Terence Rajivan Edward

This essay reflects on the fate of a reliable woman essayist of our time: Martha Nussbaum. Brian Leiter has reminded us of his 2017 vote for Best Anglophone philosophers since 1957. Similar essayists, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel, make the top 10. Martha Nussbaum is not on the list of 20 at all. Poor Martha Nussbaum! Neither am I though. I propose that it is like a club, as lots of others probably think. The club has solved various problems, which are difficult to solve - if you don’t solve them well, you would easily lose your students, amongst other things - and maybe Martha Nussbaum is not a proper member of the club. One might propose that she is good for a kind of reader who enjoys Victorian classics: a reader in search of a lot of common sense, some system, good scholarly knowledge, but readability rather than cult-like obscurity, big books to delve into, briefer articles too, the big issues of the day and material of enduring value, philosophy which is involved with the problems our lives confront us with - that combination please. But in my experience, there are stark divisions amongst such readers, for example pro-Dickens versus anti-misogynist-Dickens. These will affect her reception a lot, I suspect.

This paper challenges Pierre Bourdieu’s claim that successful people’s career dispositions cannot be specified. After presenting how I approached stand-up comedy, I consider philosophy, a field on which Bourdieu has written. I present some dispositions of some successful people in philosophy, e.g. “Do not get involved with really really fine details, such as the difference between the word “error” and the word ‘mistake.’ Maybe there is some difference, but hardly anyone outside of Oxford cares and you need to appeal to the average philosopher.” But then I consider two objections, one of which I regard as more of a problem: they seem to do something different when an authority tells them to and this can be quite surprising, such as suddenly working on trans-rights. In the appendix, there is some material about Juliette Binoche and Virginia Woolf.

Can the social world be predicted? If it cannot, can any study of it count as scientific? Isn't what distinguishes science from non-science successful prediction? This paper argues that social anthropology can predict some social change. It introduces a structural-functionalist theory of literary fashion to counter the objection that functionalist anthropology ignores social change. Literary fashions are there to maintain social structure. If there is a structure of the best-and-the-rest and a foreign writer appears in-between, the rest do what that foreign writer does, upping their game, so that he or she appears as merely one of them. I argue that this structural-functionalist theory of literary fashion enables prediction.

British social anthropologists since the 1970s probably, are interested in comparing and contracting worldviews. I associate this kind of anthropology with Professor Marilyn Strathern and various anthropologists influenced by her. I shall apply it to analytic philosophy as I have experienced it in Manchester and also for almost a year at University College London, to identify an official assumption (or that is how official discourse of the discipline seems best modelled by us - I prefer that view here). The methods of the discipline are like a technology: much as one can photograph this, that, or the other, one can apply its methods to any philosophical topic, or even any topic (identifying premises and inferences of arguments and inquiring into how sound premises are). The assumption is not discussed, but is surely known by some. It is a you-can't-live-with-it-you-can't-live-without-itassumption, it casually seems to me. You cannot live with it, because you find that if you want to produce the recommended kind of work you will work in certain topics and take small steps from previous literature. But you cannot live without it, because you end up with folk who dubiously say, "Hey, I could not do the work properly in my topic."

This paper proposes that a British anthropologist who came to analytic philosophy and tried to describe it would have problems given the emphasis of traditional functionalism on the function of social institutions, roles, and practices and also given “Strathernism’s” emphasis on contrasting worldviews, understood as composed of propositions. It seems to me that one needs an emphasis on identifying types of “move” - I was going to use the word “trick,” as we speak of tricks in sport or in a magic show, but the word will bring unwanted suggestions to some readers: there probably are some philosophers who do not pursue analytic philosophy as a kind of sport.

