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670In this paper, I present an outline of a paradox which is a variation on the lottery paradox and concerns whether we can ignore hesitant moral judgments.
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1132Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem concerns a situation in which it is morally permissible to do nothing and to save two people but not to save only one. This description seems to entail that we should do nothing rather than save only one. I object to Horton’s solution and challenge a principle he draws attention to, which is required to generate the problem but which Horton regards as beyond dispute.
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1398Do anthropologists use rational actor models? The case of Marilyn StrathernIJRDO - Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 7 (3). 2022.Economics uses rational actor models, but what about anthropology? I present an interpretation of the influential anthropologist Marilyn Strathern according to which she engages in a kind of rational actor modelling, but a kind that is different from economic modelling.
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852The economist David K. Levine claims that if a government of a country makes torture legal, the inevitable result will be torture that is out of control. I point out an inconsistency in his approach to torture. I then argue that we should be open to rare counterexamples to his claim and describe a kind of counterexample.
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878When can we know our assumptions?Philosophical Pathways 208 1-4. 2017.The expression “The owl of Minerva flies at dusk” is used to convey that philosophers are only able to identify the assumptions that are made within a period of history, a period of which they are part, when that period is coming to an end and those assumptions will soon no longer be made. In this paper, I support a rival view according to which those involved in a historical period can know their assumptions earlier, given appropriate talent and effort.
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597In this paper, I object to Michael Rush’s definitions of targeted and propositional gratitude.
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4969This paper disputes a common definition of token identity theory. It also observes that within the philosophical literature there are two significantly different definitions of token identity theory that are commonly used.
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873Political philosophers sometimes write of liberal democracies, but which societies, if any, are liberal democracies? John Rawls says that in the public political culture of a liberal democracy, we find the principle that this society should be a fair system of cooperation between free and equal individuals. In this paper, I draw attention to how, if we grant Rawls’s definition, a society can easily be mistaken for a liberal democracy when it is not. I then argue that Andrew March, Gabrielle Bada…Read more
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729I present a paradox concerning a person who desires to fail to achieve the goal that matters most to them. I recently encountered a similar paradox, but radical solipsism is a solution to it. This is not a solution to the paradox that I present.
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743Does the debate between Rawlsians and liberal perfectionists boil down to the following: for liberal perfectionists, the government should fund aesthetic projects that are in good taste; for Rawlsians, the government should be neutral on the aesthetic value of anything? If so, liberal perfectionists are committed to the view that there is objective aesthetic value. In this paper, I argue that within the Rawlsian system is a thesis that is difficult to reconcile with objectivity about aesthetics.
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752Philosophers and logicians talk of arguments for conclusions. In a recent paper, Jeffrey Goodman identifies a common way of thinking about what an argument is. I propose a definition that is quite different to this common way. I also make two objections to Goodman’s proposed definition.
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1047John Rawls’s difference principle says that we should change our economy if doing so is better for the worst-off group, on the condition that certain basic rights are secured. This paper presents a kind of case that challenges the principle. If we modify the principle to cope with the challenge, we open the way to a Sorites paradox.
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1220The surprise exam paradox: a note on formulating it and a solution to itEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 12 (2): 181-186. 2019.Some formulations of the surprise paradox involve a pair of unnecessary and controversial assumptions. After casting doubt on these assumptions, I propose a solution to the paradox.
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942Artefacts as Mere Illustrations of a WorldviewSymposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 241-244. 2017.This paper responds to an argument against a kind of anthropology. According to the argument, if the aim of anthropology is to describe the different worldviews of different groups, then anthropologists should only refer to material artefacts in order to illustrate a worldview; but the interest of artefacts to anthropology goes beyond mere illustration. This argument has been endorsed by key members of the ontological movement in anthropology, who found at least one of its premises in Marilyn St…Read more
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1038John Rawls recommends a reflective equilibrium method for evaluating which principles institutions should abide by. In this paper, I identify and challenge three assumptions that he makes.
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838There are some premise-by-premise reconstructions in political philosophy which are flawed, because they omit at least one premise or misword at least one premise. This paper focuses on a reconstruction by Richard Child. The original argument is by Andrea Sangiovanni and is about whether egalitarian values of distributive justice apply both within a state and globally. Child’s reconstruction has been reproduced in a paper by Ian Davis, who approves of it. But I point out five logical problems wi…Read more
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3254Traditional literary interpretation versus subversive interpretationAsian Journal of Advances in Research 16 (3): 34-39. 2022.I present some objections to traditional literary interpretation and consider subversive interpretation as a solution to these problems. Subversive interpretation may seem more scientific and more democratic than traditional interpretation, but it is open to doubt that it is more democratic.
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1366Cultural artefacts and neglect of the materials from which they are madeAbstracta 10 35-44. 2017.This paper discusses an explanation, offered by Tim Ingold, for why social and cultural anthropologists have so far paid little attention to the materials from which artefacts are composed. The explanation is that these anthropologists accept a certain argument. According to the argument, what an anthropologist should focus on when examining an artefact is the quality that makes it part of a culture, and this is not the materials from which the artefact is composed. I show that Ingold has not ma…Read more
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837Theory-Laden Experience and IllusionsEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 58-67. 2011.The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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1884Torture with consentPhilosophical Pathways (230): 1-3. 2019.There are attempts to define torture which say that a person is only being tortured if the pain inflicted upon them is pain that they have not consented to. In this very brief paper, I recommend that we define torture without this condition.
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1386Overlooked systems in S. Baron-Cohen's gender researchIJRDO Journal of Biological Science 5 (6): 1-7. 2019.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen claims that males are on average stronger at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average stronger at empathizing than systematizing. Systematizing is defined as the drive to construct or understand systems. In this paper, I observe that Baron-Cohen overlooks certain examples of systems, examples which lead to doubts about his claim.
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862Did the past really change in 2012?Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3): 340-344. 2015.There is an intuition that the past does not ever change. In their paper ‘The puzzle of the changing past,’ Luca Barlassina and Fabio Del Prete argue that in 2012 the past changed. I show that we are not in a position to accept their argument.
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2035A solution to the surprise exam paradoxFilozofia 72 (4): 325-327. 2017.The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day; the teacher believes that the exam would be a surprise on that day; but, actually, the exam would not be a surprise on that day. I give a reason to reject this assumption, and I point out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.
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1457Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?Accepted for Sorites 22. 2009.In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism. The position that he deems idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. Nagel claims that this position is held by a number of contemporary philosophers. Even if this is so, I justify the view that it is not a form of idealism.
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3002The definition of systematizing in S. Baron-Cohen's gender and autism researchPhilosophical Pathways (219): 1-4. 2018.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen is well-known for his thesis that males are on average better at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average better at empathizing than systematizing. In this paper, I note an ambiguity in how he defines systematizing.
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1573Do individuals in John Rawls’s original position take into account the fallibility of human nature? Some notable commentators on Rawls say that they do or that they should. But this enables us to say that individuals in the original position would not come to an agreement at all.
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2752Cartesian dualism and the study of cultural artefactsE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (2): 12-18. 2015.This paper evaluates an argument according to which many anthropologists commit themselves to Cartesian dualism, when they talk about meanings. This kind of dualism, it is argued, makes it impossible for anthropologists to adequately attend to material artefacts. The argument is very original, but it is also vulnerable to a range of objections.
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10984This paper contests a standard interpretation of how Descartes comes to the conclusion that he is not his body in the second meditation. I propose an alternative interpretation in its place.
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1816A Challenge to Social Constructivism about ScienceEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (2): 150-156. 2013.This paper presents a challenge to the coherence of social constructivism about science. It introduces an objection according to which social constructivism appeals to the authority of science regarding the nature of reality and so cannot coherently deny that authority. The challenge is how to avoid this incoherence.
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1571Unintentional ConsentKritike 9 (1): 86-95. 2015.Some political philosophers have judged that it is absurd to think that there can be unintentional consent. In this paper, I present an example of unintentional consent, which I refer to as the adapted boardroom example. I consider reasons for denying that this is an example of unintentional consent, but find that these reasons are unconvincing.
Manchester, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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