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119Conceptual analysis and x-phiSynthese 193 (8). 2016.This paper does two things. First, it argues for a metaphilosophical view of conceptual analysis questions; in particular, it argues that the facts that settle conceptual-analysis questions are facts about the linguistic intentions of ordinary folk. The second thing this paper does is argue that if this metaphilosophical view is correct, then experimental philosophy is a legitimate methodology to use in trying to answer conceptual-analysis questions
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36Azzouni Jody. Metaphysical myths, mathematical practice. The ontology and epistemology of the exact sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, and Oakleigh, Victoria, 1994, ix + 249 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4): 1312-1314. 1995.
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48Reply to DieterlePhilosophia Mathematica 8 (3): 310-315. 2000.In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity
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358Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematicsOxford University Press. 1998.In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by ar…Read more
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161A theory of mathematical correctness and mathematical truthPacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2). 2001.A theory of objective mathematical correctness is developed. The theory is consistent with both mathematical realism and mathematical anti-realism, and versions of realism and anti-realism are developed that dovetail with the theory of correctness. It is argued that these are the best versions of realism and anti-realism and that the theory of correctness behind them is true. Along the way, it is shown that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the question of whether undecidable sentences lik…Read more
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356Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinismSynthese 168 (1). 2009.This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this…Read more
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45Realistic rationalism [1998]: Can we know that platonism is true?Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4). 2003.Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:…Read more
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269Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?Philosophical Studies 154 (1): 53-78. 2011.It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. …Read more
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95Review of Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, by M. ResnikPhilosophia Mathematica 7 (1): 108-126. 1999.
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104Against (maddian) naturalized platonismPhilosophia Mathematica 2 (2): 97-108. 1994.It is argued here that mathematical objects cannot be simultaneously abstract and perceptible. Thus, naturalized versions of mathematical platonism, such as the one advocated by Penelope Maddy, are unintelligble. Thus, platonists cannot respond to Benacerrafian epistemological arguments against their view vias Maddy-style naturalization. Finally, it is also argued that naturalized platonists cannot respond to this situation by abandoning abstractness (that is, platonism); they must abandon perce…Read more
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222Platonism in metaphysicsStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects — where an abstract object is an object that does not exist in space or time and which is therefore entirely non-physical and nonmental. Platonism in this sense is a contemporary view. It is obviously related to the views of Plato in important ways, but it is not entirely clear that Plato endorsed this view, as it is defined here. In order to remain neutral on this question, the term ‘platonism’ is spelled with a lower-case ‘…Read more
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413Free Will as an Open Scientific ProblemMIT Press, Bradford. 2010.In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertaria…Read more
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374Attitudes without propositionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 805-26. 1998.This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'…Read more
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120Review: Stewart Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1): 89-91. 2002.
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20Realistic Rationalism [1998]: Can We Know That Platonism is True? (review)Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4): 459-476. 2003.Book reviewed:Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism.
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190Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal OntologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1): 145-167. 2016.This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true. Finally, the paper …Read more
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285The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis)Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 1-24. 2010.It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision‐making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual‐analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also …Read more
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175Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief AscriptionsSynthese 146 (3): 325-355. 2005.I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worrie…Read more
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24Attitudes Without PropositionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 805-826. 1998.This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing ‘that’-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form ‘x believes that p’ and ‘σ means that p’. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that ‘that’-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) ‘that’…Read more
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396A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free willNoûs 36 (3): 379-406. 2002.Let libertarianism be the view that humans are capable of making decisions that are simultaneously undetermined and appropriately non-random. It’s often argued that this view is incoherent because indeterminacy entails randomness (of some appropriate kind). I argue here that the truth is just the opposite: the right kind of indeterminacy in our decisions actually entails appropriate non-randomness, so that libertarianism is coherent, and the question of whether it’s true reduces to the wide-op…Read more
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97Reply to Armour-GarbPhilosophia Mathematica 19 (3): 345-348. 2011.Hermeneutic non-assertivism is a thesis that mathematical fictionalists might want to endorse in responding to a recent objection due to John Burgess. Brad Armour-Garb has argued that hermeneutic non-assertivism is false. A response is given here to Armour-Garb's argument
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2Mathematical platonismIn Bonnie Gold & Roger Simons (eds.), Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy, Mathematical Association of America. pp. 179--204. 2008.
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