The introduction of a term can be a significant event for us. Before we had an experience which we would describe in many words and now we have a term we can use. But if the experience is an age-old one, we are likely to wonder: is there not some term here already? Surely this type of thing has been noticed before, or something very similar. And even if there is no term, what credit should we give to the new term’s maker? The essay focuses on the term “epistemic injustice,” introduced by Miranda Fricker. I am not sure how difficult this term was to introduce: presenting considerations in favour of its being difficult and quite easy. (The consideration in favour of easiness is: there is a social circle who collect scenes from fictions which merit a term and if you are part of the circle, you have access to what they have collected and merely need to introduce a term for one such scene or what goes on within it.) Then I wonder whether Martha Nussbaum stands in a severe relation of epistemic injustice to Bernard Williams: she shares the same aim but writes more because “How do I gain an enduring place otherwise?” The paper opens with a poem about Greta Thunberg, I suppose, and is not

This paper expands on my earlier treatment of the question of why television comedy sketch shows are hit-and-miss, by examining in more detail the explanation from David Mitchell: "if we didn't perversely include about 50% unamusing material" people would be driven to find other faults with them (conveyed by Rachel Aroesti). This fails to meet a criterion for a successful answer: it should not replace a puzzle with an equally weighty puzzle. Why not do your best and let the critics find other faults? Anyway, I propose some solutions to this other puzzle: repeating an earlier solution of mine that it is a strain to improve the material to the extent that they move out of the bracket they are in; then presenting the solution that if critics find less obvious faults, the blame will be laid at sensitive members of the creative team, so one shields them by putting in obvious faults which the critic instead feels compelled to focus on; and finally the solution of a power struggle "game" between creative sketch show writers and creative critics, each trying to reduce the other to minimally rewarding work. (I have put this under the category of sexual perversion, because of the reference to perversion, but it is not sexual perversion I assume. Back to Thomas Nagel soon?)

This is an issue raised by various newspaper reviewers of the return of brilliant Cambridge comedians Mitchell and Webb to our national television screens: why can’t the television comedy sketch show survive because it conveniently supplies you with sketches whereas with the competitor, the Internet, you have to scour the Internet for sketches? The obvious answer is that it is not difficult to set up a convenient place for sketches on the Internet. Also, perhaps, um, er, there is a social justice problem if what you are basically about is convenience (all in one place): “I have got some good sketches; let me in too please, Mitchell and Webb.”

Kenneth Arrow: he must be really good. But what is his impossibility theorem in simple terms? Anyway, this is a simple paradox of politics, which may be erased soon enough. (Why preserve what every democratic generation will discover anew?) The sensible position on the political spectrum seems to be the centre. Surely political left and right cannot be entirely stupid, or they would not exist and be well-supported and powerful. It is sensible to accept the left (the socialists) regarding some points and the right regarding other points (the capitalists... and custom-loving conservatives???). But caught between these two intense forces, left and right, it is sensible to simply take a side. Otherwise you will be like these weak unstable referees faced with big strong wrestlers. So it is sensible to take from both, rather than simply agreeing with one, and also it is sensible to simply take a side, insensible not to. How can that be? Perhaps the answer is to distinguish two kinds of goal when assessing the political situation: the goal of determining which policies are best for the country (some mixture) and the goal of determining which reaction to political debate is best for me (taking a side). Of course, regarding the former goal, some will deny that mixture can function in non-ideal circumstances.

This paper is a response to academic Miriam Ronzoni and newspaper pop culture writer Rachel Aroesti. In response to Ronzoni, I introduce the concept of supervenience from analytic philosophy and use it to identify a more mysterious relationship between social justice and the basic structure of society. I then use it to propose an explanation to Rachel Aroesti for why comedy sketches provided by an algorithm are unsatisfying, but I am not sure how true it is. Supervenience, in its simple form, is when a property X is dependent on a set of other properties in the following way: the thing with property X cannot lose this property without some change in the other properties. One can suppose there is this relationship without being able to justifiably say, “Property X arises if and only if the other properties are…”

This paper introduces a paradox: global audiences are larger in recent decades, so we predict more accessible texts; but the more recent entries in a literary theory anthology are often more difficult to understand, more obscure really. How much easier Hume is to understand than Derrida, Foucault, and Lacan: merely slightly old-fashioned language! I consider some solutions to the paradox. After drafting the paper, I rewrote it as an imitation of P.F. Strawson. Some readers may prefer this more elegant presentation; otherwise will value information in the earlier draft.

