemically appropriate manner. Hence in chapter four we consider a number of conservative epistemic principles and argue for the superiority of one in particular. But these principles have themselves been subject to criticism. For this reason, in chapter five we close by responding to a recent and pressing challenge to conservative principles in epistemology (Michael Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism) which might prevent their deployment alongside the phenomenal conception. If our arguments are correct, the phenomenal conception of evidence is still an attractive account of evidence today.
    SeemingsJustification, MiscEvidentialismWarrant, MiscPhenomenal Conservatism
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