Terence Rajivan Edward

Simon Baron-Cohen says that the extreme female brain is very good at empathizing and very bad at systematizing. Why pervert Baron-Cohen and say that the extreme female brain is very good at systematizing and very bad at empathizing? The answer lies in my previous paper "Disgust and the gender of the brain." Females on average are more prone to disgust reactions than males. Disgust reactions are systematic, as we know from Mary Douglas. The extreme female brain overrides all empathy in destroying what disgusts it!

I have been contemplating the topic of "What is Cornell?" for a while and gathered various responses from friends, insofar as I have friends. This is my hypothesis. Assume you are in Cornell. If you ask for anything from another person there and it is logically and naturally possible for them to provide it, they will do so. "Shall we..." "Yes!" (Don't query this example please.) You only have to ask! But their system of student and staff selection is so good that no one asks for various things. It is a university for the well-bred.

John Searle is interested in extending his influence into social anthropology. (He has written for the journal Anthropological Theory.) But how to extend his influence? Despite probably having one of the best advisory networks ever, he doesn't appear to know how. I will tell him how! There is an old debate in British social anthropology (a debate which some American anthropologists are also interested in). The debate is over whether social structures are real or not. Founding father Radcliffe-Brown takes them to be real. Later anthropologist Edmund Leach takes the social structures anthropologists describe to be useful models: social structures are not real. Searle should start by referring to this "old" debate. Then he can say, "What you need is my distinction between ontologically subjective and epistemically objective. Social structures are ontologically subjective: they are dependent on human agreement, e.g. we agree that this organization has a head. They are brought into existence and maintained by performative language, e.g. we hereby declare that Nancy Rothwell is the vice-chancellor. But they are epistemically objective: there can be right and wrong descriptions of the social structure." I don't accept that social structures are real. I accept Leach's position. Earlier today (before the vague answer!), I wrote of actual social structure, because it was too complicated there to introduce anti-realism about social structure. Anyway, above is my recommendation to Searle.

Some people believe that the premises that mainstream British psychiatry relies on are severely faulty. Lacanians believe this and so do I. But (unlike Lacanians) I suspect British psychiatry achieves a passable level with their conclusions. How can that be? The answer I vaguely propose is this. The British psychiatrist learns a system, which is useful for them to get going at an early stage and for communicating to outsiders with little knowledge of psychiatry, such as law courts. But they don't mechanically apply the system. As they progress, they are heavily reliant on knowledge of past cases (and also unteachable diagnostic talent). "This case is similar to that case, we saw." My worry is this. Someone is going to say, "Talent?! Is this a good system then? We will send you a student. They are not the most talented but if your system is good, they will turn into a good psychiatrist and if it is bad, they will not. A good system reduces the reliance on cleverness, on individual talent." The psychiatrist is going to face severe problems with teaching this student. They don't class cases as similar and different in the way the psychiatrist does. Some psychiatrists leave because the student's judgments of similarly and difference are only slightly off and there is no way to block this dangerous new psychiatrist. (No Asians psychiatrists left?)

In my journal publication "Are individuals a problem for British structural-functionalist anthropology?" I introduce an important idea. An organization has an official structure of roles and duties, for example this is the head of the organization, that is the cleaner, etc. But sometimes one encounters a person who officially occupies a certain role but does not fit with the expectations of that role: for example, they cannot do various things which the role requires. They seem out of place. In this situation, I proposed that the anthropologist can make a radical move: they can look into whether the actual structure of the organization is different from the official structure and whether in the actual structure, the seemingly out of place individual fits. In September 2023, I was forced into the psychiatric unit of a Manchester hospital and I ended up trying my idea out. When I met the consultant psychiatrist, I asked him whether he was a doctor and, to check, I asked him to tell me what is inside a cell. He listed some items, including the cell membrane. I didn't think the cell membrane is inside the cell. So I decided to contemplate alternative organizational structures to the official structure, according to which he is a consultant doctor. I gave up after about a month and just accepted the official structure. I came to three conclusions. (i) The anthropologist in a new setting has no practical option but to accept the official structure presented to them. It just takes too long to get going otherwise and you risk looking very mad. My idea is for later at best. (ii) It took me so long to accept the official structure that I must be having a mental difficulty. I was weekly asked to accept that I had one by the medical team and I eventually did, for this reason (which is very different from their reason). (iii) The premises the psychiatrist appeals to in diagnosis are faulty in my eyes, but it is best to assume they have some way of achieving a passable level of reliability regarding their conclusions. (There is no adequate basis for me to interact with them if I don't assume this. A Lacanian psychiatrist is going to say, "The premises of British psychiatry are faulty and, consequently, the system is dangerous regarding its conclusions. And Lacan was a great doctor. He knows something." My worry is Lacan has a tantrum upon encountering other systems.)

