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12The logical and the extra-logicalIn R. S. Cohen & Marx W. Wartofsky (eds.), Methodological and historical essays in the natural and social sciences, Reidel. pp. 235--252. 1974.
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31On Concepts of Truth in Natural LanguagesReview of Metaphysics 23 (2). 1969.The purpose Tarski speaks of is "to do justice to our intuitions which adhere to the classical Aristotelian conception of truth." Tarski takes this to be some form of correspondence theory. He has earlier considered and rejected an even less satisfactory formula of this sort: 'a sentence is true if it corresponds to reality'. His own semantic conception of truth is meant to be a more precise variant doing justice to the correspondence standpoint. In this spirit I shall presently suggest a revise…Read more
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46Vice & virtue in everyday life: introductory readings in ethics (edited book)Harcourt College Publishers. 1997." Vice and virtue in everyday life is a bestseller in college ethics because students find the readings both personally engaging and intellectually challenging. Under the guidance of classical and modern writers on morality, students using this textbook come to grips with moral issues of everyday life. They discover that some currently fashionable approaches to morality, such as egoism and relativism, have long histories. They also become aquainted with the debates and criticisms of various mora…Read more
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49Ratiocination: An empirical accountRatio 21 (2). 2008.Modern thinkers regard logic as a purely formal discipline like number theory, and not to be confused with any empirical discipline such as cognitive psychology, which may seek to characterize how people actually reason. Opposed to this is the traditional view that even a formal logic can be cognitively veridical – descriptive of procedures people actually follow in arriving at their deductive judgments (logic as Laws of Thought). In a cognitively veridical logic, any formal proof that a deducti…Read more
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51The world, the facts, and primary logicNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 34 (2): 169-182. 1993.
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144Dissonant beliefsAnalysis 69 (2): 267-274. 2009.1. Philosophers tend to talk of belief as a ‘propositional attitude.’ As Fodor says:" The standard story about believing is that it's a two place relation, viz., a relation between a person and a proposition. My story is that believing is never an unmediated relation between a person and a proposition. In particular nobody grasps a proposition except insofar as he is appropriately related to some vehicle that expresses the proposition. " Fodor's story – that belief is a three-place relation betw…Read more
Waltham, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |