Ana Marta Gonzalez

I examine all the occasions on which Aquinas uses a particular example, which goes back to Plato's Republic, to shed light on the controversial subject of the immutability of natural law. Aquinas usually transcribes it as depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso, although some variations also occur. We shall first look at the context in which Plato situates this idea, then go on to examine the occasions on which Aquinas draws on it: in the Summa, when discussing the question as to whether the natural law is the same for everyone; in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, when he explains in what sense natural law may change, and in what sense it remains the same; and finally, where he examines the virtues of gnome and epieikeia, also in the Summa.

Hablar de ciencia moral es equívoco, pues depende del concepto de ciencia que manejemos, clásico, moderno o contemporáneo. Por otra parte, aun si aceptamos la posibilidad de una ciencia moral, queda pendiente la cuestión de su estatuto epistemológico: si es una ciencia práctica, si es una ciencia especulativa, y, en todo caso, qué relación guarda con la metafísica. En este artículo se examinan estos tres temas en el pensamiento de Santo Tomás de Aquino, teniendo presentes las objeciones que se han planteado dentro y fuera del tomismo.

I explore Hume’s argument for the existence of government, in which he articulates psychological and social elements. Given the human tendency to satisfy the proximate above the remote interests, the fulfilment of the rules of justice, which makes social cooperation possible, must be warranted by the artifice of government. Once the government is in place, it also performs a coordinating function, which strengthens preexistent activities, such as commerce. Indirectly, the government fulfils also a civilizing function Resumen. Se explora el argumento con el que Hume justifica la existencia del gobierno, articulando elementos psicológicos y sociales. Dada la tendencia natural a satisfacer antes los intereses próximos que los remotos, el cumplimiento de las normas de justicia, que hace posible una cooperación social efectiva, debe remediarse mediante un artificio, el gobierno. Una vez introducido, cumple también una función coordinadora, que potencia las actividades que naturalmente le preceden, especialmente el comercio. Indirectamente, ejerce también una función civilizadora.

La idea moderna de derechos humanos y el concepto clásico de ley natural no son equivalentes. Ciertamente comparten la idea de que no toda ley es convencional. Pero más allá de esto, la noción clásica de ley natural es definida claramente en el marco de las virtudes y, consecuentemente, tiene una orientación más práctica y está atada más de cerca a la historia; la noción de derechos humanos, que han heredado las teorías modernas de los derechos naturales, conduce a la subjetivación del concepto de derecho y tiende a separar al ser humano de su contexto histórico y político, donde los eventos se llevan a cabo. En ese sentido, el concepto clave asociado con los derechos humanos es aquel de “dignidad”. Dado que las dos ideas tienen diferentes puntos de partida y son diferentes en su estatuto epistemológico, no hay, estrictamente hablando, fundamento alguno para imaginar una síntesis de las dos teorías. En el plano teórico sólo podemos hablar de su complementariedad. La síntesis es algo que sólo surgirá en la práctica.

In this article, I explore the way in which Korsgaard’s approach to obligation as springing from the reflective rejection of that which threatens one’s own identity can account for obligations towards others, without making the latter relative to obligations to oneself. To this end, I begin by stressing the role of reflexivity in ethical relationships, and show how this reflexivity is mediated by reference to law, which applies both to the self and to the other. On this basis, I then argue that Korsgaard’s account of the interplay between practical and moral identity reflects the very structure of practical reason, which requires both a particular and a universal premise in order to issue practical reasons for action– and the corresponding obligations. Within this framework, I argue that Korsgaard’s solution to the problem outlined above lies in having stressed the shareable character of reasons such that it is neither your reason nor my reason that obligates me, but rather reason as such. This solution, however, requires a further argument aimed at clarifying what makes your reasons different from my own.

