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Terence Rajivan Edward

University of Manchester
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    990
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 More details
University of Manchester
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2007
Homepage
Manchester, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology
Value Theory
History of Western Philosophy
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Social Science
General Philosophy of Science
1 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Philosophy of Anthropology
  • All publications (990)
  •  386
    Comparison of the first page of The House of Mirth with Commonplace
    I observe common ground and differences between the first page of Edith Wharton’s The House of Mirth and Christina Rossetti’s Commonplace.
  •  558
    Poetry smuggling in a liberal society
    I make a proposal for how one can continue to teach poetry through official channels in a liberal society, conceived as a set of rules for citizens who disagree on a lot of things, including the value of poetry. The proposal is to quote inspiring or relevant poems in textbooks for other disciplines.
    Political LiberalismLiterary Values
  •  470
    Sophocles on trial: a case for devaluation
    I anticipate someone who dismisses Sophocles as mere literary craftsperson of high skill, arguing that such craftspeople turn up generationally and that the credit should go to the mythmakers.
    Literary Values
  •  412
    Ifs and buts: Anca Gheaus’s flawed argument construction
    This is my response to a premise-by-premise argument in Anca Gheaus’s “Biological Parenthood: Gestational, Not Genetic.”
    Teaching Philosophy
  •  2169
    Objections to Robert Graves’s The Greek Myths
    This is a two page handout summarizing a number of objections made against Robert Graves's book of Greek myths.
    Literature and Knowledge
  •  385
    The virgin birth debate and testimony
    Various tribes deny that pregnancy is caused by sexual relations. Is this irrational? I present a puzzle involving testimony which some tribes might once have faced.
    Testimony
  •  679
    Myth and implication: why did Oedipus solve the Sphinx’s riddle?
    This paper presents an obvious explanation for why Oedipus even attempted to solve the Sphinx’s riddle, given the high cost of failure.
  •  621
    The death of A.J. Ayer, rational actor models, and the curriculum
    This paper reflects on an article that appeared after the death of A.J. Ayer, which complains about what British philosophers focus on. I propose that the content of the philosophy curriculum can be predicted from a rational actor model.
    Teaching PhilosophyA. J. Ayer
  •  708
    How many riddles did Oedipus solve?
    This paper proposes that before the opening of Sophocles’ play Oedipus the King, the “hero” had to solve a lot of riddles.
    Classics
  •  443
    How did the arts originate?
    This is a dialogue based on three distinct essays I earlier wrote. The three essays present four speculative theories of the origins of art altogether. One is the group demarcation account, according to which the arts originated from the desire of a group of humans to demarcate themselves from outsiders. Another is the "scientific" account, according to which the arts originated from experiments on what effects can be made upon the mind, upon human minds, such as what scares. A third is the surp…Read more
    This is a dialogue based on three distinct essays I earlier wrote. The three essays present four speculative theories of the origins of art altogether. One is the group demarcation account, according to which the arts originated from the desire of a group of humans to demarcate themselves from outsiders. Another is the "scientific" account, according to which the arts originated from experiments on what effects can be made upon the mind, upon human minds, such as what scares. A third is the surplus energy account, according to which the arts originated as a way of indicating surplus energy, by putting extra effort into doing a task in an artistic way. A fourth account - satirical - is the trophy account, according to which a tribe of strong people sometimes kept a weak child, weaker than normal, rather than killing them, as a symbol of its overall strength: we can carry this person. And they called what the weakling did "art".
    History of Aesthetics
  •  406
    Organizing and destruction: a Socratic dialogue
    By means of a brief Socratic dialogue, I consider the question of whether organizing involves destruction, prefaced by a poem of course.
    Donald Davidson
  •  493
    On what is offered, by M*l*n K*nder*
    I distinguish two senses of the word “offer.” I do so within a brief pastiche, which I put down to the influence of the European Union.
    Conceptual Analysis in Jurisprudence
  •  571
    The descriptivist theory of names and the problem of paradoxical reputations
    This paper presents an objection to the theory of names according to which what a name refers to is determined by a description that the speaker or writer associates with that name. Some names are associated with paradoxical descriptions. I use the reputations of Henry Sidgwick and J.M.E. McTaggart to illustrate this problem.
    Henry SidgwickDescriptive Theories of Names
  •  604
    Does the principle of charity have a problem with literary form?
    In this paper, I propose that there are or will be examples where the principle of charity recommends an interpretation which makes a text more true than another interpretation, whereas the rival interpretation improves on making sense of its form.
    The Principle of CharityLiterary Values
  •  630
    Beyond tribalism: an attempted solution to the kalela dance paradox
    I propose a solution to the paradox of the kalela dance, as presented by Richard Werbner, based on a variety of liberalism I once identified.
  •  159
    An idiotic definition of an idiot
    This paper rejects an attempt to define what an idiot is for when Henry Sidgwick tries to clarify the doctrine that each individual should be given as much freedom from interference as possible.
  •  494
    Lowe hanging fruit? Underdeterminism and the evaluation of libertarianism
    I respond to Dan Lowe’s charge that libertarianism, or the most defensible version, involves an unacceptable “asymmetry of value.” I argue that there is an inconsistency between Lowe’s approach to counterexamples and his eventual objection.
    Political LibertarianismQuine-Duhem Thesis
  •  400
    “Je suis une Cartésienne"? Dream and reality in an Annie Saumont fiction
    I consider the question of whether Annie Saumont is simply a disciple of Descartes in her fiction “You Should Have Changed at Dol.” Other interpretations are available according to which her commitments are more qualified.