This paper responds to Anderson Woods’ famous paper against Jeremy Bentham’s use of the formula: the greatest happiness for the greatest number. (Or of the greatest number: no distinction made here.) I reject two objections that Woods makes: that the formula, taken literally, specifies two final ends when it is intended to specify one; and that these ends are inconsistent. Both fail because the ends extracted are incorrect and a correct extraction does not fail to specify a final and consistent end. Then I make my own objection: that the formula is misleading at best, because utility monsters, as they are today called, count for more when the aim is maximizing the happiness in the world.

This paper is an attempt at P.F. Strawson's style. It raises the question of whether philosophers should write for the gratification of outsiders with little knowledge of philosophy. I distinguish between readers seeking literary pleasures, even if the ideas expressed are not new, and readers seeking new ideas. I point out the advantages of being able to communicate to people in neighbouring specialisms at the same time and hopefully being able to better achieve fair evaluation because one will be valued by a reader who is excited by one’s ideas regardless of social hierarchy and fashion. But I also point out disadvantages: obviously it makes the communication of complicated or subtle or nuanced points difficult; the uninitiated reader may not be able to distinguish a small step from what was before and an ingenious leap; and it usually does not help enhance one’s long-term prospects of staying in the philosophy curriculum.

The thought of a machine that writes essays goes back to the nineteenth century at least and in recent years the thought has finally been realized: there are machines which write essays, software which does. Can a machine write good essays though? This paper responds to the sample essay recently provided on Leiter Reports entitled “Contractualism and the Moral Significance of Others: A Critical Appraisal.” The machine’s essay suffers from a major problem and a number of minor weaknesses. The problem and the weaknesses give rise to a paradox: the machine is not good at mechanical tasks. I offer two solutions to the paradox, including that it was simply not written by a machine.

In numerous works, Dame Professor Marilyn Strathern has written of the concept of a relation in her discipline, social anthropology. This paper was prompted by Strathern’s 2025 description of how, as a student, she needed to be told by Esther Goody that societies in conflict are in a relationship: a relationship of enmity. I present an attractive thesis on the Victorian debate between evolutionism versus diffusionism, according to which only the latter always requires the concept of a relation in all its explanations of shared features. I then introduce how relations are normally understood in contemporary analytic philosophy. If we work with this normal understanding, the thesis must be rejected.

There is demand but little supply. I have some desire to read a book of the type The World As I See It, which addresses enduring social questions or prominent social questions of our day, of the sort that are discussed at intellectual dinner parties (or so one imagines). I desire this from various academics, impressive in their specialisms, but they do not produce the desired matter. Others probably desire this too. In this paper, I identify three reasons for why it is not met: “I only give the views of the side I compete for, not my private views,” “My own beliefs on such matters are complicated and it is a mental drain to present them; on such topics I prefer to present a simple view eloquently expressed,” and “I have experienced the gains of a professional social science framework and I apply that, suppressing my private views which are beyond the scope of the framework.”

This paper assesses the famous saying, “Youth is wasted on the young.” It considers an older person who says this and aims to convey: (i) there are generations and I am a member of an older generation; (ii) all members of younger generations have advantages that members of my generation (and any older) do not have; (iii) these advantages are the advantages of youth in general; (iv) it is possible for at least some youths to make good use of these advantages; (v) it is rational for at least some youths to make good use of these advantages; (vi) the possibility is never realized. I introduce the objection that (iv) and (vi) are contradictory: if all youth do not make good use of the advantages of youth, then the best explanation would seem to be that it is impossible for them to. Nevertheless, I continue the evaluation, by examining the Humean thought that youth are irrational given their desires, because of their beliefs, and the thought that aging involves an evidence-based dislodging of a shared set of beliefs, a paradigm. I cannot at present see any reason to think that only the old would have the evidence.