In this article I argue the relevance of natural law for framing and addressing ethical issues raised by the practice of business in a global context. There are historical, as well as systematic reasons for this. On the historical side, it can be argued that the origin of modern economics is linked to a cultural context, still influenced by modern natural law theories. Thus, even if Hume’s moral theory is everything but a natural law theory, either in the traditional or the modern sense, his “laws of nature” (fixation of property, rules for its transference, and promises) represent a systematization of the rules of justice necessary to preserve the space of economic freedom required for development of a commercial society. This systematization is in line with the classical approach to natural law, which nevertheless presents further advantages for developing an ethical approach to economic activity, since it brings with itself a conception of economic agency richer than that of Hume: a conception that is not necessarily linked to pursuit self-interest, but rather is inspired by ethical motives right from the start. Indeed, on the systematic side, the classical natural law is seen as the law of practical reason: a set of principles in charge of inspiring both virtuous action and legal practice, so that we can realize the human good. Assuming the embodied and social nature of human beings, as well as the various cultural realizations of humanity, a natural law approach to ethics is in a position to stimulate a dynamic and bottomup articulation of the personal and common good, concern for progress and sustainable development, universal principles and cultural variations.

This paper focuses on the third chapter of Fides et ratio, entitled Intellego ut credam This sentence is usually connected with the preambula fidei, truths which are supposed to prepare human mind to receive the gift of faith. But in this case, Pope John Paul II develops this sentence in a different, more existential way according to which the real preambula fidei are not so much a set of truths as the real man who seeks the truth with his entire life. This interpretation remarks the practical dimmension of the relationship between man and truth

Qué es la ética, cuál es su objeto, en qué relación se encuentran moralidad y felicidad, qué diferencia hay -si es que la hay-, entre ética y moral, así como el recorrido histórico que permite comprender la frecuente diferenciación de ambos términos, o de qué modo cabe plantear la enseñanza de la ética en una sociedad pluralista, son cuestiones que, de un modo u otro, gravitan sobre nuestras discusiones éticas. Si, como ya viene siendo habitual observar, nuestros conflictos y desacuerdos éticos obedecen en gran medida a que ni siquiera estamos en claro acerca de la naturaleza de nuestros desacuerdos, explorar cuestiones como las que acabo de indicar es una tarea inexcusable. A este respecto, y en abierto contraste con una visión muy extendida, que tiende a presentar la ética como si fuera un recetario o un prontuario para resolución de conflictos morales, los estudios recogidos en este volumen nos recuerdan que la ética es ante todo una disciplina filosófica, y, por tanto, una tarea reflexiva, que partiendo de la experiencia del obrar humano, no persigue otra cosa que comprenderla mejor, con el fin de contribuir a la consistencia y dirección del obrar humano.

The purpose of this paper is to view Kant's approach to education in the broader context of Kant's philosophy of culture and history as a process whose direction should be reflectively assumed by human freedom, in the light of man's moral vocation. In this context, some characteristic tensions of his enlightened approach to education appear. Thus, while Kant takes the educational process to be a radically moral enterprise all the way through—and hence, placed in a relational context—he also aspires to constitute education as a science, to be improved through experiments, thereby paving the way for a systemic approach to education; in spite of its moral inspiration, his systemic approach not only could enter into conflict with the moral demand of taking each individual subject as an end, but is also marked by an intrinsic paradox, already involved in the ambiguity of the term ‘humanity’, which might mean a) humanity as a moral disposition present in each individual human being or b) humanity as a whole, as the ‘human species’

This book brings together a number of contributions dealing with certain fundamental structures of practical rationality, as they are presented in the areas of the philosophy of action and normative ethics, namely: intentionality, normativity, and reflexivity. With the term “intentionality,” is meant a set of problems that are linked not only with the teleological structure of praxis-oriented rationality, but also with its temporal structure. “Normativity”, in turn, refers to a distinct set of problems, which cannot simply be reduced to those entailed in the intentional nature of human action, even if this notion incorporates a reference to the good or value in its very structure. Finally, with the term “reflexivity” we point at the linkage between the normative dimension of reason with both the contingent circumstances of action and the moral receptivity of the agent, as it is experienced in moral judgment.

