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378Attitudes without propositionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 805-26. 1998.This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing `that'-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form `x believes that p' and `σ means that p'. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that `that'-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) `that'…Read more
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122Review: Stewart Shapiro, Thinking about Mathematics. The Philosophy of Mathematics (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (1): 89-91. 2002.
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20Realistic Rationalism [1998]: Can We Know That Platonism is True? (review)Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4): 459-476. 2003.Book reviewed:Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism.
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194Anti‐Metaphysicalism, Necessity, and Temporal OntologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1): 145-167. 2016.This paper argues for a certain kind of anti-metaphysicalism about the temporal ontology debate, i.e., the debate between presentists and eternalists over the existence of past and future objects. Three different kinds of anti-metaphysicalism are defined—namely, non-factualism, physical-empiricism, and trivialism. The paper argues for the disjunction of these three views. It is then argued that trivialism is false, so that either non-factualism or physical-empiricism is true. Finally, the paper …Read more
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287The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis)Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 1-24. 2010.It is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision‐making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual‐analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also …Read more
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179Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief AscriptionsSynthese 146 (3): 325-355. 2005.I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worrie…Read more
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25Attitudes Without PropositionsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 805-826. 1998.This paper develops a novel version of anti-platonism, called semantic fictionalism. The view is a response to the platonist argument that we need to countenance propositions to account for the truth of sentences containing ‘that’-clause singular terms, e.g., sentences of the form ‘x believes that p’ and ‘σ means that p’. Briefly, the view is that (a) platonists are right that ‘that’-clauses purport to refer to propositions, but (b) there are no such things as propositions, and hence, (c) ‘that’…Read more
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402A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free willNoûs 36 (3): 379-406. 2002.Let libertarianism be the view that humans are capable of making decisions that are simultaneously undetermined and appropriately non-random. It’s often argued that this view is incoherent because indeterminacy entails randomness (of some appropriate kind). I argue here that the truth is just the opposite: the right kind of indeterminacy in our decisions actually entails appropriate non-randomness, so that libertarianism is coherent, and the question of whether it’s true reduces to the wide-op…Read more
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102Reply to Armour-GarbPhilosophia Mathematica 19 (3): 345-348. 2011.Hermeneutic non-assertivism is a thesis that mathematical fictionalists might want to endorse in responding to a recent objection due to John Burgess. Brad Armour-Garb has argued that hermeneutic non-assertivism is false. A response is given here to Armour-Garb's argument
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2Mathematical platonismIn Bonnie Gold & Roger Simons (eds.), Proof and Other Dilemmas: Mathematics and Philosophy, Mathematical Association of America. pp. 179--204. 2008.
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348Fictionalism in the philosophy of mathematicsStanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.Mathematical fictionalism (or as I'll call it, fictionalism) is best thought of as a reaction to mathematical platonism. Platonism is the view that (a) there exist abstract mathematical objects (i.e., nonspatiotemporal mathematical objects), and (b) our mathematical sentences and theories provide true descriptions of such objects. So, for instance, on the platonist view, the sentence ‘3 is prime’ provides a straightforward description of a certain object—namely, the number 3—in much the same way…Read more
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151A Solution to the Paradox of AnalysisAnalysis 76 (1): 3-7. 2016.The paradox of analysis asks how a putative conceptual analysis can be both true and informative. If it is true then isn’t it analytic? And if it is analytic then how can it be informative? Our proposed solution rests on a distinction between explicit knowledge of meaning and implicit knowledge of meaning and on a correlative distinction between two kinds of conceptual competence. If one initially possesses only implicit knowledge of the meaning of a given concept and the associated linguistic e…Read more
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258Why metaphysical debates are not merely verbalSynthese 197 (3): 1181-1201. 2020.A number of philosophers have argued in recent years that certain kinds of metaphysical debates—e.g., debates over the existence of past and future objects, mereological sums, and coincident objects—are merely verbal. It is argued in this paper that metaphysical debates are not merely verbal. The paper proceeds by uncovering and describing a pattern that can be found in a very wide range of philosophical problems and then explaining how, in connection with any problem of this general kind, there…Read more
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41Review of Mark Balaguer: Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4): 775-780. 1999.
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120Conceptual analysis and x-phiSynthese 193 (8). 2016.This paper does two things. First, it argues for a metaphilosophical view of conceptual analysis questions; in particular, it argues that the facts that settle conceptual-analysis questions are facts about the linguistic intentions of ordinary folk. The second thing this paper does is argue that if this metaphilosophical view is correct, then experimental philosophy is a legitimate methodology to use in trying to answer conceptual-analysis questions
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37Azzouni Jody. Metaphysical myths, mathematical practice. The ontology and epistemology of the exact sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, and Oakleigh, Victoria, 1994, ix + 249 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 60 (4): 1312-1314. 1995.
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51Reply to DieterlePhilosophia Mathematica 8 (3): 310-315. 2000.In this paper, I respond to an objection that Jill Dieterle has raised to two arguments in my book, Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. Dieterle argues that because I reject the notion of metaphysical necessity, I cannot rely upon the notion of supervenience, as I in fact do in two places in the book. I argue that Dieterle is mistaken about this by showing that neither of the two supervenience theses that I endorse requires a notion of metaphysical necessity
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362Platonism and anti-Platonism in mathematicsOxford University Press. 1998.In this book, Balaguer demonstrates that there are no good arguments for or against mathematical platonism. He does this by establishing that both platonism and anti-platonism are defensible views. Introducing a form of platonism ("full-blooded platonism") that solves all problems traditionally associated with the view, he proceeds to defend anti-platonism (in particular, mathematical fictionalism) against various attacks, most notably the Quine-Putnam indispensability attack. He concludes by ar…Read more
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164A theory of mathematical correctness and mathematical truthPacific Philosophical Quarterly 82 (2). 2001.A theory of objective mathematical correctness is developed. The theory is consistent with both mathematical realism and mathematical anti-realism, and versions of realism and anti-realism are developed that dovetail with the theory of correctness. It is argued that these are the best versions of realism and anti-realism and that the theory of correctness behind them is true. Along the way, it is shown that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the question of whether undecidable sentences lik…Read more
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358Why there are no good arguments for any interesting version of determinismSynthese 168 (1). 2009.This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this…Read more
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46Realistic rationalism [1998]: Can we know that platonism is true?Philosophical Forum 34 (3-4). 2003.Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:;Jerrold J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism;Book reviewed:…Read more
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272Is there a fact of the matter between direct reference theory and (neo-)Fregeanism?Philosophical Studies 154 (1): 53-78. 2011.It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. …Read more
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