Let's take "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" as an example. I guess it is not written for someone like you, despite how good at philosophy you are, all your family are, etc. It is written for two kinds of reader. One is highly sensitive to the text's structure and wording (and even literary value), and likely has a degree from Oxford University, such as P.M.S. Hacker or H.J. Glock. The other is not very sensitive at all. They read some of the paper and register that Davidson is attacking an anthropologist claiming that others have an alien conceptual system, and then they take such claims as Davidson's main target. They read on for pages until they encounter talk of radical interpretation. "Finally, Davidson is going to apply his system to attack his target," they think. They register Davidson's claim that the radical interpreter cannot interpret others as having an alien conceptual system. Then, having noticed these things, they make a reasonable guess at his argument. "He is saying that if we cannot verify that others have such a system, then they don't!" (The specific location of the radical interpreter material in the structure of the paper is ignored.)

The playwright Tom Stoppard died last Saturday, 29th November 2025. I found out from the website of the British newspaper The Guardian, which apart from articles also featured a large photograph. In the photograph, Stoppard looked like the distinguished philosopher Crispin Wright and I doubt this was an accident: he makes heavy reference to British philosophy in his plays. I myself have taken Wright as a model for imitation when trying to participate in the dominant kind of comedy here in the North of England: character comedy. I wonder whether this comedy has its roots in the empiricist philosophy dominant in England. I consider what rationalist comedy, as an alternative, would be like, and I propose that it involves inferences which lead to conclusions remote from one’s experiences and are somehow amusing.

There is an article by Mary Beard on the University of Manchester which I cannot find. I also searched for it three years ago extensively and could not find it. It was published not long after the merger between the Victoria University of Manchester and UMIST, 2007 perhaps. I remember it clearly though. It said that the University of Manchester is a nouveau riche university which buys up stellar academics, whereas we at Cambridge produce them. I anticipate someone (or someone's) reading my "Why become Simone de Beauvoir?" and wondering what is the difference between my position and Beard's? There I imply that the University of Manchester is heavily influenced by the fame system. Well, there are a number of differences! One difference is I take Beard to be trying to direct the University of Manchester: she aims to change its behaviour. It should focus on producing leading academics, in her eyes. I was not trying to direct the university by my implication. Probably the best thing for it to do is buy up famous academics, and tolerate any mockery. They bring much needed experience and they produce a buzz around the place! And what else to do with the money? Pay teaching assistants more? There are probably people who want the pay to be low, to deter some people from trying to become academics, and you would not want a protest. (See George Bernard Shaw.)

I have lived in my apartment since 2015 and on a couple of occasions have complained about noise in the street at night, to the non-emergency police number. The police don't do anything! But I have probably lost my right to consistently complain. In September 2023, I was in the street late at night pretending to be the French intellectual Simone de Beauvoir. It was meant to be comedy. At worst, I expected to be told firmly to go indoors. I saw the police and ran away, but they apprehended me and forced me into hospital. My mind was clouded from writing a lot, but I certainly did not believe I was Simone de Beauvoir! This is a good portion of what happened. The fame system is different from the quality system, in various fields, probably all fields. If you know a field well, you know this. For example, if you follow football (soccer), you know that there are many players better than David Beckham at his peak but far less famous. I take the neighbouring university to be heavily influenced by the fame system. I suspect there are academics who would even pretend that certain figures don't exist because they are outside the fame system. Whatever I write, I think I am not suitable for the fame system. So I pretended to be Simone de Beauvoir to mock them - here: is this more to your tastes?

