James O. Young

Some writers have objected to cultural appropriation in the arts on the grounds that it violates cultures’ property rights. Recently a paper by Erich Matthes and another by C. Thi Nguyen and Matthew Strohl have argued that cultural appropriation does not violate property rights but that it is nevertheless often objectionable. Matthes argues that cultural appropriation contributes to the oppression of disadvantaged cultures. Nguyen and Strohl argue that it violated the intimacy of cultures. This paper argues that neither Matthes nor Nguyen and Strohl succeed in showing that cultural appropriation is often objectionable.

Many philosophers have claimed that reading literary fiction makes people more virtuous. This essay begins by defending the view that this claim is empirical. It goes on to review the empirical literature and finds that this literature supports the claim philosophers have made. Three mechanisms are identified whereby reading literary fiction makes people more virtuous: empathy is increased when readers enter imaginatively into the lives of fictional characters; reading literary fiction promotes self-reflection; and readers mimic the prosocial behaviour of fictional characters. The paper concludes with a caution: there is a danger that readers could mimic antisocial behaviour displayed in literary fiction. If they do, reading some literary fiction could make readers less virtuous.

This book is an exploration of “affective attachment,” which Singer describes as “the part of affective life which is pertinent to the phenomenon of attachment.” Affective attachment includes sex, love, and compassion. It is difficult to summarize Singer’s views on this topic. Singer sees the book as a systematic exploration of affective attachment, “a single unfolding of speculative thought.” At the same time he allows that he finds “that our affective being is so mercurial that touching on it at a single point quickly precipitates volatile excursions that often rebound in unforeseeable directions”. Whether or not Singer is right, his many excursions give the book more of the character of a philosophical commonplace book than a systematic treatise. A short review cannot do justice to all of the rich detail of this book and is bound to make it seem more systematic than it is.

_The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation_ undertakes a comprehensive and systematic investigation of the moral and aesthetic questions that arise from the practice of cultural appropriation. Explores cultural appropriation in a wide variety of contexts, among them the arts and archaeology, museums, and religion Questions whether cultural appropriation is always morally objectionable Includes research that is equally informed by empirical knowledge and general normative theory Provides a coherent and authoritative perspective gained by the collaboration of philosophers and specialists in the field who all participated in this unique research project

It has long been known that Jean-Baptiste Du Bos exercised a considerable influence on Hume’s essays and, in particular, on the ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ and ‘Of Tragedy’. It has also been noted that some passages in the Treatise bear marks of Du Bos’ influence. In this essay, we identify many more passages in the Treatise that bear unmistakable signs of Du Bos’ influence. We demonstrate that Du Bos certainly had a significant impact on Hume as he wrote the Treatise. We go on to argue that Hume’s views on morality are an extension to the moral realm of Du Bos’ views on beauty and criticism. Du Bos may also have influenced Hume’s distinction between ideas and impressions.

In at least one respect, classical music is superior to popular music. Classical music has greater potential for expressiveness and, consequently, has more potential for psychological insight and profundity. The greater potential for expressiveness in classical music is due, in large part, to it greater harmonic resources. The harmonies in classical music are more likely to be functional, more contrary motion is employed, and modulation is more common. Although popular music employs rhythms not found in classical music, on the whole there is less rhythmic variety in popular music than there is in classical.

An answer is provided to the question of the conditions under which sentences are true. Realists claim that reality provides the truth conditions of sentences. Realism is rejected. An anti-realist position according to which truth is relative to the theories of linguistic communities is adopted. A sentence is true if and only if warranted by theories held to be correct by a community. ;Many of the standard objections to anti-realism and relativist positions are considered and refuted. Anti-realism is not self-refuting. The discovery that a sentence is warranted and yet false does not refute the theory that truth is warrant in a theory; such a discovery presupposes tacit appeal to some other theory. Realism is not required for the explanation of cognitive success. ;Following Michael Dummett, the question of what speakers know when they understand a sentence is posed. Speakers understand a sentence when they are able to apply to it the concepts of truth and falsity. Dummett's empiricist account of the conditions under which the concepts of truth and falsity are applied to sentences is rejected. These conditions are provided by the theories, not the experiences, which would warrant sentences. It is shown that all that speakers can know when they understand a sentence is that it is true if some theory, which warrants it, is correct. The concepts of truth and falsity are, therefore, applied to sentences on the basis of a knowledge of the theories which would warrant them. Theories, not reality, provide the truth conditions of sentences

Peter Kivy argues that Handel was the first composer to be regarded as a genius and that only in the eighteenth century was the philosophical apparatus in place that would enable any composer to be conceived of as a musical genius. According to Kivy, a Longinian conception of genius transformed Handel into a genius. A Platonic conception of genius was used to classify Mozart as a genius. Then Kant adopted a Longinian conception of genius and this shaped the perception of Beethoven. Kivy is wrong on all counts. Composers were thought to be geniuses long before Handel. The emergence of philosophical aesthetics in the eighteenth century did little to shape conceptions of musical genius. More specifically, Kivy misrepresents Kant's conception of genius and the role that it plays in the recognition of Beethoven as a musical genius