This paper presents an example of a topic inviting amateur psychology in response and introduces some characters: some who try to shut down the topic and some who will allow for it but with greatly reduced amateur psychology. It raises the question of why these characters hate amateur psychology so. Also it introduces a rational actor model in relation to the topic: a model which explains why people in a field look similar. People in a job want to be regarded as competent, so it is rational for them to develop a distinctive look.

Philosophy news sites have recently drawn attention to how there are an increasing number of females being awarded PhD degrees, more than one third. The information is based on United States degrees. Why were there so few female philosophers in the past and why are they increasing now, in philosophy in the English-speaking world? This paper registers difficulties with understanding what is going on, such as there are problems with running a philosophy department which we are unaware of. Without being aware of the problems even, let alone solutions, how can we explain anything? All we can say, it seems, is that we are confronted with a puzzle: an area with famously liberal philosophers strangely has not historically done well with gender equality (and also with various other underrepresented groups). Nevertheless, I consider three guesses for the recent increase, of which I favour one: many are attracted by the increasing heritage-orientation of English-speaking analytic philosophy. (Perhaps some people of the future are interested in some simply-worded reflections of a reasonably intelligent person of our time, on such matters of enduring discussion as the state of philosophy.)

It must be interesting to some people to read the simply-worded reflections of a reasonably intelligent person of his/her time on a topic of enduring discussion, or chatter. For example, which field or profession or specialism has the cleverest people? I present an answer that occurred to me after years of observation but it might be arrived at much sooner by rational actor model. Then I consider challenges to this answer. (I would be careful writing an essay like this, though. “Because it is timeless?” Um, er, um. “Because it is precisely what others would cut in a decision-making process: your essay versus a Hume specialist’s essay say?” Perhaps, but the people who have troubled themselves to converse a lot with me: this is the sort of thing worth reading for them, given how they come across, taken at face value. This is a democratic essay!)

The Telegraph newspaper draws attention to female Labour politicians who have a similar appearance. Why do they all look so similar? One explanation is that this is what voters associate with Labour competence, in woman anyway: if you are a female and have this look, then you are believed to be a competent labour politician. This paper introduces a paradox, which involves the explanation; surely all (or most voters) also believe that it is possible to achieve the look without the competence. I consider three solutions to the paradox.

This paper presents a different objection to the "neo-Kantian" idea of alternative systems of concepts for organizing the same sensory content. In any actual case that is plausibly this, the content (the experience or the pre-experiential sensory input) received by others with an alternative system is actually significantly different. I refer to social anthropology as a source of the objection but the objection as developed there is rejected by British anthropologists. I also appeal to my supposedly psychotic experience to support the objection, but the support is still insufficient.

In February or March 2023, I went shopping for a mother's day card. I could not find any at a local shop and made an inquiry at the counter. The till worked said there were none. I picked up a card which said, "To my wife," brought it to the counter and said, "This might work for someone," alluding to the Oedipus myth. Pleased with my joke, I bought the card. I put it on a mattress next to mine and also another curious card I found. In April 2023, I found they were missing and contacted the police. I asked them if an ELECTRONIC bug could be sent under the door of my apartment and remove the card. In September 2023, I was admitted to North Manchester General Hospital with mental health difficulties and my question was used as evidence of severe mental disorder. I said (a) that the bug question expressed a hypothesis, not a belief; and (b) I abandoned the hypothesis after talking to the police. (From my earlier reading on philosophy of psychiatry, delusions are supposed to be robust: the delusional subject does not abandon them. By the way, Sean Crawford, alarmed, said: you are working on that now!) I was troubled by the fact that my hypothesis was taken as evidence of paranoia and repeatedly asserted its status as hypothesis, but the consultant psychiatrist said that most people don't consider such a hypothesis. (Through my sister in October 2023, I learnt of another psychiatric response: "you acted on the hypothesis - you called the police." But the cards have never been found: it was entirely reasonable for me to call the police and I had other hypotheses, such as ordinary theft. By the way, it is not as if I am married and the to-my-wife card is normal in my home. NONE of these people asked about what was lost and whether it was found.) In a previous contribution, I have raised a concern about the NMGH consultant psychiatrist's appeal to what is normal versus my hypothesis (entitled "Hypotheses as evidence for madness, Humeans"). Here I will raise much the same concern with different detail: if you work in various areas of philosophy, you may well entertain hypotheses that are NOT normally considered in this situation going by statistics. Consider epistemology and philosophy of science, the second area being one I regularly write in. And you might naively introduce one of the less statistically normal hypotheses to a police officer, but certainly not one out-there by the standards of philosophy (evil demons manipulating your perceptual experience, brains-in-vats, etc.). This is especially likely if you believe your work to be of practical relevance, contrary to the common image of philosophy. (By the way, various philosophers would argue that it is rational, given our commonsense starting point, to ignore demons and brains-in-vats hypotheses, BUT do any think it is rational to ignore the electronic bug hypothesis in my 2023 position? The extent to which these people incentivize conformity to an extremely narrow standard of normality, by light or heavy means! "No, it's just for you in that situation." Really? I believe pastoral-lover Elizabeth Gaskell kept a cow in her garden in industrial Manchester!)