John Rawls has tens of thousands more citations than Donald Davidson, according to Google Scholar. Is Rawls therefore more influential? There is a problem. Rawls is mainly cited in politics, law, economics (his home discipline?), and philosophy. That's hardly anything! My current psychiatrist (the fourth one assigned to me) has not even heard of Rawls, except through my references to him. From my experience, there are lecturers interested in Davidson in every department (or discipline area) in my university. In philosophy, in politics, in economics, in anthropology, very probably in computer science. I forgot to ask the current psychiatrist, but I presume she knows of Davidson (and rejects him severely). The main Davidsonian argument in psychiatry (an attempt to extend his system) is this: (1) beliefs come as a whole (you cannot have one belief without having a number of rationally related beliefs); (2) there is no whole set of rationally-related beliefs that come with a delusion (e.g. the delusion that one is dead); therefore (3) delusions are not beliefs.

In my youth, I had discussions with various PhD students in social anthropology at the University of Manchester. And both foreign and native students tell me that they have trouble learning old British functionalist anthropology. They can get value from Foucault, but they can't get value from these works and find them difficult to read. My hypothesis is that these students think: there must be some high value in these old British monographs but (now that the time has past?) I am not clever enough to access this value. Here is a different explanation for why "you" cannot access the value and some others can, a guess I suppose. The others don't use the books that you do. To get going, they use philosopher I.C. Jarvie's fun 1964 book The Revolution in Anthropology (or another Popperian book). It is flippant. It more or less opens by charging Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski with the murder of the great Cambridge don Frazer, with no adequate evidence. It has sections like "The Prophet Dun It", when explaining cargo cults. Despite this unprofessional surface, it is a very useful introduction to British functionalist anthropology. (Sarah Green told me she started off as a Popperian.)

I did some comedy for a few months, between December 2024 and April 2025, and I will probably do some more soon. But I find that some comedic material is better incorporated here, from my perspective. I can go into more detail and I have more reliable (or transparent) systems of feedback, citation, and protection against plagiarism. I used to do a section about the concept of mansplaining. A man is mansplaining (!) when he explains something to a woman in simple language and a number of words, when she just needs a few words to grasp what he aims to convey. He is treating her as less intelligent than she is. It is meant to be an insult, by the way! My criticism of this insult was "I only have two speeds of explanation: too fast for you and too slow for you. So the responsible thing to do is go too slow." (I have this other worry. When you are explaining to a whole group of people, there is someone who wants the explanation speed to be slow enough that they "get it" but also fast enough that a slower-witted competitor in the group does not. The preferred speed is bound up with rational strategy.) Anyway, if my criticism is not enough to kill this insult, one must confront Hal Varian's approach in Intermediate Microeconomics (as I interpret it). His first chapter is difficult and after that you don't complain about any slowness.

One of the criticisms of mainstream economics is that it relies on unrealistic assumptions, for example (an example I am able to give from spending time in economics) that people want as much leisure time as possible. Many people would rather have some work than none. The usual response is that unrealistic assumptions don't matter if the models still predict. But under pressure, the economist is likely to give greater space to behavioural economics. The assumptions there seem more realistic and there is still some maths: they cannot get rid of the maths without devaluing their degrees, because you expect an economics degree holder to be comfortable with some maths. But the mainstream economist sometimes asks, of behavioural economics, is this economics or psychology? A social anthropologist looking in can relate. The fieldwork studies by cognitive scientists are good with conceptual clarity, but they just lack the richness of detail of people's lives that certain other frameworks "produce," leaving aside a few distinguished exceptions. (A question I have: can Susan Carey even do that twice?!) But fieldwork is what anthropology is all about, to most anthropologists. Thus, is this anthropology? The anthropologist can relate to the economist somewhat. But they have a problem with relating further (apart from their communism). They don't know the mathematics to follow the debate in economics and verify that there is an analogous problem. I think the anthropologist can learn it. The anthropologist may think, "I am closer to literature," but I think if you have reached lecturer level in a social science, learning another social science is always easier than going outside: they form a kind. Warning though: most economic textbooks are of no use to get started. I use Hal Varian's Intermediate Microeconomics, which was recommended to me. I read chapters in 2022. The first chapter is hard, but after that it is much easier, though you might have to go slowly and even do the exercises. Reading it will make you better at anthropology as well.

One of Jacques Lacan's most famous and controversial contributions to psychoanalysis is his introduction of variable length sessions. A patient has a session with their psychoanalyst each week, say, but the analyst varies the length of the session. The main reason that is given for this is that with a fixed length, the patient plans the session so that they talk about all kinds of other stuff and they only present the material useful for analysis at the end (or many patients do). A session with a surprise termination gets them saying useful material sooner (with some exceptions of course). If you are a functionalist anthropologist looking at Lacanian psychoanalysis, you will probably set aside this reason altogether and look at the social function that variable sessions have. There is a whole set of people who won't go in for Lacanian psychoanalysis, because they don't want to pay and then get some very short sessions. The people who still go are probably very committed to the Lacanian project: variable sessions guarantees devotees. (By the way, an excitement-craving faux-aristocrat like Lacan probably cannot stand the people attracted by regular length sessions: begone dullards!)

In recent decades, there has been interest in why artefacts were ignored in British social anthropology. Early on in his classic 1936 study We, The Tikopia, Raymond Firth tells that the (quite) isolated Tikopia tribe are increasingly using Western tools. They are keen for more of these tools, as well. But Firth tells us that he will not focus on tool use. Why not? He says that the Tikopia social structure is unaffected by the use of Western tools. For anyone versed in British anthropology, the argument is obvious: the proper object of study for a British social anthropologist is social structure and the Tikopia social structure is not affected by the use of Western tools. I wish to make an observation. Firth's argument is the opposite of what Marilyn Strathern attributes to British social anthropology. In her history, artefacts are mere illustrations of the proper object of study and there is no need to refer to them in the final fieldwork report. Firth, in contrast, draws attention to a cleavage between artefacts and the proper object of study: the tools are increasingly Western but the social structure is not. The Cambridge professor's history of anthropology is clever, fun to respond to, and memorable, but it is contradicted by the textual evidence provided by the thorough LSE monograph.

John Rawls thinks that we should only enter judgments made in some mental states into the reflective equilibrium procedure. (Don't worry if you don't know what this procedure is.) Hesitant judgments, judgments made while upset, judgments made while frightened, and more, are excluded (unless they are also made in the suitable state or states of mind). These other states of mind are not good for making judgments in general, Rawls thinks. Rawls would surely exclude judgments made while a bit drunk as well. But during anthropologist Jeanette Edwards' fieldwork in Bacup, she came across a coco-nutter ritual which spectators watch while under the influence of alcohol. I think it is a question for debate whether she should have been a bit drunk as well and then described the ritual. Some will say that that is better anthropology. She is then closer to grasping the native spectator's point of view.

A little bit of fun, if permitted. I can only find an abstract for Marilyn Strathern's paper "Virtual Society? Get Real!" The entire paper used to be available online as a PDF. Going by memory, it says that we today don't use the word "virtue" much. But it is used in philosophy, such as in virtue ethics. I was going to mock Strathern for having a defective feedback network and not doing an Internet search. Then I was planning to consider the defence that philosophers who use "virtue" are outside of the people referred to as "we". Then consider the counter that anthropologist Sharon Macdonald is married to a philosopher, as I was informed by kinship anthropologist Jeanette Edwards, so there are probably no grounds for excluding the philosophers. Then I was going to consider the defence that these anthropologists do not count as "we". Then I was going to say that, ideally, this should have been said ten years or more ago. (Also I was going to ponder how it took me so many papers to write what I regard as a decent paper responding to Jeanette Edwards, when I can now do so more or less when I want.) I must surely ruin someone else's fun now, in return.

Sebastian Gardner's paper "Splitting the Subject: An Overview of Sartre, Lacan and Derrida" is a kind of "nonsense" paper, or significant portions of it are. For example, Gardner writes, 'The orthodox way of "taking" Freud, in analytic philosophy of mind and in philosophy of science, is something like this: we argue over whether or not a concept of selfhood that has its basis in consciousness can be stretched to cover the unconscious as Freud describes it, and we attempt to see how much mentality can survive the loss of the property "potential object of consciousness." ' In philosophy of science, the orthodox way of taking Freud is actually this: we argue over whether or not Freudian psychoanalysis is a science or a pseudo-science, starting with Popper's proposal that scientific theories have to be falsifiable (i.e., if they are false, they can be proved to be false by a test) and psychoanalysis is not. "Everyone" knows this, across so many disciplines, maybe even you do.

Okay, Lacanian psychiatry does not rely on medication. It diagnoses you on the basis of language use and confines itself to linguistic interactions. But is it actually better to take medication than enter into these interactions? According to the Lacanian system, as I understand it, the hysterical person is disposed to frustrate the desires of others. But Lacan himself seems a hysteric according to this system. So why should we place as much trust in the writings of (Nazi-loving!) Lacan as a Lacanian psychiatrist does? (I would like to say that I do not think I suffer from the problem that philosopher John McDowell does. McDowell would presumably prefer to trade mainly with fellow virtuous agents. But his standard of a virtuous agent is extremely high. As I understand him, even a person who experiences certain temptations but outweighs them in their private decision-making process is not a virtuous person for McDowell. So I think McDowell's system leads to a problem of trade. How do I trade with those people, because are they good people? "Yes, you indicated this in your earlier dialogue on ethics versus specialization." I thought I would spell it out more clearly for some readers. I am not going to expand on it even further though, partly because the problem is now obvious!)

For any core liberal right, the Rawlsian tries to argue for that right, e.g. "We should have this right because individuals in the original position would agree to it." But as I observed in my paper, 'Rejecting the question "What is the right to freedom of speech derived from?" ' some rights are absences and, unless there is a special reason to think the absence mistaken, we don't need to argue for why there are these absences. I have a legal right to say, "When" if the legal system I am under does not contain laws restricting me from saying, "When" (leaving aside special contexts perhaps): the absence of such restrictive laws is sufficient for me to have the right. Why aren't there such restrictive laws? Well, why should there be? There is no reason to answer the former question unless the latter question is addressed, but the Rawlsian peculiarly goes ahead and answers it any way: there aren't, because individuals in the original position would reject a legal system featuring such laws. I don't know if this is a major criticism of Rawls, but I thought I would share it.

"Imagine" someone is making life difficult for you. You ask, "What's the problem?" They say, "I am not going to tell you but you can guess and if you guess correctly and change your behaviour accordingly, the source of stress will go away." You make a reasonable guess. They say, "That's not it." You make another reasonable guess. They say, "That's not it." This pattern goes on for a while. You begin to worry that every time you propose an answer to what the problem is, they move to another interpretation. "How to deal with such a person, or institution even?" Have a guess?! All societies or all but the most exotic must have some solution. I guess if a football club did this and the difficulty were large enough, one would look for a reason to relegate them.

While I was detained in North Manchester General Hospital, I was informed that an expert thought one of the papers I had recently uploaded is nonsense, namely "The difference principle and getting rid of economic experts". It argues that in some circumstances the difference principle requires that we get rid of economic experts and give the money saved to the worst off. I read it again and it makes sense to me. If there is an error in it, it needs to be explained. But I think I know why it has been called a nonsense paper. The expert thinks, "Academic papers depend on fair-minded expert peer review for approval. Who are you going to get as a fair-minded expert reviewer? Your best chance is to ask an economist. And the economist is going to feel threatened and play strategically with you rather than fairly, because you are putting his job at threat. You cannot get a peer reviewer, so it is outside the academic game, so it is nonsense."

John Rawls's monumental book A Theory of Justice has more than one hundred thousand citations, according to Google Scholar. I have about 15 to 20 citations, I suppose. But I think this difference is misleading and even sometimes wonder whether Rawls is truly global. Rawls is heavily promoted. I believe his citations spread outwards from a base, through a network of persons who know each other, through face to face contact: each member has had face to face contact with at least one other member (including lectures as face-to-face). "Engage with Rawls, he is important." "Okay." And so Rawls spreads. Early on Harvard researchers cited him, soon University of Oxford academics did, in this century Italian academics gave him a number of citations. When is Rawls cited on all continents? Probably it takes decades. If you include syllabuses, I have been cited on all continents already. The citations do not spread outward through a network. Interested strangers just read the material and cite it. (A speculation: in the nearest possible world in which Rawls does not benefit from a network promoting him, which is a world very remote from our own, he gets one citation: from me.)

