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Terence Rajivan Edward

University of Manchester
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University of Manchester
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2007
Homepage
Manchester, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Value Theory
History of Western Philosophy
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Social Science
General Philosophy of Science
1 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Anthropology
  • All publications (982)
  •  550
    On the exhaustion criterion of difficulty, with Wittgenstein, Robert Graves, and Kripke
    The philosopher and builder Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks that architecture is more difficult than philosophy. He suggests an exhaustion criterion for how difficult a discipline is: a field is more difficult the more exhausting it is. I make a case against this claim. There was once a demand to prevent the Greek myths from establishing themselves in the curriculum by means of “our own rival myths.” It is difficult to compete with a renowned Greek myth, but if one does produce a rival, it may well …Read more
    The philosopher and builder Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks that architecture is more difficult than philosophy. He suggests an exhaustion criterion for how difficult a discipline is: a field is more difficult the more exhausting it is. I make a case against this claim. There was once a demand to prevent the Greek myths from establishing themselves in the curriculum by means of “our own rival myths.” It is difficult to compete with a renowned Greek myth, but if one does produce a rival, it may well not be exhausting to do so.
    The Nature of PhilosophyLudwig WittgensteinAesthetics and Culture, Misc
  •  494
    Victorian anthropology paradox: another solution
    Parts of the Victorian middle class were troubled by how Victorian society was both highly evolved and contained savage parts. I propose a solution to the paradox they faced.
    Philosophy of Anthropology
  •  461
    Laughter and ethnic identity: Flora Nwapa’s Women are Different
    This brief paper raises a puzzle, or half-puzzle, about Flora Nwapa’s ethnic identity in light of sentences in her novel Women are Different and presents two solutions.
    Race as a Subjective Identity
  •  524
    Against evil reflective equilibrium: a response to Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath
    This paper responds to Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath’s worry that there can be evil reflective equilibrium. I propose that some of John Rawls’s restrictions on moral judgments we can enter into the procedure serve to protect against evil reflective equilibrium.
    Reflective Equilibrium
  •  489
    On Parfit’s disagreement with Nietzsche (by D*n*ld D*v*ds*n)
    This paper presents a Davidsonian perspective on Derek Parfit’s disagreements with Nietzsche. I have actually gone further, too far perhaps, and tried to imitate Davidson’s attractive essayistic style.
    Nietzsche: Utilitarianism
  •  471
    The psychology of specialization and the origins of money
    This paper raises a worry that it is difficult to reconcile Adam Smith’s claims about the relationship of specialization to talent and character with his account of the origins of money. Specialization makes one stupid outside of one’s specialism yet money arises by specialists also providing what everyone wants.
    History of Economics
  •  576
    Dorothea versus John Locke’s philosophy
    I interpret George Eliot as objecting to John Locke in Middlemarch – more specifically, his theory of ideas – by means of her account of Dorothea’s experiences of Edward Casaubon at dinner.
    Locke: Ideas, Misc
  •  388
    A compensatory solution to the all-or-nothing problem
    The all-or-nothing problem, formulated by Joe Horton, presents us with a situation in which you can do nothing or save one child or save two. It is dangerous to save any, making doing nothing morally permissible, but there is no extra danger in saving two, so it seems wrong to just save one. But then doing nothing is morally better than saving one. I present a solution in response to this problematic result, which is that doing nothing is not an accurate description of a permissible option.
    Supererogation
  •  439
    “Graphomania” in Told by an Idiot, and crowds
    This paper examines what is said about a craze for essay writing in Rose Macauley’s 1923 essayistic novel Told by an Idiot, comparing the material with Milan Kundera on graphomania. In the appendix, I note a passage on crowds which is reminiscent of the widely read European author.
  •  760
    Ought-implies-can, the original position, and reflective equilibrium
    Are John Rawls’s most noticeable methodological contributions, reflective equilibrium and the original position, consistent with each other? I draw attention to a worry that they stand in inconsistent relationships to the claim that ought implies can: it can only be the case that we ought to do something if we can do it.
    The Original PositionReflective EquilibriumMoral SemanticsOught Implies Can
  •  636
    Social anthropology summary: A.R. Radcliffe-Brown’s objections to Sir James Frazer
    This is a one page handout presenting some objections A.R. Radcliffe-Brown makes to Frazer on rites and Frazer's evolutionism.
    Philosophy of Anthropology
  •  672
    The social organism analogy in British anthropology and analytic political philosophy
    This is a one page handout, which specifies four uses of the social organism analogy in British structural-functionalist anthropology and contrasts these uses with uses in analytic political philosophy.
    Objections to UtilitarianismPhilosophy of AnthropologySocial and Political Philosophy
  •  470
    Can Raz consistently suppose that fundamental moral principles are satiable?
    Joseph Raz claims that the fundamental principles of morality and politics are satiable: there is a point at which one has fulfilled them. I argue that Raz cannot consistently endorse this claim, given his approach to saving lives.
