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755Avia Pasternak argues for a right that democracies have to sanction other democracies. This paper reconstructs her argument and objects to one of its premises.
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2177Joseph Raz on the Problem of the AmoralistAbstracta 7 (1): 85-93. 2013.Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these interpretations yields an argument that we are in a position to accept.
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804Deferentialism and the Territory of PhilosophyEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 7 (1): 56-62. 2014.David Liggins and Chris Daly have argued against a recent trend in which some philosophical debate or other is said to be settled by claims from a discipline other than philosophy, because claims from that discipline entail a position on the debate and any claims from that discipline have greater authority than any philosophical claims when the aim is to extend our knowledge. They label this trend deferentialism. This paper presents a dilemma for their argument.
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4895Does Marilyn Strathern Argue that the Concept of Nature Is a Social Construction?Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4): 437-442. 2016.It is tempting to interpret Marilyn Strathern as saying that the concept of nature is a social construction, because in her essay “No Nature, No Culture: the Hagen Case” she tells us that the Hagen people do not describe the world using this concept. However, I point out an obstacle to interpreting her in this way, an obstacle which leads me to reject this interpretation. Interpreting her in this way makes her inconsistent. The inconsistency is owing to a commitment that she shares with previous…Read more
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974In different papers, David Liggins and Chris Daly tell philosophers what they should not do. There is no sign of them withdrawing any of these prohibitions, but I show that they fail to be consistent when asserting them. The inconsistency concerns when a philosopher should defer to the empirical findings of science.
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1893Astrology, Fate and CausationPhilosophical Pathways (200). 2016.Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions about which propositions are essential to astrology.
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2753Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objectionE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 23 (2): 37-41. 2016.This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.
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2825Feminist Research and Paradigm Shift in AnthropologyMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 4 (2): 343-362. 2012.In her paper ‘An Awkward Relationship: the Case of Feminism and Anthropology’, Marilyn Strathern argues that feminist research cannot produce a paradigm shift in social anthropology. I reconstruct her arguments and evaluate them, revealing that they are insufficient for ruling out this possibility.
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693This paper defends the practice of attributing a worldview to a group against the objection that this practice overlooks different views within the group and wrongly portrays the group as homogeneous.
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2080The asymmetry objection to political liberalism: evaluation of a defenceE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (1): 26-32. 2018.This paper evaluates Jonathan Quong’s attempt to defend a version of political liberalism from the asymmetry objection. I object that Quong’s defence relies on a premise that has not been adequately supported and does not look as if it can be given adequate support.
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697Taking the concepts of others seriouslyMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 8 (1): 143-153. 2016.This paper assesses an argument against the representationalist tradition in anthropology: the tradition of reporting how a cultural group represents the world. According to the argument, anthropologists working within this tradition cannot take the concepts of those they study seriously. I defend the representationalist tradition against this argument.
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1167Non-social human beings in the original positionPhilosophical Pathways (205). 2016.This paper argues that Rawls must commit himself to non-social human beings to defend his original position procedure.
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2124Descriptive metaphysics, revisionary metaphysics, anti-metaphysicsEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 36-43. 2012.This paper observes that P. F. Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is a baffling one from the perspective of traditional metaphysics. If one thinks of metaphysics as the study of the fundamental nature of reality, it is bewildering to divide up metaphysics in this way. The paper then tries to show how the distinction is no longer bewildering if we deny that such study is possible.
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1227Anthropology in the context that produced itMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 6 (1): 347-360. 2014.This paper evaluates a definition of anthropology at home formulated by Marilyn Strathern in her book contribution 'The Limits of Auto-Anthropology'. According to the definition, anthropology at home is anthropology carried out in the social context that produced this discipline. I argue that this is not an adequate definition of anthropology at home.
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833From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual DiversityOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1): 3-8. 2015.This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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1776The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated RealityE-Logos 19 (1): 2-8. 2012.This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent
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96625This paper presents two accounts of how Oedipus might have arrived at the answer to the Sphinx's riddle by proceeding methodically.
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1282Are there uncontroversial error theories?Philosophical Pathways (162). 2011.This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
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840Theory-Laden Experience and IllusionsEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 58-67. 2011.The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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1889Torture with consentPhilosophical Pathways (230): 1-3. 2019.There are attempts to define torture which say that a person is only being tortured if the pain inflicted upon them is pain that they have not consented to. In this very brief paper, I recommend that we define torture without this condition.
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1389Overlooked systems in S. Baron-Cohen's gender researchIJRDO Journal of Biological Science 5 (6): 1-7. 2019.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen claims that males are on average stronger at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average stronger at empathizing than systematizing. Systematizing is defined as the drive to construct or understand systems. In this paper, I observe that Baron-Cohen overlooks certain examples of systems, examples which lead to doubts about his claim.
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864Did the past really change in 2012?Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3): 340-344. 2015.There is an intuition that the past does not ever change. In their paper ‘The puzzle of the changing past,’ Luca Barlassina and Fabio Del Prete argue that in 2012 the past changed. I show that we are not in a position to accept their argument.
Manchester, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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