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53Manifest Reality: Kant’s Idealism and his Realism (review)Journal of Philosophy 113 (2): 112-116. 2016.
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723We are grateful to Ganson and Mehta (forthcoming) for their reply to our defence of phenomenal particularism against the objections raised by Mehta in his (2014). Their reply clarifies the nature of their objections to phenomenal particularism and helps identify the locus of our disagreements. In what follows we aim to defend phenomenal particularism against the objections raised in their reply.
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2032Testimony and Other MindsErkenntnis 80 (1): 173-183. 2015.In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it
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2984Is Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories fit for purpose?Kantian Review 15 (2): 118-137. 2010.James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests an interesting reason wh…Read more
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1361Kant on Perception: Naive Realism, Non-Conceptualism, and the B-DeductionPhilosophical Quarterly 64 (254): 1-19. 2014.According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a …Read more
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533Nonconceptualism, Hume’s Problem, and the DeductionPhilosophical Studies 174 (7): 1687-1698. 2017.Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide a…Read more
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955Unity, Objectivity, and the Passivity of ExperienceEuropean Journal of Philosophy 24 (3): 946-969. 2016.In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences if we …Read more
Oxford, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Immanuel Kant |
20th Century Analytic Philosophy |
The Problem of Other Minds |
Perception |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Immanuel Kant |
The Problem of Other Minds |
Perception |