The contemporary confluence of globalization and ethical pluralism is at the origin of many ethical challenges that confront business nowadays, both in practice and in theory. One of the challenges arising from the development of globalization has to do with respect for cultural diversity. It is often said that the success of economic globalization tends towards social and cultural homogeneity. To the extent that cultural diversity is usually seen as a valuable reality, that global trend seems to contradict our efforts to respect ethical pluralism, both personal and cultural, within society. In this paper I argue that (a) ethical minimalism, despite its emphasis on tolerance and justice, does not take pluralism seriously into account in present-day society, and (b) ethical minimalism is not suited to balancing the homogenizing trend of globalization. Certainly ethical norms are necessary, but by no means are they sufficient in themselves to encourage either justice or tolerance; nor are they sufficient to inspire and encourage good practices and sound regulations. Instead, virtue-based ethics has the capacity of inspiring and encouraging good practices. Particularly, virtue-based ethics is able to inspire a serious dialogue about ethical and legal issues both in the public arena and within organizations.

Además del concepto explícito de cultura como perfeccionamiento de la naturaleza, que podemos reconocer en muchos lugares del corpus kantiano, la entera empresa crítica puede considerarse cultura en un sentido más profundo: cultura como proyección de una subjetividad que busca en la naturaleza los indicios del destino racional y moral del hombre. Según esto, la filosofía kantiana puede verse como una filosofía de la cultura, posible, en última instancia, por la reflexividad de la razón, que advierte sus propios intereses, y configura el mundo conforme a ellos

Se explora la justificación que ofrece Hume del gobierno en dos momentos, y, a partir de ahí, los argumentos con los que pretende salvar la posibilidad de la resistencia civil sin afirmar tajantemente un derecho a la resistencia. Para ello pone en juego su distinción entre obligación natural —u obligación de interés—y obligación moral —-avalada por el sentimiento. Al hilo de esta distinción puede señalarse un criterio para distinguir normalidad y excepción, y, eventualmente, el tipo de situación que podría respaldar acciones de resistencia civil.

In the following pages, our specific aim is to show how Hume’s analysis of justice provides the occasion for the gradual display of some key elements of a psychosocial action theory, which lay the foundations for later social thinking. RESUMEN: En lo que sigue, nuestro objetivo específico es mostrar cómo el análisis que realiza Hume de la justicia proporciona la ocasión para introducir de manera gradual elementos clave para el desarrollo de una teoría psico-social de la acción, presupuesta en buena parte del pensamiento social posterior.

Mientras que la interpretación tradicional de Tomás de Aquino había mantenido durante siglos que la ética tenía un fundamento en la naturaleza, apostando, en consecuencia, por una ética secundum naturam, contemporáneamente, en parte por la influencia anglosajona, pero también por la avalancha de estudios históricos y críticos sobre la obra del Aquinate, la tendencia se ha invertido, y se ha considerado preciso interpretar la ética tomista como una ética secundum rationem, poniendo el acento en la racionalidad práctica y no tanto en la naturaleza. La corrección tiene cierto sabor kantiano, pero en principio parece fiel al propio planteamiento tomista, y parece conjurar asimismo el peligro de transgredir la llamada «ley de Hume», que denunciaba como ilegítimo el tránsito de enunciados de hecho a enunciados de deber. A pesar de la justificable insistencia en lo secundum rationem, mi opinión es que asistimos a un nuevo desequilibrio, consistente en pasar por alto el efectivo fundamento natural de la moral tomista que, con mayor o menor acierto, destacaba la tradición. Ciertamente, sobre la naturaleza como criterio de moralidad pesan muchas objeciones, pero es dudoso que éstas afecten realmente a lo que Tomás de Aquino entendía por naturaleza. En este libro se examina este concepto en su pensamiento, así como la conexión entre la naturaleza y el obrar moral.

This book attempts a conceptual clarification of Kant’s approach to culture, given the lack of systematic study of this aspect of his thought. At its origin there was only a thematic interest in the manifold meanings of the term “culture”, as well as the underlying persuasion that Kant’s moral philosophy could provide us with a systematic framework to understand the increasing relevance of “culture” in modern thought. Specifically, the hypothesis was that the emergence of culture as a relatively autonomous realm was implied in Kant’s refusal to let nature play a role in the constitution of the moral norm, and his requirement that the moral norm be defined through pure reason alone. As a result, culture would appear as a middle terrain: being neither empirical nature nor pure morality. Accordingly, culture can be approached either from the perspective of nature, or from the perspective of morality. Both approaches represent what can be termed “Kant’s explicit account of culture”. Behind this explicit, two-fold account of culture, however, an implicit account of culture in terms of “projection of man’s subjectivity” can be discovered. This latter account, itself a consequence of the critical enterprise, constitutes Kant’s most original contribution to the philosophy of culture.

