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1060Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objectionE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 23 (2): 37-41. 2016.This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.
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1428Feminist Research and Paradigm Shift in AnthropologyMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 4 (2): 343-362. 2012.In her paper ‘An Awkward Relationship: the Case of Feminism and Anthropology’, Marilyn Strathern argues that feminist research cannot produce a paradigm shift in social anthropology. I reconstruct her arguments and evaluate them, revealing that they are insufficient for ruling out this possibility.
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209This paper defends the practice of attributing a worldview to a group against the objection that this practice overlooks different views within the group and wrongly portrays the group as homogeneous.
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1280The asymmetry objection to political liberalism: evaluation of a defenceE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (1): 26-32. 2018.This paper evaluates Jonathan Quong’s attempt to defend a version of political liberalism from the asymmetry objection. I object that Quong’s defence relies on a premise that has not been adequately supported and does not look as if it can be given adequate support.
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337Taking the concepts of others seriouslyMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 8 (1): 143-153. 2016.This paper assesses an argument against the representationalist tradition in anthropology: the tradition of reporting how a cultural group represents the world. According to the argument, anthropologists working within this tradition cannot take the concepts of those they study seriously. I defend the representationalist tradition against this argument.
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604Non-social human beings in the original positionPhilosophical Pathways (205). 2016.This paper argues that Rawls must commit himself to non-social human beings to defend his original position procedure.
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901Descriptive metaphysics, revisionary metaphysics, anti-metaphysicsEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 36-43. 2012.This paper observes that P. F. Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is a baffling one from the perspective of traditional metaphysics. If one thinks of metaphysics as the study of the fundamental nature of reality, it is bewildering to divide up metaphysics in this way. The paper then tries to show how the distinction is no longer bewildering if we deny that such study is possible.
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707Anthropology in the context that produced itMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 6 (1): 347-360. 2014.This paper evaluates a definition of anthropology at home formulated by Marilyn Strathern in her book contribution 'The Limits of Auto-Anthropology'. According to the definition, anthropology at home is anthropology carried out in the social context that produced this discipline. I argue that this is not an adequate definition of anthropology at home.
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362From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual DiversityOrganon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (1): 3-8. 2015.This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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1037The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated RealityE-Logos 19 (1): 2-8. 2012.This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent
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91812This paper presents two accounts of how Oedipus might have arrived at the answer to the Sphinx's riddle by proceeding methodically.
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684Are there uncontroversial error theories?Philosophical Pathways (162). 2011.This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
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447Theory-Laden Experience and IllusionsEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (2): 58-67. 2011.The persistence of certain illusions has been used to argue that some theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. Learning that one of these illusions is an illusion involves accepting theories. Nevertheless, the illusion does not go away. It seems then that these theories cannot affect our perceptual experiences. This paper contests an assumption of this argument: that the only way in which our perceptions can be affected by holding these theories is by the illusion going away.
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1150Torture with consentPhilosophical Pathways (230): 1-3. 2019.There are attempts to define torture which say that a person is only being tortured if the pain inflicted upon them is pain that they have not consented to. In this very brief paper, I recommend that we define torture without this condition.
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455Overlooked systems in S. Baron-Cohen's gender researchIJRDO Journal of Biological Science 5 (6): 1-7. 2019.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen claims that males are on average stronger at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average stronger at empathizing than systematizing. Systematizing is defined as the drive to construct or understand systems. In this paper, I observe that Baron-Cohen overlooks certain examples of systems, examples which lead to doubts about his claim.
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423Did the past really change in 2012?Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (3): 340-344. 2015.There is an intuition that the past does not ever change. In their paper ‘The puzzle of the changing past,’ Luca Barlassina and Fabio Del Prete argue that in 2012 the past changed. I show that we are not in a position to accept their argument.
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1020A solution to the surprise exam paradoxFilozofia 72 (4): 325-327. 2017.The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day; the teacher believes that the exam would be a surprise on that day; but, actually, the exam would not be a surprise on that day. I give a reason to reject this assumption, and I point out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.
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901Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?Accepted for Sorites 22. 2009.In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism. The position that he deems idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. Nagel claims that this position is held by a number of contemporary philosophers. Even if this is so, I justify the view that it is not a form of idealism.
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743The definition of systematizing in S. Baron-Cohen's gender and autism researchPhilosophical Pathways (219): 1-4. 2018.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen is well-known for his thesis that males are on average better at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average better at empathizing than systematizing. In this paper, I note an ambiguity in how he defines systematizing.
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993Do individuals in John Rawls’s original position take into account the fallibility of human nature? Some notable commentators on Rawls say that they do or that they should. But this enables us to say that individuals in the original position would not come to an agreement at all.
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1699Cartesian dualism and the study of cultural artefactsE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (2): 12-18. 2015.This paper evaluates an argument according to which many anthropologists commit themselves to Cartesian dualism, when they talk about meanings. This kind of dualism, it is argued, makes it impossible for anthropologists to adequately attend to material artefacts. The argument is very original, but it is also vulnerable to a range of objections.
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970A Challenge to Social Constructivism about ScienceEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (2): 150-156. 2013.This paper presents a challenge to the coherence of social constructivism about science. It introduces an objection according to which social constructivism appeals to the authority of science regarding the nature of reality and so cannot coherently deny that authority. The challenge is how to avoid this incoherence.
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9534This paper contests a standard interpretation of how Descartes comes to the conclusion that he is not his body in the second meditation. I propose an alternative interpretation in its place.
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769Unintentional ConsentKritike 9 (1): 86-95. 2015.Some political philosophers have judged that it is absurd to think that there can be unintentional consent. In this paper, I present an example of unintentional consent, which I refer to as the adapted boardroom example. I consider reasons for denying that this is an example of unintentional consent, but find that these reasons are unconvincing.
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386On the definition of jealousy and other emotions in Anarchy, State, and UtopiaPhilosophical Pathways 1 (209): 1-3. 2017.This paper responds to an ingenious footnote from Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Using a table of four possible situations, Nozick defines what it is to be jealous, envious, begrudging, spiteful and competitive. I deny a claim that Nozick makes for his table, a claim needed for these definitions. I also point out that Nozick fails to capture what he has in mind by jealousy.
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428From an analysis of the notion of organization to limits on conceptual diversityEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1): 86-94. 2013.This paper evaluates an argument from Donald Davidson against alternative conceptual schemes. The argument can be divided into two stages. In the first stage it is argued that only pluralities can be organized. In the second stage it is argued that if our conceptual scheme organizes a plurality and someone else’s scheme also organizes that plurality, there must be a set of common concepts, hence someone else’s scheme can never be an alternative scheme to ours. I object to the first stage of the …Read more
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237A value-based solution to the surprise exam paradoxPhilosophical Pathways (221): 1-2. 2018.I identify an assumption that the students should not rely on: if the teacher believes that the exam would not be a surprise on a certain day, the teacher will not give the exam on that day. The reason I present for not making this assumption does not involve doubting the moral goodness of the teacher. But it does involve making a value judgment.
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627Nagel on ConceivabilityAbstracta 5 (1): 16-29. 2009.In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject an important example that Nagel offers of a contemporary…Read more
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350Avia Pasternak argues for a right that democracies have to sanction other democracies. This paper reconstructs her argument and objects to one of its premises.
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1362Joseph Raz on the Problem of the AmoralistAbstracta 7 (1): 85-93. 2013.Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these interpretations yields an argument that we are in a position to accept.
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