-
892On ComplacencyAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 43 (4): 343-55. 2006.This paper begins by drawing attention to inadequacies in common characterizations of the vice of complacency. An alternative account is presented that avoids these flaws. The distinctive nature of complacency is then clarified by contrasting it with related vices, including apathy, resignation, akrasia, excessive pride, and hypocrisy.
-
291Is (merely) stalking sentient animals morally wrong?Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2). 2000.Such activities as tracking, watching, and photographing animals are frequently presented as morally superior alternatives to hunting, but could they themselves be morally problematic? In this paper I argue that, despite certain differences from the stalking of humans, a strong case can be made for the prima facie wrongness of stalking sentient animals. The chief harm of stalking is the fear and altered patterns of behavior which it forces upon its victims.
-
33Dale Jamieson, Ethics and the Environment (review)Environmental Ethics 31 (3): 333-336. 2009.A short book review of Dale Jamieson's "Ethics and the Environment"
-
2839The experience machine and mental state theories of well-beingJournal of Value Inquiry 33 (3): 381-387. 1999.It is argued that Nozick's experience machine thought experiment does not pose a particular difficulty for mental state theories of well-being. While the example shows that we value many things beyond our mental states, this simply reflects the fact that we value more than our own well-being. Nor is a mental state theorist forced to make the dubious claim that we maintain these other values simply as a means to desirable mental states. Valuing more than our mental states is compatible with maint…Read more
-
766Promising and supererogationPhilosophia 32 (1-4): 389-398. 2005.A paradox involving promises to perform supererogatory actions is developed. Several attempts to resolve the problem, focusing in particular on changing our understanding of supererogatory actions, are explored. It is concluded that none of the proposed solutions are viable; the problem lies in promises with certain contents, not in our understanding of supererogation.
-
1796Moral Realism and ArbitrarinessSouthern Journal of Philosophy 43 (1): 109-129. 2005.In this paper I argue (i) that choosing to abide by realist moral norms would be as arbitrary as choosing to abide by the mere preferences of a God (a difficulty akin to the Euthyphro dilemma raised for divine command theorists); in both cases we would lack reason to prefer these standards to alternative codes of conduct. I further develop this general line of thought by arguing in particular (ii) that we would lack any noncircular justification to concern ourselves with any such realist normati…Read more
-
308Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro, Environmental Virtue Ethics (review)Environmental Ethics 28 (4): 429-32. 2006.A short review of "Environmental Virtue Ethics" (2005), a collection edited by Ronald Sandler and Philip Cafaro.
-
1608Autonomy, agency, and the value of enduring beliefsCanadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1). 2010.My central thesis is that philosophers considering questions of epistemic value ought to devote greater attention to the enduring nature of beliefs. I begin by arguing that a commonly drawn analogy between beliefs and actions is flawed in important respects, and that a better, more fruitful analogue for belief would be desire, or a similarly enduring state of an agent. With this in hand, I argue that treating beliefs as enduring, constitutive states of agents allows us to capture the importance …Read more
-
29Alan Thomas, Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (9). 2007.This is, surprisingly enough, a review of Alan Thomas' "Value and Context: The Nature of Moral and Political Knowledge". A very nice book. More details in the review itself.
-
1250Other–regarding epistemic virtuesRatio 15 (3). 2002.Epistemologists often assume that an agent’s epistemic goal is simply to acquire as much knowledge as possible for herself. Drawing on an analogy with ethics and other practices, I argue that being situated in an epistemic community introduces a range of epistemic virtues (and goals) which fall outside of those typically recognized by both individualistic and social epistemologists. Candidate virtues include such traits as honesty, integrity (including an unwillingness to misuse one’s status as …Read more
-
1591Friendship and epistemic normsPhilosophical Studies 165 (2): 349-370. 2013.Simon Keller and Sarah Stroud have both argued that the demands of being a good friend can conflict with the demands of standard epistemic norms. Intuitively, good friends will tend to seek favorable interpretations of their friends’ behaviors, interpretations that they would not apply to strangers; as such they seem prone to form unjustified beliefs. I argue that there is no such clash of norms. In particular, I argue that friendship does not require us to form beliefs about our friends in the …Read more
Hamilton, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Normative Ethics |
Environmental Ethics |
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Areas of Interest
1 more
Epistemology |
Aesthetics |
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Value Theory, Miscellaneous |
PhilPapers Editorships
10 more