What is the female mind? The female mind: what is it like? (Though maybe some females have male minds and some males have female minds; so says Simon Baron-Cohen.) Our stereotypes seem contradictory to me. On the one hand, the female mind is socially intelligent: receptive to the less obvious emotions and thoughts of others, able to detect hints; and to perceive the subtler requirements of complex social situations; etc. (Dear David Liggins and Chris Daly, I should probably look up a definition.) On the other hand, woman is risk averse. She does not take risks, unlike man. But all this receptivity involves risk surely and indeed the stereotypical male mind perceives risks in woman's assessments. Are you not reading too much into that situation? And is that not a coincidence? Maybe when the young psychiatrist who visited yesterday said that your blood sugar levels are at sub-diabetic level, he was not using a metaphor: to express a preference for another Los Angeles rock'n'roll band, more mainstream, or even comment on how far you have reduced your sugary writing compared to what was promised, etc. And maybe it was a just coincidence that the new care coordinator nurse was wearing a Levi's t-shirt and the psychiatrist carried a Levi's bag. And that he looked like a slimmer Michael Rush. (Question: by Western stereotypes, women's receptivity spills over into more metaphysical matters - she is more disposed to superstition, etc. Is the female psychiatric ward much more populated? Or is there a sex-based baseline which is used in diagnosis? "It is nothing abnormal for a woman in your situation to believe... but a man on the other hand"???)

In my experience, a paranoid person can also be suspected of autism. But how to respond to the diagnostic tests if one is famous, or somewhat famous even? In 2023, I asked a nurse if any celebrities ended up in here - North Manchester General Hospital - and he asked me, "Are you not a celebrity, Terence?" If you say, "No", you are autistic, working with overly rigid criteria for celebrityhood and missing various hints. If you say, "Yes", you are paranoid, imagining various powerful institutions are interested in you, academic with a few journal publications and citations number 3000343 or whatever. Perhaps there was no such fork in this context, but my starting worry is that a little bit of fame and medical questions often produce this kind of fork, since one of the standard questions for if you are paranoid (illegitimately paranoid) concerns whether you think messages are being sent to you, including (especially?) by means of various forms national media (e.g. newspapers and television). A further worry is that given the aim of no diagnosis, one feels a pressure to get answers exactly right: never failing to detect a hint but also never overperceiving hints, when the hint detecting business is by its nature risky. But probably biggest of all is this worry: if you are likely to end up with a diagnosis, it is rational to prefer autism. Autism these days is perceived as a disorder with a wide spectrum of instances (overly wide, I believe) and at the milder end of this spectrum, there is just a diagnosis which gives one certain disability benefits, whereas with paranoia it does not take much before one is regarded as a danger to the general public. BUT autism is the boring option. Which of these Instagram videos is responding to me???