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181Computation and intentionality: A recipe for epistemic impasseMinds and Machines 15 (2): 207-228. 2005.Searle’s celebrated Chinese room thought experiment was devised as an attempted refutation of the view that appropriately programmed digital computers literally are the possessors of genuine mental states. A standard reply to Searle, known as the “robot reply” (which, I argue, reflects the dominant approach to the problem of content in contemporary philosophy of mind), consists of the claim that the problem he raises can be solved by supplementing the computational device with some “appropriate”…Read more
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114The whole rabbit: On the perceptual roots of Quine's indeterminacy puzzlePhilosophical Psychology 22 (6). 2009.In this paper I offer a novel analysis of Quine's indeterminacy puzzle and an unorthodox approach to its resolution. It is argued that the ultimate roots of indeterminacy lie not in behaviorism per se, but rather in Quine's commitment to a fundamental assumption about the nature of perceptual input, namely, the assumption that sensory information is strictly extensional. Calling this assumption the 'principle of input extensionalism' (PIE) I first demonstrate the fundamental role that it plays i…Read more
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155Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly FalsePhilosophical Psychology 28 (2): 294-298. 2015.Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature Is Almost Certainly False. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.804045
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73Review essay: The mind as a scientific objectPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 37 (2): 229-241. 2007.The prevailing message of this volume lies in the claim that psychology ought to come to terms with the irreducible cultural dimensions of mind. Though this is an important message, the author argues that an uncritical shift in favor of a cultural approach runs the risk of imposing uniquely human characteristics on the general study of the mind. Moreover, by treating the nature-nurture dichotomy as an axiom, the bulk of the articles in this collection fail to consider the possibility of transcen…Read more
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127Consciousness and the first personJournal of Consciousness Studies 14 (12): 57-91. 2007.According to John Searle's connection principle (CP) all intentional states are, necessarily, potentially conscious (Searle 1992). Thus formulated, CP implies that intentionality is ontologically dependent on consciousness. Searle's argument in favour of CP is based on the assumption that, while every intentional state is endowed with an aspectual shape, only conscious intentional states are intrinsically so endowed. In turn, the contention that only conscious intentional states are intrinsicall…Read more
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163Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalismPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2): 225-243. 2009.The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with th…Read more
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169Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversyPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1): 1-26. 2013.This paper engages the extended cognition controversy by advancing a theory which fits nicely into an attractive and surprisingly unoccupied conceptual niche situated comfortably between traditional individualism and the radical externalism espoused by the majority of supporters of the extended mind hypothesis. I call this theory moderate active externalism, or MAE. In alliance with other externalist theories of cognition, MAE is committed to the view that certain cognitive processes extend acro…Read more
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108Aim that Bow! An Interactivist Gaze at the Problem of Intentional TrackingAxiomathes 21 (1): 67-97. 2011.In this essay I offer a theory of the outward directedness of intentional states, namely, an account of what makes intentional states directed at their respective intentional objects. The theory is meant to be complementary to the canonical interactivist account of mental content in that the latter emphasizes the predicative, intensional, and internal aspects of representation whereas here I shall focus on its denotative, extensional, and external aspects. Thus, the aim is to establish that the …Read more
Itay Shani
Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai Campus
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Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai CampusProfessor
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Biology |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |