Manuel Garcia

Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself”—_de se_ thoughts, Lewis called them—that raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of _de se_ thought—how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. The main tenets of the two contrasting accounts—Lewisian and Perrian—are rehearsed in the first section of this chapter, together with some weaknesses of Perry’s presentation of his view. In the second, a proposal is presented, a specific elaboration of the Perrian account which overcomes the weaknesses. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of reasons for preferring one or another account, in particular regarding the issue of the communication of _de se_ thoughts.

This chapter defends the view that the concept of self is a kind of phenomenal concept, anchored in self-experience. This approach sheds new light on the epistemic privileges traditionally attached to I-thoughts. Coliva (2003) argues that we should distinguish between immunity to error through misidentification and two other properties it is often confused with: the impossibility of a split between semantic and speaker’s reference, and the “Real Guarantee.” The phenomenal-concept model explains why each of these three properties arises in connection with I-thoughts, and with what frequency. It also makes sense of the fact that they are regularly conflated, given their common source in the nature of the concept of self, and in the properties of self-experience.

Pérez López, amigo y colaborador de Leonardo Polo, desarrolla lo que puede considerarse una Teoría General de Sistemas que resulta de gran utilidad. De ella serían casos particulares los sistemas ultraestables y estables. Sus modelos tienen gran utilidad para la comprensión analítica del modo de ser humano y del funcionamiento de las organizaciones y de la dirección. Se realiza una introducción panorámica del propósito de ese autor y del método y alcance de sus investigaciones en el comportamiento humano y el funcionamiento de las organizaciones.

Se discutirán críticamente algunas tesis recientes sobre cognición geométrica, específicamente la tesis de la universalidad planteada por Dehaene et al., y la idea de una “geometría natural” empleada por Spelke. Argumentaremos la necesidad de distinguir entre cognición visuo-espacial y conocimiento geométrico básico, y más aún, afirmaremos que este último no se puede identificar con la geometría euclidiana. El propósito principal del artículo es proponer una caracterización de la geometría básica, para lo cual se requiere una combinación de experimentos en cognición visuo-espacial con estudios en arqueología cognitiva e historia comparativa. Ofreceremos ejemplos de estos campos, con especial énfasis en la comparación de ideas y procedimientos geométricos de la antigua China y Grecia.

We argue against the claim that the employment of diagrams in Euclidean geometry gives rise to gaps in the proofs. First, we argue that it is a mistake to evaluate its merits through the lenses of Hilbert’s formal reconstruction. Second, we elucidate the abilities employed in diagram-based inferences in the Elements and show that diagrams are mathematically reputable tools. Finally, we complement our analysis with a review of recent experimental results purporting to show that, not only is the Euclidean diagram-based practice strictly regimented, it is rooted in cognitive abilities that are universally shared.

Manuel de Pinedo attempts to determine what the drug-induced psychoactive experience tells us about experience in general. What it tells us, he argues, is that the latter is an irreducibly personal-level phenomenon. More specifically (and as he puts it) “Who we are, who we are with, what we know and expect, how we feel, are constitutive aspects of experience in general and of psychoactive experience, in particular”. While arguing for this, he provides reasons for thinking that neither biochemical reductionism nor psychological reductionism adequately describe experience, either in general or in psychoactive experience.

Este artículo estudia las diferencias entre el juicio de los periodistas culturales y el gusto de los lectores, aplicando un análisis de contenidos a los “libros del año” recomendados por los principales suplementos españoles (‘ABC Cultural’, ‘Babelia’, ‘Cultura|s’ y ‘El Cultural’) entre 2010 y 2020 (n=1.133), y cotejando estos listados con las valoraciones de los usuarios de ‘Goodreads’. Los libros seleccionados reciben una puntuación media discreta (7,3), con apenas un 0,2% de títulos considerables “sobresalientes”, lo que evidencia la distancia existente (aunque decreciente) con los críticos, sobre todo al cruzar con las variables de nacionalidad y género del autor.

Castañeda, Perry and Lewis argued that, among singular thoughts in general, thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’—first-personal thoughts, which Lewis aptly called de se—have a distinctive character that traditional views of contents cannot characterize. Drawing on Anscombe, Annalisa Coliva has argued that a feature she calls Real Guarantee marks apart de se thoughts—as opposed to others including Immunity to Error through Misidentification that have been proposed for that role. I'll argue that, while her work points to a truly distinguishing feature of the de se, we need an account of the notion other than hers and Echeverri's recent development of it. I'll offer an alternative, drawing on Léa Salje's work. Finally, I'll briefly outline how, thus understood, the Real Guarantee feature could be adequately explained by theories of de se thoughts like the one I favour, even if it is an open option to just explain it away.

La Iglesia católica se encuentra en un proceso de reflexión sobre la sinodalidad. En este contexto, se ha hecho notar que las Iglesias orientales han funcionado históricamente sobre la base del sínodo como método de gobierno y reflexión comunitaria. Así pues, puede ser recomendable analizar cómo estas Iglesias han vivido la sinodalidad en su historia. El autor pretende contribuir a esta tarea presentando el pensamiento de Teodoro Abu Qurra, un significativo autor cristiano árabe del siglo ix, en particular, su tratado Sobre los Concilios.

Propuesta de un nuevo y complementario enfoque —el traductológico— para el estudio de los romanceamientos granadinos considerados en cuanto que testimonios únicos para la historia de la traducción del árabe al español y la historia del arabismo en España. Dicho enfoque se lleva aquí a la práctica ilustrado con dos romanceamientos inéditos llevados a cabo en 1517 por Bemardino Xarafí, escribano público y romanceador de la ciudad de Granada y su Reino. La edición de los mismos se acompaña de un amplio estudio traductológico, una panorámica general sobre los Xarafí y otros romanceadores granadinos del primer tercio del XVI y un análisis descriptivo comparado con otros romanceamientos del siglo XVI y con los procedimientos de traducción actualmente aceptados en la traducción jurada del árabe al español.

Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom's normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.

John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone to sceptical attacks and waters down McDowell’s holism. We propose to retain McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature—without appealing to McDowell’s Kantian conception of experience—, and argue that it is sufficient to avoid the oscillation and to make sense of the objectivity of thought.

Richard Moran has argued, convincingly, in favour of the idea that there must be more than one path to access our own mental contents. The existence of those routes, one first-personal—through avowal—the other third-personal—no different to the one used to ascribe mental states to other people and to interpret their actions—is intimately connected to our capacity to respond to norms. Moran’s account allows for conflicts between first personal and third personal authorities over my own beliefs; this enable some instances of Moore-paradoxical cases to be meaningful. In this paper we reflect on the consequences of this view for the acquisition of beliefs, and argue that, as in the moral case, excessive concentration on a thirdpersonal understanding of thought undermines the very idea of being directed to the world and of being capable to fully own our own beliefs. We suggest that maybe too much attention to epistemic virtues or tojustification is misdirected and could produce beliefs that are themself not first-personal enough.

Este artículo estudia las diferencias entre el juicio de los periodistas culturales y el gusto de los lectores, aplicando un análisis de contenidos a los “libros del año” recomendados por los principales suplementos españoles (‘ABC Cultural’, ‘Babelia’, ‘Cultura|s’ y ‘El Cultural’) entre 2010 y 2020 (n=1.133), y cotejando estos listados con las valoraciones de los usuarios de ‘Goodreads’. Los libros seleccionados reciben una puntuación media discreta (7,3), con apenas un 0,2% de títulos considerables “sobresalientes”, lo que evidencia la distancia existente (aunque decreciente) con los críticos, sobre todo al cruzar con las variables de nacionalidad y género del autor.

El presente artículo reconoce que las dos grandes metodologías de Foucault (la arqueología y la genealogía) surgieron en dos momentos diferentes de su enfoque metodológico, y argumenta que a partir de la década del setenta se desarrolla el concepto de dispositivo en el filósofo debido a una discontinuidad en su investigación. Se sostiene que este problema surgió a raíz de una serie de situaciones: el descubrimiento de un nuevo problema de investigación y su relación con la ocurrencia de una coyuntura sociopolítica especifica (fracaso de las movilizaciones sociales del mayo francés en 1968). Lo anterior llevó a Foucault a plantear la pregunta por ¿cómo se ejerce el poder y cuál es su relación con el saber?, en lugar del antiguo interrogante sobre ¿qué es el poder? Esta transformación de la pregunta resultó fundamental en Foucault, ya que le permite concluir que todo dispositivo presupone la existencia de un poder y que todo poder se ejerce mediante la utilización de un saber. El artículo se cierra con una referencia a Jurgen Habermas, autor que precisa la crisis que generó en Foucault el fracaso de las movilizaciones sociales ocurridas durante el denominado mayo francés. El presente trabajo se elaboró a partir de un método de investigación cualitativa y una técnica de rastreo bibliográfico.

José Luis Moreno argumenta contra lo que considera una variedad de formas de fetichismo político. Lo que tienen en común es depositar una confianza excesiva o monolítica en algún mecanismo democrático en particular. Compartimos su motivación y en esta nota crítica intentamos llevar sus argumentos más lejos preguntándonos si diferentes tipos de conocimiento políticamente relevante pueden distinguirse, si en algunos contextos es necesario dejar las decisiones en manos de expertos y si la propuesta de Moreno cae en un nuevo tipo de fetichismo con respecto al sorteo como mecanismo capaz de eliminar injusticias sociales profundas.

Recommending the identity of bidders in public procurement auctions has a significant impact in many areas of public procurement, but it has not yet been studied in depth. A bidders recommender would be a very beneficial tool because a supplier can search appropriate tenders and, vice versa, a public procurement agency can discover automatically unknown companies which are suitable for its tender. This paper develops a pioneering algorithm to recommend potential bidders using a machine learning method, particularly a random forest classifier. The bidders recommender is described theoretically, so it can be implemented or adapted to any particular situation. It has been successfully validated with a case study: an actual Spanish tender dataset which has 102,087 tenders from 2014 to 2020 and a company dataset which has 1,353,213 Spanish companies. Quantitative, graphical, and statistical descriptions of both datasets are presented. The results of the case study were satisfactory: the winning bidding company is within the recommended companies group, from 24% to 38% of the tenders, according to different test conditions and scenarios.

In this paper we reject the nature–culture dichotomy by means of the idea of affordance or possibility for action, which has important implications for landscape theory. Our hypothesis is that, just as the idea of affordance can serve to overcome the subjective–objective dichotomy, the ideas of landscape and ecological niche, properly defined, would allow us to also transcend the nature–culture dichotomy. First, we introduce an overview of landscape theory, emphasizing processual landscape theory as the most suitable approach for satisfying both cultural and naturalist approaches. After that, we introduce the idea of affordance and we analyze a tension between sociocultural and transcultural affordances (affordances that depend on cultural conventions and affordances that depend on lawful information and bodily aspects of agents). This tension has various implications for landscape theory and ecological niches. Our proposal is that sociocultural and transcultural aspects of affordances could be systematically accommodated if we apply niche construction theory (the theory that explains the process by which organisms modify their selective environments) as a methodological framework for explaining the emergence of ecological niches. This approach will lead us to an integrative account of landscapes as the products of the interaction between human and environmental elements, making it a clear example of a concept that transcends the nature–culture dichotomy.