    Moral Principles, Misc
  •  377
    On the chaste world of Milan Kundera*
    Milan Kundera is now perhaps the greatest living philosopher, but he suffers from logical problems. One might propose that since he is a person who works primarily in the medium of fiction, one should not be too harsh on him, rather find ways to make him more logical. The result may be rather chaste.
  •  507
    A solution to a Victorian anthropology paradox
    This paper considers a paradox which the historian of anthropology George Stocking draws attention to: from the point of view of parts of the Victorian middle class, Victorian society was highly evolved yet also contained savage components. I clarify the paradox and propose a solution.
    Philosophy of Anthropology
  •  423
    The marriages of Rosamonds
    I compare Rosamond’s relationship with her husband in Middlemarch with Rosamond’s marital relationship in L.A.G. Strong’s short story “The Seal.” I interpret the latter fiction as addressing the unpleasant question: what sort of decent man can suppress Rosamond?
  •  347
    Propositions, the paradox of analysis, and Milan Kundera's author's note
    Ijrdo-Journal of Educational Research 11 (1): 1. 2025.
    I present a literary solution to the paradox of analysis in light of The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, and also raise a question of whether sentences across languages are expressing the same proposition, owing to differences in informativeness.
    The Paradox of Analysis
  •  509
    “What is the difference between your response to Marilyn Strathern on feminist anthropology and Victoria Loblay’s response?”
    Regarding the argument by Marilyn Strathern which Victoria Loblay focuses on, I present two differences between my response and Loblay’s response. Also I raise a concern about Loblay’s response.
    Feminist Perspectives on Phenomena, Misc
  •  534
    Reflective equilibrium, considered moral judgments, and interests – a response to Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath
    Which moral judgments should one pay attention to in building a moral philosophy? Thomas Kelly and Sarah McGrath object to John Rawls’s suggestion to not rely on judgments heavily bound up with one’s own interests. I propose a solution in response to the objection.
    Racial DiscriminationReflective Equilibrium
  •  426
    Graphomania again: a taxi driver puzzle from Milan Kundera and a solution
    This paper presents a puzzle that occurred to me while reading Milan Kundera defining graphomania: a mania for writing books for an unknown public. I also present a solution.
  •  475
    A built-in objection against if-I-were-a-horse argument
    Max Gluckman introduces us to if-I-were-a-horse arguments, but what is wrong with them? In this paper, I draw attention to an objection built-in to the terminology.
    Philosophy of Anthropology
  •  713
    Nationalism and the original position
    This is a one-page handout presenting some objections nationalists might or do make to John Rawls's original position method.
    The Original PositionCommunitarianismNationalism
  •  466
    Frazer and the social function of gift exchange norms
    Why is there a norm of reciprocity in certain societies – the recipient of a gift should give a gift in return? Or what is its function? Sir James Frazer provides an unobvious answer to the function of such a norm in one society: it serves to establish who is alive.
  •  583
    Does the persistence of genius depend on social obstacles? Troubles with displacing Wittgenstein on The Golden Bough
    This paper considers the debate between teams of skilled contributors versus a genius by focusing on a specific case: a team project to overturn some remarks by Wittgenstein on Frazer’s The Golden Bough. In theory, there can be a team which does this, but in actual practice, such a team seems unlikely to arise.
    Folk Concepts and Folk IntuitionsLudwig Wittgenstein
  •  317
    A gain from “faux specialization,” from Flora Nwapa’s Efuru
    This paper begins with Adam Smith’s advice to specialize and draws attention to an advantage from a misleading appearance of fixed specialization, identified in Flora Nwapa’s novel Efuru.
    Philosophy of Economics
  •  466
    Sorites arguments, a myth of genius, and overpopulation
    This paper responds to Theron Pummer’s distinction between Sorites arguments and repugnant conclusion arguments by presenting a Sorites overpopulation argument. Also I present a Sorites argument in favour of myths of genius.
    Population EthicsSorites Paradox
  •  599
    Gluckman versus Frazer: if-I-were-a-horse arguments
    I present anthropologist Max Gluckman’s explanation of what “if-I-were-a-horse” arguments are and introduce three questions. How do we define this kind of argument? Are earlier anthropologists “guilty” of them? And is it a bad idea to make them? I address the first two questions, proposing that Frazer is not much guilty of precisely these, though his project calls for them.
    Philosophy of Anthropology
  •  737
    On Milan Kundera’s definition of graphomania
    This paper presents two objections to Milan Kundera’s definition of graphomania.
    Literature and Knowledge
  •  430
    Savage and civilized on controlling the weather, from The Golden Bough
    Sir James Frazer’s The Golden Bough presents a puzzle regarding how primitive peoples believe they can control something which civilized people regard as beyond their control: the weather. I clarify the puzzle and consider Frazer’s solution to it, as well as other solutions.
    Philosophy of Anthropology
  •  381
    Relativism issues: The econocracy against multiple-choice questions
    This paper draws attention to a worry concerning what the book The econocracy says about multiple-choice questions versus essays. They face a problem reminiscent of the problems facing various kinds of relativism.
    Relativism about Truth
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