  •  503
    Analytic philosophy abroad and the dictator lookalikes paradox
    In this paper, I present some obstacles I envisage analytic philosophy facing as it spreads abroad. I use a paradox to illustrate these obstacles.
    The Nature of Analytic Philosophy
  •  586
    History lessons in contemporary French literature: a brief inquiry
    This paper makes a comparison between Milan Kundera and Annie Saumont. I assume there is a message being sent by Saumont in her highly recommended short story “You Should Have Changed at Dol,” regarding history in Kundera, but what is the message? I offer two interpretations.
    Literary ValuesLiterature and Knowledge
  •  481
    Against Bourdieu? Prizes, split systems, and explaining underrepresentation
    When Pierre Bourdieu addresses the problem of why people from certain discriminated groups are hardly present in some fields, he emphasizes the role of stylistic factors that cannot be captured in terms of rules. An alternative explanation refers to split systems, both of which can be captured by means of rules.
    Equality of OpportunitySociology
  •  986
    What “everyone” needs to know? Sidgwick and Hart against the priority of liberty
    This is a one page handout, which draws attention to subtle adaptations that H.L.A. Hart makes regarding material from Henry Sidgwick, when he debates with Rawls and appeals to Sidgwick's objections to the priority of liberty. These adaptations challenge the impression that Rawls should have known better.
    Theories of FreedomJohn RawlsHenry Sidgwick
  •  638
    Henry Sidgwick on freedom as the formula for justice
    This is a two page handout, briefly summarizing late nineteenth and early twentieth century philosopher Henry Sidgwick's objections to giving all citizens a right to as much equal freedom as possible. H.L.A. Hart, who uses the material in a notable paper, also figures.
    Theories of FreedomHenry SidgwickJustice
  •  508
    Is reflective equilibrium a philosophical method? Is it a problem, if not?
    I consider Timothy Williamson’s objection that we do not have any reason to regard reflective equilibrium as a philosophical method. I present what I think a Rawlsian advocate of the method would say, or could say.
    Reflective Equilibrium
  •  1347
    H.L.A. Hart, Scott Soames, and the priority of liberty rights over economic gains
    This paper responds to material from Scott Soames’s wide ranging book The World Philosophy Made, material which I am actually tempted to overlook. Soames adds a detail to a criticism H.L.A. Hart makes of John Rawls, but I argue that Soames cannot consistently endorse this criticism, given his acceptance of trickle-down economics and his aspiration to cohere with a dominant strand of right-wing American philosophy.
    Theories of FreedomJohn RawlsRightsVagueness in Ethics and the LawConceptual Analysis in Jurispruden…Read more
    Theories of FreedomJohn RawlsRightsVagueness in Ethics and the LawConceptual Analysis in Jurisprudence
  •  680
    Description of method
    Timothy Williamson objects that we do not have any reason to regard reflective equilibrium as a philosophical method, whether good or bad. For Williamson, a proposed method of inquiry, whether good or bad, must meet these conditions: it should identity a source of evidence (e.g. the stream of sensory experience or the faculty of sensory experience); it should answer the question of what kind of evidence this source provides (e.g. information about the external world, information that is not nec…Read more
    Timothy Williamson objects that we do not have any reason to regard reflective equilibrium as a philosophical method, whether good or bad. For Williamson, a proposed method of inquiry, whether good or bad, must meet these conditions: it should identity a source of evidence (e.g. the stream of sensory experience or the faculty of sensory experience); it should answer the question of what kind of evidence this source provides (e.g. information about the external world, information that is not necessarily true); it should answer the question of how this source can provide such evidence (e.g. through causal relations – an instance of a type of thing in the external world causes an experience of there being an instance, in appropriate conditions). In this paper, I propose a less demanding account of when a method is being described. Something is a method of inquiry if and only if it is a set of instructions and following those instructions leads one to arrive at conclusions.
    Epistemological Theories, MiscReflective Equilibrium
  •  499
    A paradox of underdetermination
    One way of trying to justify the thesis of the underdetermination of scientific theories is by actual examples. In this paper, I present a paradox which arises from trying to justify the thesis in this way.
    Underdetermination of Theory by Data, Misc
  •  452
    Are these the paradoxes being referred to?
    I make some proposals regarding which paradoxes Dr. Johnson was referring to in a preface.
    Niccolo Machiavelli17th/18th Century British Philosophy
  •  453
    On the very idea that social anthropology can contribute to the study of specialization
    I present an argument against the very idea that anthropology can contribute to the study of specialization. But an obvious reply is “Actually anthropologists at home can study specialization.” I provide some details concerning this reply, focusing on incentives to specialize directed at sensitive souls.
    Explanation in EconomicsPhilosophy of Anthropology
  •  655
    A problem with detecting problem-solving outside the natural sciences
    In this paper, I draw attention to an obstacle to determining to what extent the portrait of normal science as a problem-solving activity applies outside the natural sciences. I give two examples from social anthropology, one from the heyday of British structural-functionalism and one from recent British anthropology, “responding” to Marilyn Strathern’s problem of the feminist fieldworker. (NOTE: there is a duplicate of this but neither may be showing on my profile. A proverb: the guest hates th…Read more
    In this paper, I draw attention to an obstacle to determining to what extent the portrait of normal science as a problem-solving activity applies outside the natural sciences. I give two examples from social anthropology, one from the heyday of British structural-functionalism and one from recent British anthropology, “responding” to Marilyn Strathern’s problem of the feminist fieldworker. (NOTE: there is a duplicate of this but neither may be showing on my profile. A proverb: the guest hates the other guest; the host hates them both.)
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