In the 2018-19 academic year, the post-crash economic society made life difficult for everyone else in the University of Manchester school of social sciences, with their intense protests. The students wanted to discuss the foundations of mainstream economics and learn alternative approaches. Regarding the former, topic, I am not sure why the following was not said. "Most of you don't do pure economics. And we have courses in other discipline areas within the school which allow you to discuss this. You can discuss prisoner's dilemma in ethics essays. Is this a good approach? There is a rational actor model in words which you can discuss in political theory essays. You can discuss mainstream economics versus Bourdieu in sociology." Courses could probably have been added elsewhere to further meet the students demands (including the demand for alternative approaches), for example Adam Smith versus anthropologists on the origins of money. Why did the school management just not take this option, given resistance from economists to curriculum change? Occur: three possible reasons have occurred to me. (i) My preferred response didn't occur to them. (ii) It occurred to them in broad outline, but they simply don't know the school well enough to fill in the details. (iii) The management don't interpret the student protesters as I do, in terms of the surface appearance of their protest. ("Someone is unhappy about something, but it may well not be that the students are unhappy about the economics curriculum." What an earth could it be though?)

In 2015, Anna Alexandrova and Robert Northcott published a paper entitled "Prisoner's dilemma doesn't explain much". In it, they describe how prisoner's dilemma has been applied to thousands of topics but there is only one successful case, regarding an RNA virus. They aim to criticize prisoner's dilemma research, but today we might well regard this as a good return: all the effort was worth it for that success. I actually read the paper before the Covid pandemic and thought, "Wow, an RNA virus." I wonder whether Alexandrova and Northcott had that reaction as well, but decided to proceed with their planned paper against prisoner's dilemma research. (Psychiatrists: is there medication for that?!)

Sociologist: There's a kind of person whose perspective is this: once I know the rules of a game, I always win. It might not literally be a game. And he might not literally be a player. He is wealthy enough and he (or she) has people committed enough to master the game. To prevent such a person from gaining influence, you need to make success depend on factors that cannot be specified in rules. Then your field, or whatever it is, will operate as Bourdieu says. It will favour people who achieve a style that cannot be specified in rules. Me: Interesting. But I propose that you can tell this person all the rules of some games and once they know them, they will just say, "I am not playing."

In my earlier paper "Beyond micro-analysis of pastiche: Max Beerbohm's imitation of Joseph Conrad," I observed how various pastiches can be detected as "off target" without going into fine details (statistical analysis of patterns of word use and the like). Beerbohm's imitation is off target, because it is largely from the perspective of the native and Conrad is famously Eurocentric. For about a decade, I lived on a road where further down was the house of a 19th century writer and I now do some work there, after it has undergone a dazzling makeover. Yesterday a visitor said Victorian houses were cluttered and this house is not cluttered. I believe with scant knowledge of Victorian culture, one can similarly detect the style as "off target." "When did you personally come to this conclusion and how?" I won't answer this question, but you know how, if you write a lot, you can go a bit mad. I went fractionally mad in September 2023 and was medicated by the authorities for about a year. I am still quite slow and docile and accepting of surface appearances. (To illustrate, I went to my favourite Chinese restaurant yesterday. I ordered a fried rice dish which I prefer to be cooked with a bit of egg, though I don't eat the egg. I left the egg pieces on a side. When I finished eating, the waitress asked me if I would like to have the remaining egg packed in a box, to take with me. Under normal conditions, I would have made some remark, such as "Yes, and I'll give it to the restaurant next door." But I just slowly said, "No.")

A clever academic from the British system moves to the United States and makes proposals but these are not accepted. However, he is not told why. What is the problem? In this situation, it is understandable to reach for the sociologist Bourdieu. The Bourdieu explanation is "There is something stylistically off about the Brits ideas. They are just not our style: the style of the institution he has moved to. And you cannot specify in rules how to achieve this style. You have to just get it." Bourdieu provides an explanation, I shall concede, but there is at least one rival explanation. This is that the rules can be specified, but there are incentives against doing so. A filling in of detail: the fair-minded communication person/system which would provide this character with stylistic rules is under too much pressure to function. If they start stating the rules, some people become rude or they deliberately misinterpret the information, etc. Why would that be? More filling in: there are people who don't want the competition to increase by these rules becoming publicly available. I doubt Bourdieu scores a transparent victory, in this kind of context (whether fictional or real). A rival approach which commits itself to rules can go several rounds with Bourdieu and at best he scores a few narrow victories.