Although Kant is not usually counted among the forerunners of social sciences, any look at the work of the most prominent social theorists of the past century shows the pervasive influence of Kant's philosophy. This influence is obvious and crucial at the epistemological level, if only because Kant himself set the frame for subsequent discussion of the difference between human and natural sciences. Yet, Kant's work is also rich in substantive contributions to social theory, which may be articulated around his conception of culture and cultural progress.

After many years drawing attention to the differences between Aristotelian and Kantian Ethics, recent scholarship tends to stress their commonalties instead. Among the authors representing this trend of contemporary moral philosophy, Christine Korsgaard has undoubtedly a leading role. Without denying the differences existing between them, Korsgaard has been particularly keen on calling our attention to their shared views.Yet Korsgaard herself has acknowledged an obvious difference between Aristotle and Kant, regarding their approach to emotions : unlike Kant, Aristotle does not think of inclinations and emotions as mere feelings, but rather as valuable sources of information about morally salient aspects of our situation. In other words : they provide us with (germinal) reasons for action. Korsgaard, however, keeps this difference at the level of moral psychology, arguing that it does not make a great difference at the level of ethical theory. Now, this is precisely what I find controversial. My point is that this sort of difference imports a more fundamental one about practical reason in its entirety, a difference which used to be preserved in Kant’s own reference to a “pure practical reason” – against which Aristotle’s might be called “impure practical reason”.

El uso habitual del lenguaje reconocía hasta hace todavía relativamente poco tiempo un sentido ético-normativo en los términos "natural" y "naturaleza". De un tiempo a esta parte, sin embargo, ha penetrado profunda¬mente en el sentido común epocal la idea de la diferenciación del hombre con respecto a la naturaleza. De ahí que, ante la invitación a secundar la naturaleza, no sea infrecuente escuchar la respuesta: "¿por qué? ¡si yo soy un ser racional, una persona!". Esta mentalidad coexiste culturalmente con la cre¬ciente conciencia ecológica, que puede interpretarse como una invitación a considerarnos de nuevo como seres naturales. La invitación nos llega cuando ya hemos aprendido a vernos como seres libres, y a defender nuestra libertad; cuando en el discurso ético, términos como "dignidad" y "persona" han pasado a desempeñar el papel privilegiado que en otro tiempo desempeñaba el término "naturaleza": la fuerza retórica que en otro tiempo tenía el término "naturaleza", la tiene hoy el término "libertad". El reto es ahora conciliar el logro principal de la filosofía moderna –somos libertad– con la herencia clásica -somos naturaleza-. La tesis que se defiende en este trabajo es que, lejos de representar un obstáculo para la dignidad y la libertad real del hombre, la apelación a la naturaleza es lo único que garantiza que el término dignidad sea algo más que una palabra cargada de fuerza retórica para los occidentales.

RESUMEN:En este trabajo se analiza el modo en que Kant distingue entre sentimiento y emoción, por un lado, y emoción y pasión, por otro, para mostrar: 1) que bajo el término “emoción” Kant entiende principalmente la afección orgánica privada de contenido cognitivo, aunque precedida y seguida de representaciones; 2) que la emoción constituye un elemento integral de lo que Kant denomina “sentimiento”, término del que se sirve para designar la dimensión subjetiva de la experiencia en sentido amplio, no limitado a la afección empírica; 3) que su concepción negativa de la pasión justifica la posterior distinción entre emoción y pasión introducida en los estudios científicos. ABSTRACT:In this article I analyze Kant’s distinction between feeling and emotion, on the one hand, and emotion and passion, on the other. The objective is to show: 1) that by the term “emotion” he understands organic affection, deprived of cognitive content, although preceded and followed by representations; 2) that emotion so understood constitutes for Kant an integral part of “feeling”, by which Kant designates the subjective dimension of experience, in a broad sense, which is not limited to empirical affection; 3) that his negative approach to passion justifies the sharp distinction between emotion and passion introduced in scientific studies of emotion